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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the entry of renewable energy technologies 
into Pacific Islands’ electricity markets, with particular focus on a new technology: the 
Pelamis, a wave energy converter. Pacific Islands are endowed with various types of 
renewable energy resources, yet they remain highly dependent on expensive fuel imports 
for their energy requirements, using little renewable energy. This paradox is investigated 
by studying the characteristics of Pacific Islands’ electricity markets, including a case-
study on the entry of a new renewable energy technology, the Pelamis, into the electricity 
market of Hawaii. The integration of renewable energy technologies into Pacific Islands’ 
electricity systems is then analysed from the point of view of an energy planner. The 
recent application of portfolio analysis to energy planning has provided a new framework 
to evaluate the different electricity generating options available to energy planners. 
Taking both the generating cost and financial risk of each technology into account, 
portfolio theory has been applied to various European countries, by comparing actual 
generation portfolios to an efficient frontier showing the trade-off between energy 
security and the cost of electricity generation. This framework has clear relevance to 
Pacific Island Countries. However, the characteristics inherent to Pacific Island Countries 
have important implications on the operation of their electricity systems, which are not 
necessarily taken into account in portfolio analysis. In particular, geographical isolation 
inhibits these countries from connecting to larger intercontinental grids, which 
emphasizes the importance of reliability of supply. This thesis presents a mathematical 
model which establishes a method for computing an optimal intertemporal path for 
introducing renewable energy into a pre-existing electricity system. The model explicitly 
allows for the cost of maintaining reliability of supply as intermittent generators are 
integrated. The framework also incorporates concepts from Integrated Resource Planning 
and portfolio analysis. Finally, policies for accelerating renewable energy development 
are reviewed, and a discussion is provided on the policies which are likely to be most 
suitable to Pacific Islands. One of the main conclusions of this thesis is that the amount of 
backup capacity for renewable energy can be optimally minimized by diversifying the 
mix of renewable energy resources in each island. In practice, this would require studying 
the complementarities and loading curves of the various renewable resources available, 
and comparing their total potential production, and the variability of this production, to 
electricity demand. This would allow energy planners to model the inclusion of a 
maximum amount of renewable energy using a minimum of backup capacity to maintain 
system reliability, potentially leading to a more efficient implementation and formulation 
of policies aimed at developing renewable energy generation in Pacific Islands.    
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the entry of renewable energy technologies 
into Pacific Islands’ electricity markets, with particular focus on a new technology: 
the Pelamis, a wave energy converter. The case of Pacific Islands is considered 
because these countries are endowed with various types of renewable energy 
resources, yet they remain highly dependent on expensive fuel imports for their 
energy requirements, using little renewable energy (Jafar, 2000, p.306; Yu and 
Gilmour, 1996, p.698; World Bank, 1992). This paradox is investigated by studying 
the characteristics of Pacific Islands’ electricity markets: how are the electricity 
systems operated in these islands, and how are technology choices made? After 
examining the characteristics of Pacific Islands’ electricity systems, a case-study is 
provided on the entry of a wave energy technology, the Pelamis, into the electricity 
market of Hawaii. This case study provides information on Hawaii’s electricity 
market and its regulation, highlighting the presence of conflicting objectives between 
policy-makers and market-oriented electric utility stakeholders. It also provides 
information on the Pelamis, including its generating costs (Previsic, M. et al., 2005 b), 
and the potential for its entry in the electricity market of Hawaii.  
 
Following this study of Pacific Islands’ electricity markets, the integration of 
renewable energy technologies is analysed from the point of view of an energy 
planner. The recent application of portfolio analysis to energy planning has provided a 
new framework to evaluate the different electricity generating options available to 
energy planners. Taking both the generating cost and financial risk of each technology 
into account, portfolio theory has been applied to various European countries 
(Awerbuch and Berger, 2003; Jansen et al., 2006), finding evidence that energy 
security can be significantly improved by diversifying the generating mix without 
incurring any cost, if the EU were to move onto its efficient frontier. Applying this 
framework to Pacific Island Countries is likely to yield similar results. However, the 
characteristics inherent to Pacific Island Countries have important implications on the 
operation of their electricity systems, which are not necessarily taken into account in 
portfolio analysis. In particular, geographical isolation inhibits these countries from 
connecting to larger intercontinental grids, which emphasizes the importance of 
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reliability of supply (Mayer, 2000). This thesis presents a model which examines the 
implications of increasing renewable energy in the electricity generating mix of 
Pacific Island Countries. The model establishes a method for computing an optimal 
intertemporal path for introducing renewable energy into a pre-existing electricity 
system, with explicit allowance for the cost of maintaining reliability of supply as 
intermittent generators are integrated. The framework incorporates concepts from 
Integrated Resource Planning and portfolio analysis.  
 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides information on electricity 
supply and renewable energy in Pacific Island Countries. Chapter 3 presents 
information on wave energy generation and the Pelamis wave energy converter. In 
addition, the technical problems and economic benefits associated with introducing 
renewable energy into existing electricity systems are discussed. Chapter 4 provides a 
case-study of the entry of renewable energy technologies into the electricity market of 
Hawaii, and the potential for the entry of a wave energy technology in this market. In 
chapter 5, a model for the integration of renewable energy technologies in Pacific 
Islands is developed. Chapter 6 reviews policies available for accelerating renewable 
energy development, and provides a discussion on the policies which are likely to be 
most suitable to Pacific Islands. Finally, chapter 7 concludes.  
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Chapter Two: Analysis of the Key Patterns and 
Trends of Electricity Production and Consumption in 
Pacific Island Countries 
 
 
 
1) Sources of Electricity Generation in Pacific Island Countries 
 
Pacific Islands all benefit from abundant resources in renewable energy, 
whether it is hydroelectricity, geothermal, solar, or wind energy. Despite an increase 
in the use of such resources for electricity generation in the last three decades, 
virtually all Pacific Island Countries generate most of their electricity using oil-fuelled 
generators (except for Fiji and Samoa, which have significant hydro resources). This 
section provides a brief overview of the energy sources used for electricity production 
in Pacific Islands. For more detailed information, a table displaying the sources of 
electricity generation in each country can be found in the appendix (Table A1).  
 
Diesel combustion plants can be found on each main island in the Pacific, mostly 
providing the bulk of electricity generation in all islands1. This pattern is depicted in 
figure 2, which shows the supply technology for electricity generated by the main 
electricity provider of each country2. The share of renewable energy use, such as solar 
home systems often found in outer islands, is thus understated in figure 2.1. However, 
diesel generators can also be found in remote areas and villages which are not 
connected to the main electricity grids.  
 
                                                 
1 In Tonga, the Marshall Islands, Guam, FSM, Niue and Palau, there are some small-scale, off-grid 
renewable energy systems such as solar photovoltaic and wind power.  Note that in the discussion 
which follows, distillate-fuelled turbines have been included in the “diesel” category. 
2 The use of off-grid systems is not represented in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.1: Percentage of Electricity Generated from Diesel Plants 
(Main electricity providers) 3 
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Most electricity in New Caledonia is generated by gas turbines or internal combustion 
engines. However, it could not be determined how much electricity was generated 
from each plant, so the amount of diesel generation in New Caledonia displayed in 
figure 2.1 includes generation from gas turbines.  
 
In Fiji, hydropower is the main source of electricity, and in French Polynesia, New 
Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu, hydropower 
represents the second largest source. However, the share of hydropower has been 
decreasing in the past years, notably in Fiji and New Caledonia. In Fiji, the share of 
hydropower decreased from 92 percent in 1995 to 80 percent in 2000 and to 55 
percent in 2003 due to a drought. However, this share is likely to have increased again 
because new hydropower plants have been constructed since 2003 (Wade, H. et al., 
2005 Volume 4, p. 23). In New Caledonia, the contribution of hydropower to total 
generation has slightly increased over the years (from about 16 percent in 1995 to 
                                                 
3  Sources: French Polynesia—Electricité de Tahiti; New Caledonia—Institut de la Statistique des 
Etudes Economiques de Nouvelle Caledonie (2004) Bilan Energie 2004; Hawaii—Hawaiian Electric 
Company (http://www.heco.com); Guam, Marshall Islands—Pacific Power Association (2006) United 
States of America Insular Areas Energy Assessment Report; Remainder—Wade, H. et al. (2005).  
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more than 19 percent in 2004) to the detriment of diesel generation, but the 
installation of both a gas turbine in 2003 (Institut de la Statistique des Etudes 
Economiques de Nouvelle-Calédonie (ISEE), 2003) and a coal combustion plant in 
2006 to respond to growing industrial needs may have reversed this trend. There is 
also hydropower potential in the Federated States of Micronesia, including an existing 
run-of-river hydropower plant in the state of Pohnpei (Pacific Power Association, 
p.236). 
 
Wind turbines have been installed in the Cook Islands, Fiji, New Caledonia, French 
Polynesia, Hawaii and Papua New Guinea, but they typically do not contribute much 
to the total electricity generation as there is little installed capacity. For example, in 
New Caledonia in 2006, the installed capacity of wind turbines exceeded 19 megawatt 
(MW) but wind energy represented 3 percent of total electricity production.  
 
Solar energy is widely used in Pacific Islands (except in Nauru4), particularly in outer 
islands and remote villages which do not have access to a main electricity grid. Solar 
photovoltaic and solar water heating systems have often been installed in the context 
of lending and donor programmes for rural electrification. Although such programmes 
were not always successful, the experience they provided led to substantial 
improvements in solar energy use, and organisations are now more informed on the 
institutional approaches that are suitable to introduce and maintain solar systems in 
Pacific Islands (Liebenthal, A. et al., 1994). In Hawaii, there are a large number of 
grid-connected solar panels since cash rebates, state and federal tax credits on solar 
water heaters and solar photovoltaics have provided incentives for households to 
invest in such systems (Wade et al., 2005, Volume 4 pp. 61-62).  
 
There are also hybrid power plants combining solar and wind energy with diesel 
generation in Fiji and French Polynesia (solar/diesel hybrid). However, the Fiji plant 
has been using less and less renewable energy: the wind and solar components 
contributed over 60 percent of the hybrid generation in 1997, but their contribution 
fell steadily to less than 15 percent in 2002, due to a lack of technical support and 
component failures (Wade et al., 2005, Volume 4, pp.61-62). 
 
                                                 
4 It is unclear why there are no solar systems installed in Nauru.  
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Biomass gasification has been used in a few islands, notably in Papua New Guinea for 
commercial copra, cocoa, coffee and tea drying. In late 2002, 52 gasifiers were still 
used by coffee processors in Papua New Guinea  (Wade et al., 2005, Vol.1 p.47). A 
few plants are also operating in Fiji, Cook Islands, and the Federated States of 
Micronesia; however these plants have not typically been used for energy production. 
In Micronesia, for example, the gas is bled off because people find the concept of 
using biogas from manure for cooking offensive (Wade, H. et al., 2005, Vol.3, p. 26). 
Gasifiers for power generation were installed in Vanuatu (between 1982 and 1994) 
and Samoa (in the early 80s), but these systems are no longer operating.  
 
In summary, although most Pacific Island Countries have some experience with 
diverse renewable energy technologies, the contribution of renewable energy sources 
remains relatively low. Apart from hydropower in some islands with a suitable 
resource such as Fiji and Samoa, diesel generators remain the biggest source of power 
generation.  
 
2) Electricity Supply in the Main Islands 
 
There are three types of electricity supply arrangements in Pacific Islands: 
regulated monopolies, government-owned utilities and public service concessions. In 
most countries, main grid electricity is provided by a government-owned utility, 
which is often the sole electricity provider. Most of these utilities used to be 
government departments and have become corporate state-owned enterprises.  In the 
Solomon Islands and Samoa, the utility has been commercialised and is meant to 
operate as a business. A list of the main electric utilities in Pacific Islands is provided 
in Table A2 of appendix 1.  
 
Regulated monopolies supply the bulk of electricity in Tonga and Hawaii.  In Vanuatu 
and the French Territories of the Pacific (French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Wallis 
and Futuna), private electricity companies are providing electricity in the context of 
(long-term) public service concessions. These concessions allow the electricity 
companies to operate within specified geographical areas as part of a contract with the 
government. For example, UNELCO (Vanuatu) has the concession to generate and 
distribute electricity in Port Vila, Luganville, Malekula and Tanna (Wade, H. et al., 
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2005, Vol. 16, p. 8). Anybody can produce and supply their own electricity outside 
the specified areas and on other islands5. UNELCO (Vanuatu) and the electricity 
supply companies in French territories are all subsidiaries of the same company 
ELYO, from the international group SUEZ6. 
 
Only in Hawaii, Tonga, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia and New 
Caledonia are the electric utilities privately owned or managed (although Shoreline, 
the company which supplies electricity in Tonga, has been in the process of becoming 
nationalized again7).  
 
In some Pacific Island Countries, different power supply arrangements apply for 
different groups of islands. For example, in the Federated States of Micronesia there 
is a different public electric power system in the principal island of each of the four 
states, so that each state manages its own power supply. In some countries, there is 
more than one supplier on a given island. In New Caledonia, for instance, both EEC 
and ENERCAL hold concessions for the production and distribution of electricity. In 
Kiribati, there is a public utility responsible for power, but the Solar Energy Company 
(SEC), an incorporated company owned by the government, is involved in the sale 
and lease of solar electric systems and relevant components (Wade et al., 2005, Vol. 5, 
p. 10). The country with the highest number of electricity providers is Papua New 
Guinea: while PNG Power (PNGP) is responsible for the generation, transmission and 
distribution of electricity throughout the country, operating three main interconnected 
systems and nineteen smaller provincial systems, there are a large number of private 
electricity producers whose total installed capacity is comparable to that of PNGP 
(Wade et al., 2005, Vol. 10, pp. 12-13).  
 
All the electric utilities in Pacific Islands are responsible for not only electricity 
generation, but also the transmission and distribution of electricity 8 . Vertical 
integration is common because of economies of scope and scale (Domah, 2002). In 
some islands, the electric utilities supply both electricity and water (American Samoa 
                                                 
5 www.investinvanuatu.com/vanuatu/infrastru.htm  
6 http://www.elyo.com/business-uk/filiales/default.htm  
7 http://www.matangitonga.to/article/tonganews/business/article_print_northpower070806.shtml  
8 Except for EEC in New Caledonia, which does not ensure electricity transmission on the main island 
(electricity distribution is provided by Enercal, another electric utility). 
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Power Authority in American Samoa, Public Utilities Board in Kiribati, Nauru 
Phosphate Corporation, and EEWF in Wallis and Futuna).  
 
In most islands, the main electric utility only serves the main island or largest islands. 
Only the Solomon Islands Electricity Authority (in the Solomon Islands), the Tuvalu 
Electric Corporation (in Tuvalu) and Electricité De Tahiti (French Polynesia) extend 
their services to all or a large number of populated islands. Some utilities have 
recently expanded to provide electricity to smaller islands: Shoreline in Tonga, and 
UNELCO in Vanuatu (Wade et al., 2005, Vol. 1, p. 29). Nevertheless, in most Pacific 
Island Countries the percentage of households electrified in outer islands and rural 
areas is lower than in the main islands and urban areas. As displayed in figure 2.2 
below, the total percentage of households with access to electricity ranges from under 
20 percent (in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu) to close to 100 
percent (Wade et al., 2005, Vol. 1, p. 30).  
 
Figure 2.2: Access to Electricity in Pacific Islands9 
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9  Sources: Kiribati and Tonga—Meritec (2001) Private Participation in Infrastructure in Pacific 
Island Countries annex 1 p.5.; Remainder—Wade et al. (2005) Vols. 2-4, 6-12 and 16. Note: The 
figure for Papua New Guinea is only an estimate from the PIREP report; it does not come from an 
official census. 
 9
Electric utilities of Pacific Islands vary dramatically in size, from 2.4 MW of installed 
capacity in Niue (with less than 2000 customers) to about 614 MW in Papua New 
Guinea (Wade et al., 2005, Vol. 1, p. 32). Table 2.1 displays the annual amount of 
electricity generated by the main electric utility in 19 Pacific Island Countries. 
Generation in recent years remains below 200 GWh per year in most Pacific Islands 
except for Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, and Papua New Guinea. 
One may expect the difference in electricity generation to be caused by differences in 
population levels, which would explain why electricity generation is higher in Papua 
New Guinea than anywhere else. However, although domestic consumers constitute 
the largest category of customers for most islands utility grids, they generally account 
for well under half of the total consumption of electricity.  
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Table 2.1: Electricity Generation in Pacific Islands  
Country 
Capacity, 
MW 
(year) 
Electricity 
Generated, 
MWh 
(year) 
Source 
American Samoa 93.75 (2005) 
188,975 
(2005) 
American Samoa Power Authority10 , Pacific 
Power Association (2006) 
Cook Islands 10.66 (2002) 
29,758 
(2002) 
Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Project Vol.2  
table 7.2 
Federated States of Micronesia 34.49 (2005) 
84,517 
(1997) Pacific Power Association (2006) 
Fiji 194.00 (2003) 
6,989,000 
(2003) 
Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Project Vol.4 
table 3.2  
French Polynesia 215.49 (2005) 
514,900 
(2005) Electricité De Tahiti 
Guam 552.2 (2004) 
1,876,708 
(2004) Guam Power Authority
11  
Kiribati 7.75 (2003) 
15,900 
(2003) 
Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Project Vol.5  
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 
Marshall Islands 31.3 (2005) 
101,166 
(2003) 
Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Project Vol.6 
table 2.3, Pacific Power Association (2006) 
Northern Mariana Islands 126.5 (2005) 
432,000 
(2005) Pacific Power Association (2006)  
Nauru 18.9 (2004) 
33,000 
(2000) 
Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Project 
Vol.7 , ADB Key Indicators 2003 
New Caledonia 348.4 (2004) 
1,677,527 
(2004) 
Institut de la Statistique et des Etudes 
Economiques (2004)  
Niue 1.6 (2002) 
3,369 
(2002) 
Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Project Vol.8  
table 2.2 
Palau 28 (2005) 
81,866 
(2004) Pacific Power Association (2006) 
Papua New Guinea 451 (2001) 
3,178,000 
(2003) 
Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Project 
Vol.10, APEC energy overview 2005 
Samoa 36.02 (2003) 
93,070 
(2003) 
Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Project 
Vol.11 table 2.3.  
Solomon Islands 22.4 (2002) 
86,887 
(2002) 
Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Project 
Vol.12 table 2.8. 
Tonga 11.4 (2003) 
34,000 
(2003) ADB Key Indicators 2003 
Funafuti (Tuvalu) 2.4 (2002) 
4,658 
(2003) 
Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Project 
Vol.15 table 2.7 
Vanuatu 21.6 (2002) 
47,148 
(2002) 
Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Project 
Vol.16 table 2.4.  
TOTAL 2207.86 15,472,449  
 
Figure 2.3, which displays electricity per capita in Pacific Islands, shows that the 
discrepancies in electricity generation between Pacific Islands cannot be explained 
solely by differences in population levels. Firstly, as previously stated, electricity may 
not be available to the entire population in each island. For instance, according to the 
Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Program team, less than 10 percent of the 
                                                 
10 http://www.aspower.com/ElectricLinks/SystemLoadGrowth.mht 
11 www.guampowerauthority.com/operations/ (date: 31 may 2006)  
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population of Papua New Guinea was electrified in 2004 ( Wade et al., 2005, Vol. 10, 
p. 24). Secondly, and more importantly, a large part of the electricity generated is 
consumed by industrial, commercial and government customers. Electricity 
generation is much higher in places where economic activity is focused towards 
energy-intensive activities such as industrial applications. For instance, the nickel 
industry accounts for more than half of the electricity consumption in New Caledonia 
(ISEE, 2004), and the developed tourism, commercial and U.S. military sectors use a 
large part of the electricity generated in Guam (Bureau of Statistics and Plans of 
Guam, 2004, p.290). Electricity per capita is also relatively large in Palau, which may 
be due to infrastructure development for tourism. In 2003, visitor and tourist arrivals 
numbered 68,000 for a population of about 20,000 meaning that tourism intensity is 
high, which suggests that the tourism sector is a major power consumer 12 . The 
widespread use of air conditioning in government offices and hotels may also account 
for a large part of electricity consumption.  
 
Figure 2.3: Electricity per Capita in Pacific Islands13 
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12 http://www.spc.int/prism/country/pw/stats/PalauStats/Tourism/2003.htm, 
http://www.spc.int/prism/country/pw/stats/PalauStats/Social/Census/Census.htm  
13  Sources: American Samoa—www.aspower.com, Cook Islands—Cook Islands Statistics Office; 
Guam—www.guampowerauthority.com/operations/generationunpdate.html; Tuvalu—Government of 
Tuvalu (2005); Remainder—Wade et al. (2005) Vols. 3-6,8,9,11,12,16; Asia-Pacific Energy Research 
Centre (2005); ADB Key Indicators; www.elyo.com, , Central Intelligence Agency (2006). 
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3) Electricity Supply in Outer Islands and Remote Areas 
 
In most Pacific Island Countries, rural and outer island electricity supply is 
characterised by small diesel generators as well as individual solar home systems. 
Electricity in rural areas is generally provided by provincial utilities owned by island 
councils, public works departments or cooperatives 14 , but the management, 
maintenance and quality of service provided by such systems is generally poor. For 
example, many of the small rural supply systems (called C-centres) which have been 
installed in Papua New Guinea are no longer operating (Wade et al., 2005, Vol. 10, 
p.13). Consequently, in a large number of outer islands, local schools, health centres, 
resorts and households operate their own small diesel generators.  
 
The cost of electricity supply in rural areas is much higher than in the main islands  
(Wade et al., 2005, Vol.1, Table2-7, p.24). Operation costs of the diesel generators are 
often exacerbated by low fuel efficiency due to poor maintenance, mostly because of 
a lack of skilled staff and spare parts. Government subsidies for rural electricity tend 
to be high, although subsidy arrangements are generally inconsistent and lack 
transparency (Wade et al., 2005, p.84). Despite large differences in supply costs, in 
some countries consumers in outer islands pay the same price as consumers in the 
main island and urban areas.  
 
Electricity is available less than 18 hours per day in most outer islands. Households 
thus rely on a wide range of energy sources for cooking and lighting, particularly 
firewood and kerosene. Irregular fuel supply and poor fuel handling are typical. Fuels 
are often transported from the main islands to outer islands in 200 litre drums by ship 
and small boats. Sometimes, the drums are even floated from small boats to the shore 
(Wade et al., 2005). While problems such as leakages, rusting, corrosion and 
shortages of drums are not uncommon in outer islands, such inefficient fuel 
transportation and distribution processes are unlikely to change, because of the low 
levels of demand and consumption inherent to outer islands.  
 
                                                 
14 except for Vanuatu, French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna and New Caledonia, which have privately-
owned utilities supplying electricity to main and outer islands 
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The development of reliable electricity supply systems in remote areas has often been 
claimed to be a government priority. Although all Pacific Islands have at least an 
implicit rural electrification policy, such policies are often unclear and particularly 
ambiguous with respect to responsibilities (Wade et al., 2005, Vol. 1, pp. 18-19). A 
large number of rural electrification projects have been funded by international aid 
and donor organisations from Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Japan and 
Europe (Wade et al., 2005, Vol. 1, p.18).  
 
4) International Aid for Electricity Supply in Pacific Islands 
 
International aid agencies and organisations have provided funds and technical 
assistance for a large number of energy projects in the Pacific Islands since the late 
seventies. Such projects mostly involved the installation of renewable energy 
technologies as a source of electricity supply, mostly solar photovoltaic systems, solar 
water heaters, and hydroelectricity. Most of these projects focused on rural areas and 
outer islands, for which, as stated previously, electricity supply is generally poor. 
Indeed, the objective of donors and organisations’ programmes was often to boost 
development in rural areas by improving electricity supply using sustainable, 
environmentally-friendly energy sources.   
 
The Asian Development Bank has provided assistance to a large number of Pacific 
Island Countries such as the Cook Islands, Fiji, Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Samoa, 
Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu. Such assistance often came in the form of 
loans for improving or upgrading main electricity grids (Cook Islands, Kiribati, Tonga, 
Samoa), but also in the form of technical assistance for electrification in outer islands, 
power sector reforms (Tonga), case by case studies for outer island power 
development (Cook Islands), infrastructure development, and energy development 
plans (Vanuatu), which often recommended the use of renewable energy and the 
improvement of energy efficiency. In February 2006, ADB announced that it would 
help prepare a renewable power sector development project for Fiji Islands through a 
US$650,000 technical assistance grant15. 
 
                                                 
15 http://www.adb.org/media/Articles/2006/9393-Fiji-Islands-power/  
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The European Community has provided a major contribution to outer island 
electrification, particularly with the installation of solar photovoltaic systems, through 
large funding programmes resulting from the 1975 Lomé Convention, the Lomé II 
Pacific Regional Energy Programme, and the Cotonou Agreement between the 
European Union member states and Africa, Caribbean and Pacific states. Solar energy 
has thus been promoted and developed in many Pacific Islands such as Fiji, the 
Marshall Islands, Nauru (grid-connected solar photovoltaic), Palau, the Solomon 
Islands (photovoltaic refrigeration for provincial health clinics), Tonga, and Tuvalu. 
Other projects involved the identification and promotion of new and renewable 
energy sources as part of outer island development programmes (in Micronesia), 
assistance for hydropower in Samoa, and electricity generation with a wood gasifier at 
a rural high school in Vanuatu (Wade et al., 2005, Vol. 16, p. 28). In addition, the 
European Development Fund (FED) recently started the TEP Vertes Project. This 
project was signed in October 2006 and aims at improving electricity supply in rural 
and isolated areas in French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna.  
 
The Japan International Cooperation Agency has helped many Pacific Countries with 
grants and funds for power upgrades, solar photovoltaic installations (Marshall 
Islands) and technical assistance, including the construction of a hydroelectricity plant 
in Vanuatu, and studies such as the Master Plan for Power Development for the 
Solomon Islands in 1999. Other donor organisations, such as AusAID, New Zealand 
Aid, Canada Aid, have been involved in training workshops, feasibility studies for 
electrification and hydroelectricity, and funding for solar photovoltaic projects. 
 
Non-lending services have formed the core of World Bank assistance to Pacific 
Islands between 1992 and 2002 (World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, 
2005, p.16), with studies for Samoa (Assessment for biomass energy use and 
prospects, a joint study with UNDP) and Papua New Guinea (Hydropower Resources 
Inventory Study, Rural Electrification Policy and Strategy to Improve Energy Access 
for Rural Services Delivery), and the 1992 Pacific Regional Energy Assessment 
studies carried out for twelve Pacific Islands.  
 
Other large organisations such as the United Nations, UNESCO, ESCAP, have 
undertaken surveys, studies and investigations, legislation reviews, and provided 
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funds for projects such as solar photovoltaic installations for rural health centres. In 
1984, Save the Children and USAID funded 170 solar home systems for a project 
implemented by the Tuvalu Solar Electric Cooperative Society (TSECS). Other 
TSECS projects were funded by the European Union.  
 
Regional organisations involved in Pacific Islands’ electricity and energy projects and 
studies include the Energy Working Group (EWG) of the Council of Regional 
Organisations of the Pacific (CROP), the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), 
the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), the Pacific Islands 
Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC) and the Pacific Power Association (PPA). 
New Zealand’s International Aid and Development Agency has been supporting 
SOPAC and SPREP for environmental projects including climate change and 
freshwater management. A Pacific Islands Energy Policy and Plan (PIEPP), was 
developed by EWG, which contains both energy policy and planning components. 
Regional cooperation has also resulted in various renewable energy projects. The SPC 
has put in place a programme called the Pacific Renewable Energy France Australia 
Common Endeavour programme which, with funds from France and Australia, has 
successfully implemented solar projects in the Marshall Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu, 
as well as a wind project in the Cook Islands. From biomass to hydroelectricity and 
solar photovoltaic, SOPAC has been involved in a wide range of renewable energy 
projects, often providing technical assistance for donor projects, reviewing projects, 
or investigating renewable energy resource in Pacific Islands. SOPAC has also 
implemented the Pacific Islands Energy Policies and Strategic Action Planning 
(PIESPAP) to develop and review energy policies in Pacific Islands and provide 
supporting analysis on related matters such as tariff studies, rural electricity 
frameworks and wind energy development. 
 
A striking feature from this brief overview of assistance from aid agencies is the 
recurring choice of solar photovoltaic as the technology used for electricity 
development programmes. Most projects seem to have concentrated on small solar 
systems in outer islands—there has not been any large-scale renewable energy project 
other than hydroelectricity in the main islands.  This choice has been justified by the 
fact that solar energy is profuse in Pacific Islands, and that solar photovoltaic is a 
simple, commercially proven technology which can easily be implemented, and is 
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suitable for low levels of demand. In general, renewable energy seems to be a 
sensitive choice for sustainable development: donors and organisations can provide 
investment funds for the technologies and install the systems; subsequently, the 
organisations only need to ensure system maintenance, without having to pay or lend 
money for consumers to import fuel inputs. Yet a large number of projects have failed 
due to insufficient maintenance.  
 
Solar energy is understandably an attractive, feasible solution for providing electricity 
while aiming at reducing the islands’ dependence on fuel products and promoting 
renewable energy (Lomé II Pacific Regional Energy Programme). However, a large 
number of projects have failed because of the institutional context chosen for their 
implementation16. The choice of institutional context for the implementation of solar 
projects is particularly important for the maintenance and duration of the solar 
systems. Indeed, not only do solar systems require regular maintenance, such as the 
replacement of batteries, but in most cases, a large number of solar systems are 
installed at the same time for a given project, which means that planning and 
organising the operation and maintenance of the systems is crucial. The sustainability 
of solar systems in outer islands and poor villages depends on the arrangements which 
determine who owns the systems, who maintains them, and who pays for them. Hence, 
although installing solar systems may be relatively easy and rapid, past experience has 
shown that agencies should not be lured by this simplicity, as solar photovoltaic 
systems require much more than installation to last more than a few years.  
 
5) Electricity Consumption in Pacific Islands 
 
Electricity consumption in Pacific Islands is relatively low, primarily because 
of the small size of Pacific Island Countries’ economies, but also because consumers 
use a range of different energy sources to satisfy their energy needs. 
  
Although the traditional use of biomass for household cooking has declined 
considerably in the past decades, it remains widespread in the rural areas of some 
Pacific Islands, notably in Chuuk (Micronesia), Vanuatu, Kiribati Solomon Islands, 
                                                 
16 For a detailed example, see Wade et al. (2005) Vol. 14, pp. 32-40. 
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Fiji and Papua New Guinea (Wade et al., 2005, Vol.1, p.36-37). A relatively low 
proportion of the population has access to electricity in these countries: as previously 
stated, around 10 percent of the population had access to electricity in Papua New 
Guinea in 2003, only 19 percent of households were electrified through the Chuuk 
power utility in 2000, and only 16 percent were electrified in the Solomon Islands in 
1999 (Wade et al., 2005).  
 
In most islands kerosene, and also more recently Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG), 
have replaced firewood for household cooking. Electricity is mostly used for cooking 
in urban areas and on islands such as Nauru and Niue where most of the population is 
connected to the island grid (Wade et al., 2005, Vol. 7 p. 16, Vol. 8 p.13-14). 
Households often use a combination of different sources for cooking purposes (for 
example, they may use biomass and kerosene, or gas and electricity). Kerosene and 
electricity are mostly used for household lighting. The use of low efficiency 
incandescent lighting has also been reported to be widespread in Palau (Wade et al., 
2005, Vol. 9 p. 17).  
 
The energy needs of Pacific Island households are thus met by a variety of sources, 
primarily kerosene, gas, biomass and electricity. This pattern is portrayed in the 
following graph, which shows the small contribution of electricity to non-transport 
energy consumed in some Pacific Islands for 1988/198917. It is likely that electricity 
represents a much larger part of energy consumed in these islands nowadays. For 
instance, in 1998, electricity accounted for more than thirty percent of the total energy 
consumed in Samoa, compared to less than five percent in 1988 (World Bank, 1992, 
Vol. 13). Unfortunately, recent energy balances are not available for any other islands.   
 
                                                 
17 The transport sector typically constitutes the largest consumer of energy in Pacific Islands. Including 
transport energy consumption, which consists of petroleum products only, would have understated the 
share of electricity for sectors which can choose between different energy alternatives to satisfy their 
needs (e.g. household choice between kerosene and electricity for lighting). 
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Figure 2.4: Electricity as a Percentage of Non-transport Energy Consumption in 
Pacific Islands (1988-1989 data)18 
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As explained in a previous section, electricity sales to industrial, commercial and 
government customers are typically much more significant than sales to residential 
customers, especially for islands with an important industrial sector. Government 
facilities, hotels and other tourism related businesses constitute the biggest electricity 
consumers in islands with little or no industrial activity such as Niue.   
 
Electricity consumption in Pacific Islands is thus closely related to the level and 
structure of economic activity. In most countries, electricity generation could vary 
intensely with the construction of a new business or resort, which can make 
predictions of demand growth difficult. Demand for electricity can be expected to rise 
as the economy, tourism and population grow, or when the population becomes more 
affluent (through an increased use of appliances such as televisions). In addition, 
improvements in the availability of electricity in outer islands (such as increasing the 
power supply from 18 to 24 hours per day) are likely to be followed by increases in 
                                                 
18 Source: World Bank (1992) Vol. 2-13.  
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electricity use. For example, a shift in the power supply from 12 to 24 hours (with a 
similar appliance mix) has led to about a 75 percent increase in energy use in 
Rakahanga in the Cook Islands (Wade et al., 2005, Vol. 2). This suggests that the 
relationship between electricity reliability and electricity demand is positive, but that 
it is not a one-to-one relationship, so that reliability of electricity supply is a 
particularly important characteristic.  
 
6) Cost of power supply  
 
The cost of electricity supply is determined by a number of factors: cost of 
capital, inputs for generation (primarily fossil fuels), operation and maintenance costs, 
economies of scale, and administrative costs. In addition, a critical cost component 
arises from the efficiency of the generation, transmission and distribution systems, 
which condition the amount of system losses. In 1998, system losses were 
dramatically high in some islands: they accounted for 32.48 percent of gross 
electricity generation for the state utility of Chuuk in the Federated States of 
Micronesia (Meritec, 2001). System losses are still running above 15 percent in a 
number of islands including Tonga, Samoa, and the Solomon Islands, as shown in 
figure 2.5.  
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Figure 2.5: System Loss in Pacific Islands19 
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Wade et al. (2005) provide estimates of electricity supply costs in some Pacific 
Islands. These estimates, displayed in table 2.2 below, confirm that electricity supply 
is much more expensive in outer islands than in the main islands. The most striking 
figures are those of Fiji, where supply to rural areas of Ovalau was ten times more 
expensive than supply to urban consumers of Viti Levu (the main island) in 2001. 
(Note that the data displayed in table 2.2 were gathered from different sources and 
across different years; these figures should only be considered as indicative. All the 
estimates available were converted to 2005 US$ for easier comparison20.)  
 
                                                 
19 Source: Fiji, Tonga, Tuvalu, Papua New Guinea, Samoa—Wade et al. (2005); American Samoa, 
Pohnpei, Kosrae, Palau, Marshall Islands—Pacific Power Association (2006); Remainder—Castalia 
(2005), p. 103.  
 
20 All figures were first converted to $US using an average of the relevant year’s conversion rates with 
the currency converter from http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory. Then the inflation calculator 
from http://www.westegg.com/inflation/infl.cgi was used to convert $US from different years to 2005 
$US.  
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Table 2.2: Cost of Electricity Supply in some Pacific Islands 
Country and year of 
data 
Main Island cost of 
electricity supply per kWh 
(2005 US$) 
Outer islands cost of 
electricity supply per kWh 
(2005 US$) 
Cook Islands  
(1998 costs) Rarotonga: $0.22 
Aitutaki: $0.27 
Atiu: $0.36 
Mangaia: $0.34 
Mitiaro: $0.53 
Mauke: $0.46 
Penrhyn: $0.53 
Manihiki: $0.46 
Rakahanga: $0.55 
Palmerston: $0.62 
All outer islands: $0.36 
Fiji  
(2001 costs) 
Viti Levu Urban: $0.09 
Viti Levu Rural: $0.24 
Vanua Levu Urban: $0.19 
Vanua Levu Rural: $0.58 
Ovalau Urban: $0.18 
Ovalau Rural: $0.90 
Marshall Islands  
(2004 costs) Majuro: $0.076 
Ebeye: $0.14 
Kili: $0.16 
Bikini: $0.31 
Tonga  
(1999 costs) Tongatapu: $0.23 
Ha'apai Outer Islands:  
Nomuka: $0.54 
Ha'afeva: $0.64 
'Uiha: $0.55 
Ha'ano: $0.53 
Tuvalu  
(2000 generation cost) Funafuti: $0.97    
   Source: Wade et al. (2005) 
 
Fuel costs constitute a major part of production costs: up to 80 percent of the supply 
costs of island electric utilities can be attributed to fuel costs (Castalia, 2005, p.99). 
Furthermore, a major component of fuel price in Pacific Islands is the transportation 
cost. Since fuels are usually imported through the main islands, the further an island is 
from the main island, the more expensive it is to transport fuel to this island, and the 
higher the price of fuel. Consequently, fuel costs of outer islands can be 200-400 
percent higher than those of main islands (Castalia, 2005, p.99). Figure 2.6 illustrates 
this intuitive pattern, with the example of the Cook Islands. The fitted line represents 
a simple linear regression, and shows that the further an island is located from 
Rarotonga (the main island), the higher the cost of power supply. Note that the island 
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of Aitutaki directly imports its own fuel, which explains why it has a cost of supply 
lower than that of Mangaia and Atiu, which are located almost as far from Rarotonga.  
 
Figure 2.6: Cost of Electricity Supply in the Cook Islands 
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Sources: Table 2.2 above and Wade et al., 2005, Vol. 2, Table 2.8.  
 
Fuel costs also depend on the national fuel procurement system in a given country. 
For instance, in some countries such as Vanuatu and Kiribati, the price of fuel has 
been found to be consistently higher than in Samoa and the Solomon Islands, which 
have an open market international tendering process for fuel supply (Castalia, 2005).  
 
Another explanation for the substantial difference in cost of supply between main and 
outer islands is the existence of economies of scale, as displayed for the Cook Islands 
case in the graph below (using a logarithmic trendline).  
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Figure 2.7: Economies of Scale in the Cook Islands 
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Source: Wade et al. (2005) Vol. 2, Table 2.8. Generation figures from the Cook Islands statistics office, 
table 7.2 (figures refer to generation in 2004).  
 
Using the Cook islands data and running a simple Ordinary Least Squares regression 
of the cost of electricity supply on volume of electricity supply and distance to the 
main island, gives the following results: 
 
Cost of electricity supply = 0.398 – 7.237 Volume + 0.000109 Distance  
          (7.332)  (-1.6266)             (1.531969) 
 
Both the scale and distance variables are significant at the 90% (though not the 95%) 
significance level, with an R² of 0.537. 
 
Supply costs in Pacific Island Countries, and specifically in outer islands, are thus 
exacerbated by remoteness, high transport costs for fossil fuel imports, limited 
demand for fossil fuels, limited ability to reap economies of scale, and high system 
losses. Another factor leading to high electricity supply costs is the topography of the 
islands: high mountainous terrain or small low lying atolls make it difficult and more 
costly to install and maintain infrastructure networks. Most Pacific Island countries 
are comprised of several small, dispersed islands or atolls, so that linking services 
between islands is more costly (Castalia, 2005, p.21).  
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Despite the high running costs of thermal technologies due to high transportation 
costs, there is little use of renewable energy in Pacific Islands.  At first sight, high fuel 
costs might be expected to enable renewable energy technologies to compete with 
traditional fossil-fuel technologies in Pacific Islands more readily than in most other 
parts of the world.  However, reliability is very important in these countries, 
particularly in the main islands where most industrial and commercial activities are 
taking place. Hence, apart from some outer villages and islands, there is little 
willingness to incur the high level of intermittency associated with renewable energy 
in the absence of 100% thermal backup – and the cost of holding thermal capacity in 
reserve then has to be included in the cost comparison. . Other major obstacles to 
renewable energy in Pacific Islands are explored further in chapter 6.    
 
7) Electricity Tariffs  
 
Electricity tariffs are generally established by the utilities, and reviewed by the 
cabinet or the government department responsible for electricity, who must give their 
approval before a tariff increase. In Tuvalu, tariffs are set directly by the cabinet. In 
Palau, the utility can only change its tariff after public hearings (Wade et al., 2005, 
Vol. 9, p. 13). In fact, the utility can set whatever tariff it wants as it is not bound by 
the results of the hearings, but it has incentives to keep the prices down as the tariff is 
considered to be a major political matter in Palau. Except when a variable fuel rate is 
included, tariffs are typically not altered very often or regularly—electricity prices can 
remain unchanged for years.  
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Figure 2.8: Residential Electricity Tariffs in Pacific Islands and the United States, 
2003-2004 
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Source: Wade et al. (2005), Energy Information Administration 
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epat7p4.html) 
Note: FSM: Federated States of Micronesia, M.I: Marshall Islands 
 
Average electricity tariffs are significantly high in some Pacific Islands, such as 
Vanuatu and Kiribati. In some countries, such as Tokelau and the Marshall Islands, 
the tariffs are only slightly higher than the tariffs charged in large countries such as 
the United States. These lower tariffs can be partly explained by government 
subsidies (Castalia, 2005, p. 98). In Fiji, the average electricity tariff is also lower 
mostly because more than 50 percent of electricity generation is hydro-based.   
 
In some countries (Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Tuvalu) the tariffs are very 
simple, involving a flat rate for different types of customers (residential, commercial 
and government customers) (Wade et al., 2005, Vols. 5-7 and 15). The most uniform 
tariffs can be found in Tokelau and Niue, where the government corporations charge a 
single tariff for all users, except for a premium tariff charged for the use of air 
conditioners in Niue. In Nauru, a simple tariff has been imposed since 1990 but there 
has been very little fee collection from residential customers since 2003 due to a 
financial crisis.  
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In the Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Micronesia, and Papua New Guinea, 
nonlinear pricing is used, with tariffs varying according to the type of customer as 
well as monthly consumption, typically charging higher rates for higher consumption 
levels (except in Fiji). Some utilities offer “lifeline tariffs” to low-income customers. 
Lifeline tariffs refer to the lower rates associated with low consumption levels. Such 
tariffs are charged to customers with a consumption of up to 30 kilowatt-hour (kWh) 
per month in Papua New Guinea, 50 kWh per month in Samoa, 60 kWh per month in 
the Cook Islands, 100 kWh per month in French Polynesia, Kosrae and Yap 
(Micronesia) and 500 kWh per month in Palau21. In some countries, such as the Cook 
Islands, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Value Added Tax applies to electricity sales.  
 
Electricity utilities in Tonga, Vanuatu, Guam, Chuuk, Palau and the Solomon Islands 
impose much more complex tariff structures with, for each type of customer, a rate 
which involves a minimum monthly charge, a fixed rate and a fuel surcharge which is 
adjusted monthly or every six months. In Vanuatu, adjustment is made quarterly and 
is based not only on fuel prices, but also on wage rates, an index of material costs, and 
exchange rates. EPC (Samoa) was also considering the adoption of a fuel surcharge in 
2003; however it is unknown whether the tariff has been modified. Although it may 
be a sensible decision from the point of view of electricity utilities, adjusting 
electricity tariffs to fuel prices in Pacific Islands in the short run is likely to worsen 
the vulnerability of such economies to fuel prices by reinforcing price fluctuations.  
 
As mentioned previously, a number of utilities (in Fiji, Kiribati, Palau, and Solomon 
Islands) impose a national tariff, meaning that they charge the same price in different 
islands or areas. In other countries, such as French Polynesia and Tuvalu, the price for 
electricity is lower in outer islands than in the main island. Such pricing practices may 
involve high cross-subsidies from customers in the main islands or urban areas to 
customers in outer islands, given the substantial difference between distribution costs 
to urban and rural areas. Cross-subsidization, defined in this instance as setting the 
price of electricity above its average cost in some places (typically in the main island) 
so as to set the price below its average cost in other places, can be interpreted as a 
                                                 
21 Wade et al. (2005) Vol. 2,3,9,10 and 11; www.edt.pf  
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means for redistributing resources (Viscusi, Vernon and Harrington, 2000, p. 327). 
The director of the electricity utility of Tahiti (EDT) has acknowledged that the 
company loses money in all the small outer islands it serves22, which implies a large 
cross-subsidy from customers in Tahiti to customers in outer islands such as Bora 
Bora and Moorea. In Tuvalu, customers in Funafuti (the main island) are charged a 
higher price than in outer islands, even though supply costs are higher in outer islands 
(Wade et al., 2005, Vol. 15, p. 14). However, the Tuvalu Electricity Corporation is 
required by the government to sell electricity below cost, which has significantly 
affected its performance. Wade et al. (2005) reported that the true cost of generation 
well exceeds the prices charged in both outer islands and Funafuti (the cost of supply 
was estimated to be more than four times the price of electricity in Funafuti in 2000) 
(Wade et al., 2005, Vol. 15, p. 13).  
 
Overall, most public utilities fail to recover short run marginal costs and rely on 
government subsidies to operate. This is because the tariffs charged to consumers are 
generally much lower than the marginal cost of production; this condition is often 
required by governments (such as in Tuvalu). In most cases, such financial difficulties 
have hindered the maintenance and expansion of utilities, often resulting in high 
transmission losses or outages.  
 
8)  Energy Policy and Legislation  
 
In most Pacific Island Countries, a small energy department is responsible for 
national energy policy planning and implementation, although responsibilities related 
to energy matters are often unclear and overlapping between different departments. In 
Nauru and Niue, there is no energy department; in Niue the electricity utility is in 
charge of energy planning while three other departments individually take care of 
issues related to fossil fuels, biomass and photovoltaic water pumps.  
 
National energy policies have rarely been officially endorsed by governments in 
Pacific Islands: in 2004, only three countries had national energy policies with some 
form of official endorsement and two countries had prepared draft policies that were 
                                                 
22 Conversation with Mr Joel Allain, director of EDT, on Tuesday the 18th of July 2006 in Tahiti. 
 28
under review (Wade et al., 2005, Vol. 1, pp. 16-17). Furthermore, national energy 
policies rarely provide specific guidelines and goals for implementation, such as 
priorities or budget preparation. According to Wade et al. (2005), such policies are 
often compelled or influenced by donors or regional organisations and provide a 
limited coverage of energy issues, with emphasis on power sector investment needs 
rather than policy.  
 
Legislation and regulation regarding electricity supply is limited in Pacific Islands. 
The best known legislation relating to energy supply is the Renewable Energy Service 
Companies Legislation, which was prepared by United Nations Development 
Programme and Global Environment Facility in 2003 for Fiji (Wade et al., 2005, Vol. 
1, Table 1-10). In most countries, the only legal document relating to energy supply is 
an Electricity Act which establishes the public electricity utility, its responsibilities 
and exclusive right to generate, distribute and sell electricity.  In Samoa, the EPC act 
does not give exclusive rights to the utility (EPC), but allows for EPC to issue permits 
required to generated electricity as it is the owner of the electricity grid. Similarly, the 
Solomon Islands Electricity Authority (SIEA) and the Tonga Electric Power Board 
(TEPB) issue licenses for electricity generation in the Solomon Islands and Tonga 
respectively. In Nauru and Niue, there is no formal legislation or regulation with 
regards to electricity supply; the utilities are simply required to respond to 
government orders. Electricity supply in rural and remote areas is rarely regulated, 
particularly when the public utilities do not provide electricity to these areas. In the 
Cook Islands, for instance, electricity supply in only regulated on the main island, 
Rarotonga (Wade et al., 2005, Vol. 2, p. 23).  
 
Given that the electricity sectors of most Pacific Islands are characterized by natural 
monopolies which operate in a poorly regulated environment, there is little room for 
competition in electricity supply. However, there has been considerable focus on 
regional cooperation in recent years. There are a number of institutions, agencies and 
organisations which are providing energy policy co-ordination and advice: the Pacific 
Forum Secretariat, the South Pacific Applied Geosciences Commission (SOPAC), the 
Committee of Regional Organizations of the Pacific (CROP), the South Pacific 
Regional Environmental Program (SPREP), the Pacific Islands Development Program 
(PIDP), the Pacific Power Association (PPA). The Council of the Regional 
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Organizations of the Pacific (CROP) has prepared a regional Energy Policy and Plan 
which sets out a useful framework for energy policy planning in the Pacific (Wade et 
al., 2004, p.22). 
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Chapter Three: Renewable Energy and Electricity 
Supply: Integrating Wave Energy into an Electricity 
Network 
 
 
 
1)  Wave Energy 
Wave energy has been studied for decades, with the completion of hundreds of 
patents for wave energy capturing devices before 1950. Research for wave energy 
converters intensified with the 1973 oil crisis. At that time, several governments 
started to fund programmes for wave energy converters research and development, 
notably in the UK and Norway. Unfortunately, most of these programmes failed23 and 
by the mid-1980s most research had been abandoned, affecting confidence in the 
technology. Nevertheless, further increases in oil prices and rising climate change 
concerns contributed to a renewed interest in wave energy in the mid-1990s, 
reinforced by growing experience with the offshore gas and oil platforms industry, 
and the development of new offshore wind turbines. There are currently a large 
number of wave energy converters being developed around the world (Canada, USA, 
UK, Denmark, Australia, New Zealand). These devices may be classified according to 
their placement (onshore, near shore or offshore), fixing (floating devices, bottom-
mounted devices), power take-off system (hydraulic, air turbine, water pump), and 
principle of operation (overtopping structures; Oscillating Water Columns which are 
partly submerged structures; point absorber devices, which are floating structures 
occupying a small area; wave power attenuators, which are oriented parallel to the 
direction of the waves; or wave power terminators, which extend perpendicular to the 
wave direction).   
Wave energy is a large, clean and renewable energy source. Wave power, determined 
by the height, speed and length of the waves, is concentrated near the water surface. 
One of the most attractive characteristics of this resource is its high power density, 
compared to the diffuse wind and solar energy sources (it is often described as a 
concentrated form of solar energy). Although wave energy, like wind energy, is 
                                                 
23 For more details, see http://www.wave-energy.net/Schools/History.htm  
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variable, it is more continuous than wind power and can be predicted four to five days 
in advance. The extent of variability and predictability of renewable energy sources 
are important as they determine how new renewable technologies interact with the 
existing electricity system in any given country (see section 3 of this chapter).  An 
advantage of wave energy is that the natural seasonal variability of wave energy 
follows electricity demand patterns. For example, wave power output in winter in the 
United Kingdom (from December to March) has been reported to be almost seven 
times higher than during summer (Environmental Energy Institute, 2005, p. 36), while 
average electricity demand levels are higher during winter. An assessment of wave 
energy resource in Hawaii also reports that wave power is higher between December 
and March, which corresponds to summer, when electricity demand is higher in 
Pacific Islands (Hagerman, Previsic, Bedard, 2004, p. 34).   
High power density, relatively low variability, advantageous seasonal variability and 
the ability to forecast the availability of the resource (and therefore the possibility of 
dispatching wave generation) are the key characteristics that make wave energy an 
attractive renewable energy source. However, to date, uncertainty with respect to 
reliability and survivability of wave energy converters remains prevalent, and 
production costs are relatively high as wave energy technologies are still at an early 
stage. Nevertheless, uncertainty and perceived risk are likely to be reduced with 
further demonstration and production experience. Experience with solar energy, wind 
energy, and the gas platform industry suggest that capital and production costs of 
wave energy technologies are likely to decrease significantly with experience and 
government support. Many studies have shown how learning through production 
experience has reduced unit cost for renewable energy technologies, using learning 
curves which provide a quantitative (negative) relationship between cumulative 
production and unit cost (McDonald and Schrattenholzer, 2001; Ibenholt, 2002; 
Coulomb and Neuhoff, 2006). Learning curves have also been used to determine how 
much investment or support may be required from governments for a technology to 
become competitive. For instance, Goff (2006, p. 33) found that reductions in learning 
related costs associated with increases wind capacity and investment in public 
research and development justify the need to invest further in wind energy, even if it 
still involves high up-front costs. To date only two countries, United Kingdom and 
Portugal, have provided financial support for wave energy research and development, 
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and the majority of wave energy technologies are still at an early stage. Hence risk, 
uncertainty (including regulatory uncertainty) and high costs are still associated with 
wave energy technologies, but are likely to be significantly reduced with production 
experience and government support.  
Some important matters will need to be clarified to determine the viability and 
attractiveness of wave energy at a large scale. One is the environmental impact of 
wave power plants. This aspect is particularly important to Pacific Island Countries, 
as they derive a range of benefits from their marine environment. A study conducted 
by the Electric Power Research Institute’s Electricity Innovation Institute (E2I EPRI) 
explored six different environmental issues for the island of Oahu, Hawaii, and 
concluded that wave energy is a harmless generation technology (Hagerman, Bedard, 
2004, p. 28). Nevertheless, the authors recommended that each wave energy project 
include careful monitoring and evaluation, site selection, and consultation with 
interested parties. As environmental assessments will most likely be required before 
obtaining permits for the installation of a device, this may be the best way to approach 
the issue of environmental impact assessment. As stated above, there exist a wide 
range of wave energy converters, which may have different effects on the 
environment, depending on the distance to the shore of each device, its size and 
elevation, and whether it is noisy, floating or caisson-based.  
There are several different wave energy converters currently being developed, and 
several will be commercialised within the next decade, leading to an eventual 
competition between different devices, not only in terms of least-cost generation but 
also in terms of characteristics such as maintenance, survivability and performance. 
Choices between different wave energy devices may be made according to the 
suitability of a device for a given site. However, only experience will show and 
determine the performance of each device in terms of efficiency, reliability and 
survivability. While most wave energy converters are still at the development stage, 
the deployment of the Pelamis in Portugal in 2007 will provide another step towards 
such experience.  
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2) The Pelamis 
 
The Pelamis is the world’s first commercial floating wave energy converter. It 
was developed by Ocean Power Delivery, a company based in Edinburgh. In August 
2004, a full-scale prototype of the Pelamis was installed at the European Marine 
Energy Centre, which provides independent verification and testing of grid connected 
marine devices. In 2005, a Portuguese consortium ordered three 750 kW Pelamis 
machines, which were delivered in mid 2006 and are expected to start delivering 
electricity in late 2007, constituting the world’s first wave farm. 
 
The Pelamis is an offshore floating device which consists of a semi-submerged, 
articulated structure composed of four large cylindrical sections linked by three 
hinged joints. The wave-induced motion of these joints is resisted by hydraulic rams, 
which pump high-pressure oil through hydraulic motors via smoothing accumulators. 
The hydraulic motors drive electrical generators to produce electricity. Power is fed 
down a single cable to a junction on the sea bed (several devices can be connected 
together with a single cable24), and then transmitted to the shore through a subsea 
cable. Each power conversion module is rated at 250 kW, so each device has a rated 
power output of 750 kW, with a capacity factor of 25 percent to 40 percent. The 
Pelamis is about 120 metres long, with a diameter of 3.5 metres. Although it can be 
installed in a range of water depths and sea bed conditions, the Pelamis performs best 
in waters about 50-60 meters depth. It is tied to the seafloor by a mooring system 
which consists of floats and weights, designed to keep the Pelamis positioned while 
allowing it to swing head on to oncoming waves. The Pelamis can be connected 
straight into an electricity grid.    
                                                 
24 www.oceanpd.com  
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Figure 3.1:The Pelamis 
 
 
Pelamis machine sent to Portugal 
 
            25 
    Impression of a wave farm                Pelamis under tow 
 
In general terms, offshore wave energy devices do not entail any shoreline 
modification, and maximize the potential for mass production compared to onshore 
devices. However, offshore wave power plants operate in a very hostile environment, 
meaning that maintenance is likely to be more expensive than for onshore devices.   
The Pelamis was designed with survivability as a key criterion, in order to resist 
dangerous storm conditions. While it incorporates a degree of resonant response to 
improve power capture in small waves, the machine de-tunes in large waves to 
prevent excessive loads and motions26. Other important aspects of the Pelamis include 
easy maintenance, minimum on-site installation work, little noise, and little visual 
impact (as it is a low-profile, offshore device). 
 
                                                 
25 Pictures from www.oceanpd.com  
26 http://www.oceanpd.com/Pelamis/keyConcepts.html  
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Site selection for the Pelamis will rely on a number of criteria. The most obvious one 
will be an appropriate wave resource. Another important determinant is the 
bathymetry, notably what is the sea bed structure made of and whether there are any 
obstacles which may interfere with the mooring and subsea cables. This is potentially 
a major issue in the Pacific Islands, as a majority of these islands are surrounded by 
coral reefs which could potentially impede installation or damage cables, especially in 
rough conditions. Other important determinants include the proximity of an electrical 
grid connection, the existence of onshore facilities for maintenance, and other water 
users (boats, fishers, surfers…). The availability of facilities large enough to allow for 
local construction and/or assembly of the machines on site may reduce costs, since the 
structural elements are made of steel or concrete and can be built using standard 
construction techniques. In addition, a site with existing infrastructure such as a 
seawall, a pier or an ocean outfall would facilitate the integration of transmission 
cables on the land.   
 
In 2004/2005, a series of studies on wave energy were released by the Electric Power 
Research Institute (EPRI) for five different states or cities in the United States 
(Oregon, Maine, Washington, Hawaii, and San Francisco). Among those reports was 
an assessment of the different available wave energy converters, which stated that the 
Pelamis was the only device evaluated which “was acceptable for selection by the 
State Advisors for application in a pilot plant for testing without addressing further 
issues” (Previsic et al., 2005, p. 9). At the time of the assessment, the Pelamis was the 
only device whose development was near completion and for which full-scale long-
term testing in the ocean was underway. Another EPRI report which is particularly 
relevant is the report on Hawaii (Previsic et al., 2005b), which includes a detailed 
evaluation of a hypothetical pilot scale wave power plant on Oahu, as well as the 
evaluation of a commercial wave power plant consisting of 180 Pelamis Converters, 
with a capacity of 500 kW each (compared to the standard 750 kW capacity, which 
was overrated for the Hawaii wave climate). Appendices to the report contain detailed 
financial tables of the costs and revenues for the commercial plant scenario, with 
different estimates for the case of a regulated utility owning the wave plant, and a 
non-regulated utility owning the wave plant. Given that there are both federal and 
state production tax credits available in Hawaii, different tables were also given for 
both cases with and without such tax credits.  
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3) Accommodation of Renewable Energy by Electric Utilities 
 
Similarly to wave energy converters, a range of renewable energy 
technologies rely upon uncontrollable environmental conditions to generate output. 
For example, the amount of electricity generated by a solar panel depends on the 
amount of sun, and the amount of electricity yield by a wind turbine is determined by 
the speed of wind. The output generated by such forms of renewable energy is 
therefore characterised as intermittent, as it may fluctuate significantly, adding an 
element of uncertainty to the management of an electricity supply system. 
Consequently, the connection of renewable electricity generators into an electricity 
network is likely to have significant operational and financial impacts on the 
operation of the network. The extent of these impacts will depend on the amount of 
intermittency introduced into the electricity network, as well as the variability and 
predictability of the output of renewables connected into the grid. This section 
provides an identification and description of the impacts and related costs of the 
integration of renewable electricity generators into an electricity network.  
 
The introduction of renewable energy into an electricity system heavily reliant on 
fossil fuels provides significant benefits in terms of fuel savings and reduction in 
carbon dioxide emissions. However, such benefits will be reduced to the extent that 
the addition of intermittent generators has impacts on reliability of supply, reserve 
requirements to manage unpredicted fluctuations, and the utilisation of other 
generators. The two major technical impacts of intermittency on electricity supply 
networks relate to system balancing and system reliability. 
 
Electricity supply is continuously adjusted to match electricity demand, which 
changes constantly, and can fluctuate widely over a few hours. Operational margin 
refers to the amount of plant that must be operating to ensure that demand is met. 
Some generators can vary their output continuously and rapidly, whereas others must 
produce at a constant level. Fast responding plants are required as part of the 
operational margin as they can respond quickly to demand fluctuations. The addition 
of intermittent renewable electricity generators is likely to have an impact on system 
balancing as it can increase the extent of short-run fluctuations occurring in a supply 
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system. In order to keep meeting electricity demand, it will be necessary to adjust for 
renewable generation fluctuation by ramping other plants up or down. Hence 
additional system reserves will be required when intermittent plants are added to a 
system, as uncertainty over the short-run supply and demand relationship will be 
increased. The amount of additional reserves required to maintain system balancing 
will depend on the extent of unpredicted variations in renewable energy output, 
whether intermittent output can be accurately forecasted, and the relationship between 
variation in electricity demand and intermittent output. Reserve requirements 
significantly increase if output generated by intermittent renewable generators 
decreases in periods of high demand. On the other hand, excess output from an 
intermittent generator may occur, which would require output curtailment or energy 
spilling. In addition, ramping existing thermal plants with frequent starting up and 
shutting down is likely to decrease their efficiency and cause more fuel to be burnt, 
which would partially offset fuel cost savings brought by the addition of renewable 
energy. One of the main advantages of wave energy is its predictability, meaning that 
changes in the utilisation of thermal plants could be planned in advance, reducing 
ramping duty and start up costs. However, the costs of intermittency to an electricity 
network depend not only on the nature and amount of intermittent generation, but also 
on the composition of existing conventional plants and their ability to manage or 
handle variability.  
 
In addition to the reserves required to adjust electricity supply to demand in the short-
term, reliable electricity supply requires enough capacity (much larger than 
operational reserve) to meet expected peak demand. System margin refers to the total 
installed capacity available in excess of expected peak demand to ensure reliable 
electricity supply at peak periods; it is required in order to anticipate events such as 
generators breaking down, units taken out for maintenance, or peak demand being 
higher than projected. The relationship between system margin and reliability is often 
estimated using the concept of Loss of Load Probability (LOLP), which represents the 
probability that generation will be insufficient to meet demand, expressed as a 
percentage that is the maximum number of years per century in which load shedding 
will occur as a result of insufficient generation (Gross et al., 2006). Adding 
intermittent generators in an electricity system results in changes in the spread and 
shape of the frequency distribution of available plant margin (Gross et al., 2006), 
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since intermittent output tends to vary significantly more than conventional plant 
output, and may not be available during periods of peak demand. In addition, 
renewable energy technologies typically have a smaller capacity factor than 
conventional thermal generators. This means that other things equal, a larger amount 
of capacity is required when replacing conventional generators with renewable 
technologies. Because there is uncertainty regarding the availability of intermittent 
output during peak demand periods, the addition of intermittent plants into an 
electricity network requires the installation or retention of some extra “backup” 
capacity in order to maintain system reliability, which will give rise to a cost.  
 
The term “capacity credit” refers to the amount of conventional capacity that a given 
intermittent generator capacity can replace on an electricity system with no change in 
security based on Loss of Load Probability analysis (Anderson, 2006, p. 8). That is, 
the capacity credit of an intermittent generator is the amount of (actual or hypothetical) 
conventional capacity displaced by the intermittent source, minus the conventional 
actually-installed backup capacity required to maintain reliability. Once intermittent 
plants are introduced into an electricity network, the system margin is defined by both 
the conventional capacity and the capacity credit of the intermittent plants (Anderson, 
2006). The total capacity credit of intermittent plants in an electricity system is 
determined by the correlation between demand peaks and intermittent output, as well 
as the range of intermittent outputs, the nature and variance of the geographical 
dispersion of the intermittent plants. 
 
In summary, a range of costs may arise from the introduction of intermittent plants. In 
addition to the capital and operating costs of the plants themselves (and eventually 
supplemental investment in transmission), there will be incremental capital, 
maintenance and fuel costs arising from the additional reserves required to deal with a 
higher level of unpredicted short term fluctuations, and the additional fuel burnt 
because of the increased variation of the output of conventional plants, as well as 
costs related to the amount of extra capacity required to maintain system reliability. 
Whether such costs outweigh the benefits of adding renewables into the system 
depends on a range of factors, such as the type of generators used, system balancing 
and reliability requirements, the range, nature and predictability of intermittent plants, 
their geographical dispersion, and the correlation of their output with demand peaks.  
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A large number of studies have sought to quantify the costs related to the introduction 
of intermittent renewables into electricity systems, particularly focusing on the 
integration of wind energy in European countries (e.g. Dale and Milborrow, 2003). 
However, such estimates cannot be directly transferred to Pacific Islands’ conditions 
for a range of reasons. Firstly, Pacific Islands’ electricity systems are not comparable 
to large systems given their small size and isolation, which entail important 
constraints in matters of capacity margin and reliability. Most islands manage their 
electric utilities under the N-2 criterion, which refers to an approach by which total 
system capacity exceeds expected peak load when the two largest units of the system 
are unavailable. The N-2 reliability criterion entails a relatively large amount of 
system margin, reflecting the fact that isolated systems must ensure a reliable supply 
system at all times given their inability to connect to continental grids. Mayer (2000) 
pointed out that such a management approach induces a trade off between economies 
of scale (via larger generators) and security of supply (larger generating units require 
a larger amount of backup to maintain reliability of supply). In addition, low levels of 
demand imply some rigidity with respect to the use and size of different technologies. 
Given such limited demand, the amount of intermittency should be carefully chosen 
as energy spilling may become an issue. Such characteristics are specific to isolated 
and small systems such as those of Pacific Islands.  
 
Given the differences in system management, the impact and cost of increasing the 
amount of intermittency in Pacific Islands’ electricity systems are likely to be 
substantially different from those of the European systems. While there may be less 
scope for geographical dispersion of renewable energy technologies on small islands, 
most Pacific Islands can potentially integrate a range of different types of renewables 
(solar, wind, wave), which may have positive implications for the total system 
capacity credit of intermittent plants.  On a different note, the amount of fuel cost 
savings brought by increases in renewable energy for electricity generation is likely to 
be more significant in Pacific Islands since fuel cost can be up to 200 percent higher 
than in large European countries.   
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4) Application of Portfolio Theory to Electricity Generation  
 
As seen in the previous section, whether the introduction of intermittent 
renewables into electricity networks increases or reduces the total cost of electricity 
supply will depend on several counteracting factors, including whether or not 
externalities are included in the calculation. The benefits brought by renewables, 
notably environmental benefits such as emissions reductions, and economic benefits 
related to fuel savings, are likely to be particularly significant in the Pacific Islands 
where fossil fuel prices are dramatically high. In addition, given the uncertainties 
overhanging the world oil market, a country’s security of energy supply would 
improve with the development of renewable energy for electricity generation as 
increasing the share of renewables for electricity generation would reduce 
vulnerability to international market price fluctuations. Many studies (Weisser, 2004; 
Domah, 2002; Awerbuch, 2004) have provided evidence that the risk related to fossil 
fuel price volatility and unpredictability has negative impacts on economic activity, 
terms of trade, employment and GDP growth. Awerbuch (2003) has argued that given 
such uncertainty, investment decisions in electricity generation should no longer be 
based solely on the costs of different technologies, but should also take into account 
the different risks related to each technology.  
 
Increases in the price of oil can lead to severe macroeconomic consequences for low 
income, oil-importing countries (Weisser, 2004, p.134). A rise in the price of oil 
might be deflationary, reducing ability to import, worsening the terms of trade, and 
increasing debts. This is particularly the case for Pacific Island Countries, where fossil 
fuel is relatively expensive and where the proportion of petroleum imports compared 
to total exports is high. It has been reported that Pacific Islands Countries’energy 
imports account for 15-25 percent of total imports, and over 40 percent of gross 
domestic commodity exports (for some countries this figure can be as high as 500 
percent - Grynberg, 2005, p. 9). 
 
Despite abundance of natural resources and large potential benefits from renewable 
energy, however, there is little renewable energy capacity on Pacific Islands, 
indicating either that the benefits of renewables are not appropriable by the existing 
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industry participants, or that other cost factors (such as the need to maintain reliability) 
outweigh the benefits of reduced oil dependence. 
 
An increasing number of studies have applied to electricity planning the mean-
variance analysis of portfolios, from the finance theory introduced by Harry 
Markowitz in 1952 (Awerbuch and Berger, 2003; Jansen et al, 2006; McLoughin and 
Bazilian, 2006). The mean-variance portfolio approach provides a quantitative 
framework to evaluate investment options in terms of both returns and risks (defined 
as the standard deviation of the returns), and shows that investors can reduce exposure 
to risk by holding a diversified portfolio of assets. While the goal of the analysis is to 
maximize return for a given level of risk, or minimize risk for a desired level of return 
(DeLaquil, Awerbuch, Stroup, 2005), the key characteristic for optimization is a less 
than perfect correlation between returns on each asset. In the case of electricity 
portfolios, different technologies are evaluated in terms of their generating costs 
(composed of fuel, operation and maintenance, and capital costs) and risk (in terms of 
the variability of those costs), in order to make decisions for energy planning.  
 
The approach consists of calculating portfolio cost and risk combinations for varying 
asset allocations, where ‘asset’ may be defined as either the proportion of total 
electricity generated by a technology or the amount of generating capacity of a 
technology compared to total generating capacity. Portfolio optimization leads to the 
construction of an efficient frontier, which represents the portfolio generating mixes 
(asset allocations) which have the minimum cost for any given level of risk. 
Graphically, the efficient frontier shows all efficient portfolios in terms of risk and 
unit cost of electricity (in $/MWh). Portfolio efficiency implies that electricity cost 
can only be decreased by increasing risk. The analysis thus consists of depicting the 
trade-off between generating cost and risk, showing all combinations of technologies 
which are efficient. Hence there is no prescription of a single optimal portfolio, but a 
graphical representation which displays the range of efficient choices, enabling any 
actual or projected generating mix to be located compared to the efficient frontier.  
 
The key variables for mean-variance portfolio analysis are the portfolio cost, risk, and 
the correlation coefficient or co-variance between the technologies’ expected cost 
variances. Portfolio cost is typically defined as the weighted average life-cycle cost of 
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the individual expected costs of the generating mix technologies. Portfolio risk is the 
sum of the weighted average of the individual technology cost variances, and their co-
variances. Overall, studies which have employed mean-variance portfolio theory have 
concluded that the inclusion of renewable energy technologies into generating 
portfolios is desirable from a societal point of view, as it can substantially reduce 
portfolio risk at little or no additional cost. Even though renewable technologies have 
high capital costs and induce higher generating portfolio costs, their inclusion into 
portfolios is desirable because the cost variance of renewables is not correlated with 
fossil fuel prices, which drive the bulk of cost variance for conventional generators. In 
addition, the cost structure of renewable technologies is relatively fixed over time, 
which allows for more certainty.  
 
The following paragraphs provide a brief review of some of the main studies applying 
portfolio analysis to energy planning.  
 
In one of the most detailed studies, Awerbuch and Berger (2003) apply portfolio 
theory to the European Union (EU) electricity planning. The model incorporates four 
different cost and risk components: fuel outlays, variable O&M costs, fixed O&M, 
and construction period costs (Awerbuch and Berger 2003, p. 20), where the risks and 
cross-correlations associated with fuel costs are based on historical time series and 
other risks are based on financial proxies. The efficient frontier, composed of the 
minimum risk portfolio for each level of cost, is found using Microsoft Excel Solver. 
The following graph represents the EU efficient frontier constructed in that study: 
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Figure 3.2: EU Efficient Frontier (Awerbuch and Berger, 2003) 
 
 
 
The ‘politically efficient frontier’ in the diagram accounts for practical efficiency; it 
constitutes an additional ad hoc constraint related to the inability to decommission and 
abandon the totality of existing nuclear capacity (however, it does not include 
decommissioning and salvage costs). This constraint was introduced in addition to a 
feasibility constraint, which implies that the shares of existing technologies cannot 
exceed their 2000 generation value. Existing capacity is thus considered separately to 
new capacity. Separating existing capacity from new capacity also matters in the 
sense that existing capacity has no construction period risk, whereas new capacity 
does. Awerbuch and Berger conclude that fixed cost renewable technologies must be 
included in a portfolio for efficiency, and that EU’s planned 2010 generating mix is 
sub-optimal as it is not located on the efficient frontier. Results were found to be 
robust to sensitivity analysis.  
 
Awerbuch (2005) considers Scotland’s energy diversity, using the same framework. 
However, in order to reflect system integration costs, a fixed charge of £16/MWh is 
added to the cost of wind generation, based on the estimates of Dale and Milborrow 
(2004). The graph below depicts the efficient frontier which includes integration costs, 
along with the reference-case efficient frontier which does not account for system 
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integration costs.  (Note that the vertical axis here shows cost, whereas the diagram 
from Awerbuch and Berger 2003 was drawn for the reciprocal of cost, namely return). 
 
Figure 3.3: Scotland’s Efficient Frontier (Awerbuch, 2005) 
 
 
 
Awerbuch concluded that the portfolio results remain valid even with the inclusion of 
system integration costs.  
 
Jansen, Beurskens and Tilburg (2006) look at the Dutch generating mix and propose 
some modifications to Awerbuch’s theoretical framework. The most significant 
change is related to the calculation of portfolio risk-cost, notably the relationship 
between cost minimization and return maximization. Awerbuch had defined return as 
the inverse of the weighted average of portfolio cost, which Jansen et al show to be 
misleading when calculating returns of portfolios that consist of more than two assets. 
Another adjustment is to express portfolios in terms of energy generation instead of 
generating capacity, which allows for a more accurate comparison between 
technologies, given that renewable technologies typically have a lower capacity factor 
than conventional thermal technologies. Jansen et al also propose some refinements to 
the concept and calculation of risk found in the Awerbuch-Berger framework. 
Furthermore, the cost structure is different. It consists of an investment cost (which 
includes decommissioning costs), fuel cost, fixed operation and maintenance cost, 
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variable operation and maintenance cost, and a cost for CO2 emissions per MWh of 
output, which provides a measure for environmental externalities. In addition, a fixed 
“intermittency cost” of €6/MWh is added to intermittent technologies in order to 
account for the impacts of intermittency on the system. Jansen et al use the same type 
of graphical analysis and conclude that the 2030 pre-determined portfolio targets for 
the Netherlands are inefficient. This framework was replicated by McLoughlin, 
Bazilian (2006) for the Irish generating mix. 
 
Boris Krey and Peter Zweifel (2006) apply portfolio theory to electricity generation in 
both Switzerland and the United States. Their study differs from the other portfolio 
analyses in a number of ways. Instead of determining the efficient frontier in a cost-
risk dimension, they use risk and expected decreases in costs, on the basis that 
investors are concerned with future returns rather than the current value of a share. 
More importantly, a Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE) is 
performed in order to control for the possible correlation of error terms across risk 
equations. The following graph shows the efficient frontier constructed for 
Switzerland. 
 
Figure 3.4: Switzerland’s Efficient Frontier (Krey and Zweifel, 2006) 
 
  
 
Decreases in costs are used instead of cost on the vertical axis, which may be regarded 
as confusing as it represents the (negative) variation of cost, which is already picked 
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up by the risk variable. Based on these estimates, the study concluded that for 
Switzerland, a move towards nuclear energy and away from run of river 
hydroelectricity was advisable, while an increase in production from coal and a 
decrease in gas production were advocated for the United States. Such results are 
different from those of previous studies, most likely because of the use of expected 
decrease in cost of a portfolio, rather than its cost.  
 
The various studies which have applied mean-variance portfolio theory to electricity 
generation have shown that uncertainty and the variability of generating costs, in 
particular fossil fuel costs, can be and ought to be considered for energy decisions. By 
taking both cost and risk into account, this approach has provided an important 
framework for the evaluation of national electricity strategies and the diversification 
of electricity generating technologies for improving energy security. Nevertheless, a 
number of issues remain overlooked in this framework. In particular, the absence of 
assumptions relating to the maintenance of reliability of electricity networks 
constitutes a weakness of the analysis. Awerbuch and Berger (2003) assume that no 
backup capacity is necessary in addition to the existing capacity on the grounds that a 
number of studies have claimed that wind penetration levels of 5 percent to 10 percent 
cause little change to an electricity system operation strategy (Awerbuch, Berger, 
2003, p. 57). Yet they recommend a portfolio containing 12.2 percent of wind 
generating capacity. While this figure may not be too far from the 10 percent 
threshold to be considered a threat to a system’s reliability, another study (Awerbuch, 
2005) concludes that “without increasing cost or risk, onshore wind can be increased 
to at least 31 percent of [Scotland’s] electricity generation” (Awerbuch, 2005, p. 27). 
Nevertheless, by including an estimate of the cost of integrating wind in the UK, this 
study represents the first attempt to account for reliability maintenance in portfolio 
analysis. However, the Dale and Miborrow estimate used by Awerbuch refers to the 
costs associated with developing 20 percent wind in the UK electricity system (Dale, 
Milborrow, 2003, p. 24). Jansen et al (2006) and McLoughlin and Bazilian (2006) 
both include an additional cost of €6/MWh for intermittent generation. However, 
these studies do not specify where this estimate comes from. 
 
While depicting the maintenance of reliability may not be crucial for models which 
imply relatively low penetration levels of intermittent renewables in very large 
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electricity networks, such as that of the UK with access to continental backup, it is 
likely to be far more significant once a similar analysis is applied to small island 
systems. The amount of backup capacity required to maintain reliability is relatively 
smaller for larger networks. Similarly, larger networks can sustain a wider range of 
types of generation (UKERC, 2006, p. 8). In contrast, small electricity networks 
require a large amount of reserve capacity. As already noted, most island systems 
operate with the N-2 reliability criterion (Mayer, 2000, p. 320), which means that a 
sufficient amount of capacity margin is maintained to cover peak demand in the event 
of the failure of the second largest generation unit when the largest is out for 
maintenance. In Oahu, Hawaii, for example, a system margin of 25 percent is 
maintained. Given that the system does not currently accommodate any significant 
amount of intermittent generation, any analysis involving the uptake of renewables 
must account for reliability. As pointed out by Jansen et al, ideally the cost of 
intermittency should be dependent on the penetration level (Jansen et al., 2006, p. 61) 
of intermittent technologies. In addition, the costs of integrating intermittency should 
be technology-specific; that is, they should vary with the extent of dispatchability of a 
technology. For example, it is likely that the costs arising from the integration of wave 
energy devices into an electricity system are substantially lower than those of the 
integration of wind turbines, as the wave energy resource is relatively continuous and 
can be forecast days in advance. As seen in chapter 2, there is much potential for most 
Pacific Island Countries to generate electricity from a range of renewable resources. 
Hence, constructing electricity generation portfolios for Pacific Island would require 
the inclusion of a relatively larger number of renewable technologies (solar, wind, 
wave, hydro) than has been done for European countries. Incorporating a measure 
which determines the amount of back up required to maintain reliability for each 
technology would thus be appropriate for small island portfolios. 
 
Another assumption at the core of the portfolio approach which does not necessarily 
fit to all electricity systems is that of a “flexible” generating mix; that is, that the 
generating mix can be “re-shuffled” relatively easily. Unfortunately, in Pacific Islands 
the ability to decommission plants and construct new ones is likely to be significantly 
constrained by financial resources, reliability requirements, and the utilities’ market 
power. In addition, the efficient frontiers for small islands may not be as continuous 
and large as those of larger countries, since generating mix choices for Pacific Islands 
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are likely to be constrained by low demand levels. Hence, the assumption for demand 
growth will be crucial when applying portfolio analysis to small systems such as those 
of Pacific Island Countries. Furthermore, an extended observation of the existing 
plants will be required in order to determine capacity replacement and the amount of 
backup required over the years. The separation of existing and new capacity, as in 
Awerbuch and Berger (2003), would thus be particularly useful for small island 
systems. In addition, the inclusion of construction period cost and risk and 
decommissioning costs would be useful. Although Jansen et al include 
decommissioning costs, they do not provide any specifications as to how such costs 
were determined. To replace such cost estimates, one may, for example, make 
assumptions regarding the durability of each plant. This would be a way to determine 
the maximum time a plant could be used before being abandoned.  
 
Hence, while portfolio analysis has been applied successfully to large countries, a 
number of issues will need to be addressed before applying it to smaller systems such 
as those of Pacific Island countries. The modifications required to add constraints will 
be necessary not only for extending the analysis to small island systems, but will also 
be applicable to larger systems. Such refinements would enhance the accuracy and 
credibility of the analysis, while addressing issues which are of concern to energy 
planners.  
 
So far, most studies which have applied portfolio theory to electricity generation have 
entailed the construction of an efficient frontier, providing graphical analysis for 
energy planning. Such studies have all led to the conclusion that the generating mix 
targets chosen by energy planners were not located on the efficient frontier, implying 
opportunities for Pareto improvements in the choice of electricity generating mix. 
While such analysis has typically shown that improvements could be obtained by 
increasing the amount of renewable energy for electricity generation, it has involved 
only limited discussion regarding the optimal or feasible amount of renewable energy 
in a given electricity system. The concept of portfolio analysis, however, can be used 
to investigate how much renewable energy can be integrated into an electricity system 
without compromising reliability of supply. Indeed, while it has already been applied 
to portfolios of electricity supply by minimizing the variance associated with their 
costs, the same concept of portfolio analysis could be applied to the integration of 
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different types of renewables by minimizing the variance of output produced. This 
approach could be very useful to policy-makers who are striving to increase the share 
of renewable energy without jeopardizing reliability of electricity supply, as in Pacific 
Islands. When applying portfolio analysis to reliability of supply, the degree of 
correlation between the different renewable energy resources used would become the 
key variable. For instance, if the correlation between wind and waves was close to one, 
then having a large share of electricity supplied from wind and wave energy would be 
relatively risky: in the absence of both wind and waves at the same time, there would 
be a power shortage. If, however, the degree of correlation between the wind and 
wave resource was closer to zero, then wave energy could serve as a backup for wind 
energy in the absence of wind, and vice-versa. Intuitively, the larger the diversity of 
renewable energy sources used, the higher the reliability of supply. 
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Chapter Four: Entry of a Wave Energy Technology 
into the Electricity Market of a Pacific Island – Case 
Study of the Pelamis in Hawaii 
 
 
 
1)  Introduction 
 
Because of its status as part of the United States of America, Hawaii has a 
long-established electricity system with a well-developed regulatory regime and good 
sources of information.  It faces essentially the same issues as other Pacific Islands 
with regard to isolation, remoteness, and limited opportunities to secure economies of 
scope and scale. It has also been one of the case-study locations selected by the 
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) for its evaluation of the Pelamis wave-
power technology, which means that firm estimates of the economics of introduction 
of this renewable technology have been produced on a consistent basis.  A ten-day 
field trip was undertaken in August 2006 to produce a Pacific Island case-study and to 
calibrate the mathematical model described in Chapter 5 below.  
 
The field research was carried out on three islands in the Hawaii group: Maui, Big 
Island of Hawaii, and Oahu. The goal was to acquire information and insight on the 
operation and regulation of the islands’ electricity systems, and to study the potential 
for the integration of the Pelamis wave energy technology into these networks. In 
order to understand the different perspectives and market forces evolving around the 
electricity and renewable energy markets, a broad range of market participants were 
interviewed: employees from the electric utilities, the Public Utilities Commission, 
the Government (Hawaii Department for Economic and Business Development), 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs), renewable energy research institutes, and 
political representatives. A list of the people interviewed is provided in Appendix B 
(table B1).  
 
The case study of Hawaii is presented in the following sections, starting with a 
description of the electricity market and relevant regulation. Section 2 reviews some 
of the status quo barriers to renewable energy development in Hawaii (barriers to 
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renewable energy development in Pacific Islands are discussed more thoroughly in 
chapter 6). Finally, the potential for integrating a wave energy technology in 
Hawaiian electricity networks is examined in section 3.  
 
2)  Electric Utilities, Current Regulation and Requirements  
 
Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc. (HEI) supplies power to 95 percent of the 
Hawaii electricity market through its subsidiaries Hawaiian Electric Company (HECO) 
on Oahu, Hawaii Electric Light Company (HELCO) on Big Island and Maui Electric 
Company (MECO) on Maui, which also supplies the islands of Lanai and Molokai27. 
The Kaua’i Island Utility Cooperative (KIUC) is responsible for power supply on the 
island of Kaua’i. All electric utilities operate and maintain not only the bulk of 
generation units, but also the transmission and distribution systems of the islands in 
which they operate: they are vertically integrated.  
 
In this case study, the description of electricity suppliers is mainly focused on HEI 
subsidiaries, as very little information was collected on the KIUC compared to HEI 
subsidiaries (there was insufficient time to visit the island of Kaua’i). While this case 
study is concentrated on HEI subsidiaries, which are private companies, it is 
important to keep in mind that the KIUC is a cooperative and may be more open than 
HEI to integrating renewable energy technologies.  
 
All utilities in Hawaii are regulated by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC), 
formed in 1913, and the Division of Consumer Advocate (DCA). The PUC is in 
charge of the supervision of public service companies, and the DCA represents utility 
consumer interests. The Department of Business, Economic Development and 
Tourism (DBEDT) is also involved in energy regulation and policy: the director of 
DBEDT is the Energy Resources Coordinator, and the administrator of the DBEDT 
division of Energy, Research and Technology is the Petroleum Commissioner 
(Freeman and Lazar, 2003, p. 20).  
 
                                                 
27 www.hei.com  
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Table 4.1 displays the total installed capacity in Hawaii (excluding Kaua’i Island). 
The HEI subsidiaries own and maintain the transmission and distribution systems on 
each island. All suppliers other than HECO, HELCO and MECO that are listed in the 
table below are independent power producers (IPPs) which are connected to the grid 
through Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) signed with the electric utilities. PPAs 
are subject to the approval of the Public Utilities Commission. 
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Table 4.1: Electricity Supply in Hawaii from Hawaiian Electric Industries 
Island Company Energy source / technology Location Capacity (MW) 
Oahu HECO Oil power plant Honolulu 113 
Oahu HECO Oil power plant Waiau 499 
Oahu HECO Oil power plant Kahe 651 
Oahu H-POWER Waste to energy system  Kapolei 46 
Oahu Kalaeloa Partners Oil plant Kalaeloa 180 
Oahu AES-Hawaii Coal-fired plant Kapolei 180 
Oahu 
Kapaa 
Generating 
Partners Landfill Gas (Methane) Kailua 3.5 
Oahu Tesoro Corp. Diesel or oil plant Kapolei 18.5 
Oahu Chevron Corp. Diesel or oil plant   9.6 
Hawaii HELCO Oil power plant Hill 35.5 
Hawaii HELCO Oil power plant Puna 36.3 
Hawaii HELCO Oil power plant Keahole 29.5 
Hawaii HELCO Oil power plant Kanoelehua 21.75 
Hawaii HELCO Oil power plant Shipman 18.6 
Hawaii HELCO Oil power plant Waimea 11.25 
Hawaii 
Puna Geothermal 
Venture 
Geothermal Hot Liquid (Steam 
Turbine Generators) Puna 30 
Hawaii 
Hamakua Energy 
Partners Combined Cycle plant Honokaa 60 
Hawaii HELCO Wind Farm Lalamilo 2.3 
Hawaii HELCO Hydropower (run-of-river) 
Puueo, 
Waiau 3.35 
Hawaii 
Apollo Energy 
Corp. Wind Farm South Point 9.25 
Hawaii 
Wailuku River 
Hydroelectric Hydropower (run-of-river) Wailuku 11 
Maui MECO 
Diesel units, plus two 
Combined Cycle Gas Turbines  Maalaea 196.5 
Maui MECO 
Steam Turbine (fired by bunker 
fuel) Kahului 37.6 
Maui 
HC&S (Sugar 
company) 
Bagasse (boiler, steam turbine 
generators) /  Coal / Oil Puunene 16 
Maui HC&S  Hydropower run-of-river  
Kaheka, Paia, 
Hamakua 5.8 
Maui LLC, UPC  Wind Farm Kaheawa 30 
Maui MECO Oil power plant Hana 2 
Lanai MECO Oil power plant Lanai 10.4 
Molokai MECO Oil power plant Molokai 12.05 
Source: www.heco.com  
 
 
Table 4.2: Percentage of Total Installed Capacity held by Independent Producers 
  Oahu Hawaii Maui 
Total Capacity (MW) 1700.6 290.8 287.9 
% Total Capacity from IPPs (MW) 25.7 45.5 18.0 
Source: www.heco.com (figures from table 4.2 above) 
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The tables above show that although Hawaiian Electric Industries subsidiaries are 
vertically-integrated structures and all have the status of monopolies (independent 
producers must sign a contract with the utilities in order to produce and sell 
electricity), there is some degree of competition in the market provided by a fringe of 
independent power producers exploiting renewable and fossil resources—mostly oil 
and diesel, with some hydropower and wind farms.  
 
Independent supply is encouraged by a 1978 federal law of the United States called 
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA). The aim of PURPA is to 
promote alternative energy sources and energy efficiency, and to diversify the electric 
power industry. PURPA obliges utility companies to purchase energy from 
independent companies at prices based on “avoided cost”. The qualifying independent 
facilities include small-scale producers who generate energy for their own needs but 
may have surplus energy, and incidental producers who generate electricity as a by-
product of other activities28. The term “avoided cost” refers to the incremental cost 
which an electric utility avoids by purchasing from a qualifying facility.  
 
The promotion of small-scale renewable energy in Hawaii was further enhanced in 
June 2001 with the enactment of a net-metering law. Net metering is available to 
residential and small commercial customers with solar, wind, biomass or 
hydroelectric systems with a capacity up to 10 kilowatts (kW). This capacity limit was 
increased to 50 kW in 2004, and the Public Utilities Commission has discretion to 
increase it beyond 50 kW in particular cases29. Electricity utilities are required to offer 
net metering on a first-come, first-serve basis to eligible customers until the 
aggregated net-metered capacity equals 0.5 percent of each utility’s system peak 
demand. This cap was provided by the law but may be increased by the PUC. The 
PUC is responsible for setting safety, performance, and reliability standards. Hawaii, 
like other U.S. states, has adopted national, standardized interconnection requirements 
as part of its net-metering law.  
 
                                                 
28 http://www.energyvortex.com/energydictionary  
29 http://www.heco.com/images/pdf/NEM_brochure8.pdf  
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Net metering allows customers to offset their purchases of electricity from the utility 
with electricity produced by their renewable system, credited at the retail rate. When a 
customer produces more electricity than it consumes during a month, net excess 
generation credits in the form of kWh can be applied to the following month’s bill. 
Net excess generation credits can be carried over for a maximum of 12 months. In the 
case of net excess generation, the customer still has to pay for a minimum charge 
which covers fixed costs such as meter readings and billing. Net-metered customers 
cannot be paid for excess generation (this can only occur under a power purchase 
agreement). A set of guidelines and a simple, short net metering agreement form are 
available from the HECO website30.  
 
The net metering system is accompanied by state and federal renewable energy tax 
credits. State tax credits include a 35 percent tax credit on solar thermal systems and 
solar photovoltaic systems, and a 20 percent tax credit on wind systems, for both 
residents and businesses. These tax credits apply to the cost of the systems, including 
accessories and installation, and there is no maximum limit to the total amount of the 
credit. Tax credits that exceed the taxpayer’s income tax liability may be used as a 
credit against income tax liability in subsequent years until exhausted. There is also a 
state capital goods excise tax credit for businesses, which reimburses businesses for 
the general excise tax or use tax that they pay on the purchase of a solar electric 
system (the credit is equal to four percent of the cost of the solar electric system). In 
addition, there is a federal business energy tax credit of 10 percent available to 
commercial businesses that purchase energy property in the US (including solar and 
geothermal energy). Finally, there is a Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System 
(MACRS), under which businesses can recover investments in solar electric 
equipments through depreciation deductions.  
 
An example of the outcomes from this combination of net metering services, state and 
federal taxes, is the company Big Island TOYOTA (on Big Island of Hawaii) which 
installed a 64.5 kW grid-connected net energy metered photovoltaic system in 2006, 
claimed to be the largest commercial solar electric system on East Hawaii. This 
installation was mostly planned and put in place by Mr Victor Trevino, chief 
                                                 
30 http://www.heco.com/images/pdf/net_meter_appendix1.pdf  
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operations officer at Big Island Toyota and manager of Hawaii Beef Producers, using 
an innovative financing approach based on a partnership between Big Island Toyota 
and the Bank of Hawaii31. Although Big Island Toyota hosts the solar panels and 
benefits from a net metering agreement with HELCO, the system is owned by the 
Bank, which bought the solar photovoltaic system, pays for its maintenance, and 
benefits from the tax credits enumerated in the previous paragraph. Eighty percent of 
what the bank spends on the solar panels is refunded by state and federal tax credits, 
yet the total amount spent on the panels, which reflects the real value of the system, 
appears as an asset on the bank’s balance sheet. Meanwhile, Toyota gets to reduce its 
monthly electricity bill through its net metering agreement with the electric utility, 
without having had to spend any money on the panels’ installation or maintenance. 
 
Independent producers and net metering customers (such as Big Island Toyota) assist 
the electric utilities in meeting their Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) 
requirements. The RPS, enacted in 2001, is a law which “establishes goals for electric 
utility companies in implementing renewable portfolio standards by including a 
minimum percentage of renewable energy resources within an overall resource 
portfolio”32. 
 
The 2001 renewable portfolio standard goals for each electric utility were 7 percent of 
net electricity sales by December 2003, 8 percent of net electricity sales by 2005, and 
9 percent of net electricity sales by December 2010. The Act stated that “an electric 
utility company and its electric utility affiliates may aggregate their renewable 
portfolios in order to achieve the renewable portfolio standard”33. This means that 
HEI subsidiaries can aggregate their renewable portfolios, so that, for example, 
HELCO (on Big Island Hawaii) ends up with a larger percentage of net electricity 
sales coming from renewable sources than HECO on Oahu (which is currently the 
case).  
 
In June 2004, Governor Linda Lingle signed a bill which replaced the RPS goal with 
an enforceable standard, under which 10 percent of each utility’s electricity sales must 
                                                 
31 Interview with V. Trevino, Hilo, August 2006. 
32 www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2001/bills/HB173_cd1_.htm 
33 www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2001/bills/HB173_cd1_.htm 
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be generated from renewable resources by 2010. The bill also added standards for 
2015 (15 percent), and 2020 (20 percent). The intent is to expand the standards 
beyond 20 percent and beyond 202034. The PUC is required to review and revise the 
RPS every five years.  
 
Another requirement for electric utilities is the Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) 
Framework, which was established by the PUC around 1992. The goal of the IRP is 
“the identification of the resources or mix of resources for meeting near and long term 
consumer needs in an efficient and reliable manner at the lowest reasonable cost” 
(Public Utilities Commission, State of Hawaii, 1992, p. 3). Under the IRP, which is a 
public process, all electric utilities are responsible for submitting to the PUC an 
integrated resource plan which involves the identification and evaluation of available 
supply side and demand side options to meet expected demand over twenty years. 
Each plan must include a specification of the utility’s objectives, the cost and 
implications of the objectives and alternatives to them, and a choice of resource 
options. After the PUC has approved a plan, the utility is required to carry it out by 
following its five-year implementation schedule, and to evaluate its implementation 
progress every year. A review of each utility’s resource plan is also required every 
three years.  
 
The PUC has the responsibility to review the utilities’ integrated resource plan, 
including implementation schedule and evaluations, but also to monitor each utility’s 
implementation of the plan (Public Utilities Commission, State of Hawaii, 1992, p. 5). 
The DCA, on the other hand, must make sure that each plan promotes the interest of 
utility consumers (Public Utilities Commission, State of Hawaii, 1992, p. 5). 
 
To sum up, the electricity markets of Oahu, Maui, Lanai, Molokai and Big Island of 
Hawaii are all dominated by vertically integrated monopolies. At a first glance, the 
current situation looks not unpromising for independent renewable energy producers, 
given extended regulation on the electric utilities and for the promotion of 
independent power production and renewable energy generation. However, interviews 
with key industry participants revealed the existence of a number of flaws in the 
                                                 
34 www.dsireusa.org/library  
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regulatory framework. In practice, the regulated monopolies remain monopolies, and 
renewable energy producers face important obstacles.  
 
3)  Barriers to Renewable Energy Development in Hawaii 
 
The regulatory context in which electric utilities operate provides a range of 
opportunities for independent power producers to enter and for the development of 
renewable energy. The existence of such a variety of laws and regulations can 
certainly justify the term “regulated monopoly” when referring to Hawaiian Electric 
Industries. Nevertheless, the utilities remain monopolies and the very low contribution 
of renewable energy to total electricity generation in Hawaii (excluding Kaua’i) 
indicates that there exist a number of barriers to renewable energy development by 
independent producers. In 2004, only 6.4 percent of the electricity supplied to 
consumers by the HECO companies came from renewable energy, as displayed in 
figure 4.1.  
 
Figure 4.1: Electricity Generation Sources in Hawaii (2005) 
Biomass, 3.7%
Geothermal, 2.1%Hydro, 0.5%
Coal, 14.3%
Oil, 79.3%
Wind, 0.1%
 
Source: www.heco.com 
Note: The percentage of fuels used to produce electricity is based on the amount of electricity 
generated by the HECO family of companies and the amount purchased from independent power 
producers in 2004. 
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The utilities argue that they have difficulty accommodating a large amount of capacity 
from intermittent renewable resources such as wind energy35 (see chapter 3 for a 
detailed discussion on the limitations to accommodating renewable energy into 
electricity systems). The biggest independent producers in Hawaii are coal fired and 
oil plants located on Oahu and Big Island Hawaii.  
 
The Public Utilities Commission plays a critical role in the market for electricity 
supply: approval of independent power producers, determination of fees and tariffs, 
review of the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) and the Energy Cost Adjustment 
Clause (ECAC), involvement in energy policy through the IRP process. Yet, as stated 
in a report on Hawaii energy utility regulation and taxation, the regulatory agencies 
have insufficient resources (in terms of both staff and funds) to focus on their public 
policy duties, as these agencies have been “consumed with substantial day to day 
workloads, processing applications, complaints and filings that are not explicitly 
policy matters” (Freeman and Lazar, 2003, p. 2). This was confirmed by an employee 
of the PUC interviewed in August 200636, who pointed out that the PUC deals with all 
public utilities—not only electricity and water supply, but also telecommunications 
and transportation. Out of 44 existing positions at the PUC, only 30 are filled. The 
DCA seems to be experiencing the same problems.  
 
The fact that the major utility regulatory agencies are understaffed does not constitute 
a barrier to renewable energy development in itself, but it may affect the integration 
of IPP’s by delaying PPA’s between the independent producers and the utilities. The 
2003 report on Hawaii energy utility regulation and taxation states that: “The process 
for negotiation of a PPA and approval by the PUC can be protracted. The length of 
time for an IPP to complete a PPA with a utility is a major issue regarding the 
implementation of renewable resources. In part, the length of time to complete the 
negotiations is a function of the complexity of the issues. In some cases, where the 
utility is not motivated or is disinclined to execute a PPA, the process can be 
extremely arduous and frustrating for IPP’s attempting to proceed with construction 
of resource projects” (Freemand  and Lazar, 2003, p. 102). Hence, although utilities 
are obliged to integrate IPP’s under PURPA, they have some degree of power over 
                                                 
35 Conversation with Curtis Beck (Manager at HELCO) on the 4th of August 2006. 
36 Interview with John Leite (PUC) and Curtis Beck (HELCO), 4th of August 2006. 
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the PPA process and its length of time, which can negatively affect IPP’s decision to 
enter the market; this effect can be significantly enhanced when the regulatory 
authority does not have enough resources to proceed quickly.  
 
In addition to possible delays in PPA’s, some independent renewable energy 
producers must allow a considerable amount of time and resources for permitting 
requirements. This is especially the case for Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion 
(OTEC), wave and tidal energy, and offshore wind projects. In 1991, a report on 
energy management and permitting analysis stated that over 100 permits and 
approvals may be required for a wave energy project, including environmental 
reviews, environmental impact assessments, construction, operation and land use 
permits at the federal, state and county levels (RGC/ Hagler, Bailly, Inc., 1991, p. 20). 
In addition, permit issues can be accompanied by cultural issues. Although Hawaiian 
indigenous beliefs and judgements differ across families, there has been much 
opposition to geothermal plants from cultural activists in the past37. Such cultural 
issues are not to be overlooked and may constitute a significant barrier; it is important 
that independent renewable energy producers keep the community informed before 
implementing a project.  
 
Although the Renewable Portfolio Standard was enacted to increase the percentage of 
electricity generated from renewable energy, the electric utilities are able to at least 
temporarily delay the required increase in renewable energy generation. For example, 
the RPS law empowers the PUC to issue a temporary waiver for a utility if it is unable 
to meet the RPS “in a cost-effective manner, or as a result of circumstances beyond its 
control”38. The possibility of obtaining temporary RPS waivers gives an incentive for 
utilities to claim that renewable energy solutions are not cost-effective, rather than 
trying to accommodate renewable energy production (including letting independent 
renewable energy producers enter the market). This possibility is in fact reinforced by 
the IRP system. Indeed, although the IRP encourages the identification of renewable 
energy sources for meeting expected demand, the utilities may well state that 
renewable energy sources are not reliable or not efficient enough, and choose to 
                                                 
37 Conversation with Andrea Gill (Hawaii Department of Business, Economic Development and 
Tourism), 3rd of august 2006.  
38 www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2001/bills/HB173_cd1_.htm 
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implement additional diesel plants or combustion turbines. A utility’s IRP choice can 
then be used to justify its failure to meet the RPS, in order to be granted a temporary 
waiver. In addition, the IRP enables the utilities to install more capacity instead of 
accommodating entry of independent renewable energy producers. 
 
In its latest IRP report (IRP-3), HECO states that “the IRP-3 Final Preferred Plan 
contains a strong commitment to increase the use of distillate fuels, and indigenous 
renewable resources, and in general to decrease the use of imported oil” (Hawaiian 
Electric Company, 2005, p. 1-1). This preferred plan involves the installation of a 100 
MW simple combustion turbine in 2009. The IRP report contains a section of 
comments on the IRP draft from various associations and departments. Some of the 
criticisms of the IRP include: cost analyses biased against renewable energy 
(Hawaiian Electric Company, 2005, p. 12-22, 12-43, 12-44, and 12-51) (including the 
failure to account for high oil prices by relying on 2002 data for the oil price forecast 
analysis), a “lack of adequate transparency” for the direct comparison method 
(Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc, 2005, p. 12-23), failure to consider unconventional 
approaches to funding renewable energy projects, unclear objectives, and bias towards 
utility-ownership, utility implementation and self-build options.  
 
Another problem with the RPS is that it allows utility affiliates to aggregate their 
renewable portfolios to achieve the RPS. This is mentioned in HECO’s integrated 
resource plan, which justifies the low renewable energy production on Oahu by 
asserting that there is “greater potential for renewable energy on Maui and Big Island”. 
Allowing Hawaiian Electric Utilities to aggregate their RPS across islands has led to a 
very asymmetric increase in renewable energy installation across islands, with the 
smallest integration of renewable energy independent production in Oahu. This is 
unlikely to change with the installation of new oil-fired powerplants on Oahu. 
Consequently, independent renewable energy producers can expect to have more 
difficulty in obtaining Power Purchase Agreements when dealing with HECO 
compared to HELCO and MECO. This could constitute a major barrier to wave 
energy development in Hawaii as Oahu has been recognised as the site with greatest 
immediate potential for wave power.  
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Hawaiian Electric Industries utilities benefit from an Energy Cost Adjustment Clause 
(ECAC) policy. The ECAC is an automatic rate adjustment mechanism that passes 
changes in fuel costs to utility consumers, allowing electric utilities to avoid the risks 
associated with the costs of fuel and fuel price volatility (Department of Business, 
Economic Development and Tourism of Hawaii, 2006, p.1). The Hawaii Department 
of Business, Economic Development and Tourism has reported that ECAC accounts 
for over 30 percent of the total residential bill for an average household using 700 
kWh per month in Oahu, and it accounts for almost 50 percent of the total residential 
bill for an average household with a consumption of 600 kWh per month in Maui. The 
adverse impact on consumers is much bigger than in any other state with ECAC, due 
to the heavy (78 percent) dependency of Hawaii utilities on fuels. An important 
adverse effect of ECAC is that it removes a potential incentive for utilities to invest in 
renewable energy as they do not bear the risks of fuel price volatility.  
 
A critical component of PURPA and PPA’s is the avoided cost, which determines the 
price that independent producers receive from the utilities. It consists of the 
incremental costs to an electric utility which the utility would avoid by purchasing 
from a qualifying IPP facility. The avoided cost includes the avoided capacity costs 
(which consist of avoided capital costs and avoided fixed operation and maintenance 
costs), and avoided energy costs (including avoided fuel costs, avoided variable 
operation and maintenance costs, avoided working cash, avoided fuel inventory and 
avoided transmission and distribution energy losses). Hence, while the utilities do not 
bear the risks associated with fuel price volatility, the amount independent producers 
are paid is based on fuel costs. In addition, the avoided cost does not include the 
positive externalities brought by renewables (such as reduction on greenhouse gas 
emissions and greater energy security). The question of whether to include such 
externalities in the avoided cost has been raised, but it did not result in any change. It 
has previously been argued by the Public Utilities Commision that “the models used 
by the utilities to determine avoided costs could be improved to more accurately 
evaluate renewable energy systems” (Public Utilities Commission of Hawaii, 1995, 
p.1 c-1).   
 
Net-metering, PURPA and Renewable Portfolio Standards form a regulatory context 
intended to facilitate the entry of independent renewable energy producers in Hawaii, 
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more than in most other Pacific Islands. Nevertheless, there remain important barriers 
to independent renewable energy producers: aside from the general and universal 
issues of extensive permitting requirements and potential cultural opposition to new 
renewable energy technologies, there is a lengthy process for obtaining power 
purchase agreements (which can be slowed down by the utilities), and the utilities 
retain some degree of market power given their ability to invest in excess capacity, by 
building capacity ahead of independent producers. Despite extended regulation of the 
electric utilities and the promotion of independent power production and renewable 
energy generation, the HEI companies seem to retain a large degree of control over 
independent power producers and technology choice. This is well reflected in table 
4.1, which shows that most IPPs operate oil or diesel plants. Facilitating the entry of 
independent renewable energy producers would require strengthening the regulating 
authorities and further control over the utilities’ investment decisions.  
 
4)  Feasibility and Potential for the Implementation of a Wave Energy 
Technology in Hawaii 
 
Financial benefits, permitting and wave energy in Hawaii 
 
Wave energy producers are entitled to benefit from a number of tax incentives 
in Hawaii. For technology development and research, the qualified high technology 
business investment tax credit, for example, is a non-refundable credit of 100 percent 
of the investment available to investors, with a cap of US$ 2 million per investor. This 
tax credit is available to businesses that conduct more than fifty percent of their 
activities in qualified research (including non-fossil fuel energy-related technology), 
and which conduct more than 75 percent of the qualified research in Hawaii, or 
companies that derive more than 75 percent of their gross income from qualified 
research and which receive their income from products or services sold from, 
manufactured in, or produced in Hawaii. Such companies can also benefit from a 
refundable research tax credit of 20 percent of the amount spent on certain qualified 
research expenses in Hawaii. Employees, officers, investors or directors of Qualified 
High Technology Businesses can also benefit from income tax exclusion for income 
from stock. Another income tax exclusion is available for income received by 
individuals or qualified high technology businesses as royalties and other income 
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derived from any patents, copyrights, and trade secrets developed and arising out of a 
qualified high technology business. Finally, a non refundable income tax credit of 4 
percent of the renovation costs (costs to plan, design, install, construct and purchase 
technology-enabled infrastructure) for each commercial building located in Hawaii is 
available. If a wave energy company qualifies as a high technology business, it will be 
able to benefit from these tax exemptions.  
 
Permitting is likely to be a long and difficult process for wave energy project 
developers. A number of permits required for a wave energy project have already 
been identified by the DBEDT (DBEDT, 1992), including an energy permit, approval 
from the Public Utilities Commission, and a work permit from the Department of 
Transportation. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has jurisdiction 
over wave energy projects beyond twelve miles offshore of Hawaii. If the wave 
energy converters are placed in state waters, between 0 and 12 miles offshore, the 
FERC will not be involved. If the converters are located in federal waters, the project 
developer will need to follow the FERC licence requirements under the Federal Power 
Act. Other requirements include: the Department of Interior Outer Continental Shelf 
Leasing Program, Coast Guard Regulations (hazards to navigation), an Environmental 
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement, consultation with Federal and 
State Fish and Wildlife agencies, consultation with the Secretary of Interior to 
determine if endangered species may be present, lease for use of state lands under 
waters (up to three miles offshore), and other state environmental statutes such as 
coastal erosion. In addition, coastal states with an approved Coastal Zone 
Management plan must issue a consistency finding that the proposed project is 
consistent with the state’s coastal zone management plan. The choice of where to 
implant the wave energy converters will be crucial given the amount of recreational 
activities (surf, diving…) and commercial shipping occurring around the islands. 
Moreover, the various whale exclusion zones and military hazard zones around Oahu 
are likely to be a problem for finding an appropriate location for a wave energy 
project. Note that the indigenous community does not seem to have a problem with 
wave energy or ocean thermal energy, but as suggested above it is likely that other 
members of the community, such as the tourism industry, surfers or fishers, may be 
opposed to a wave energy project depending on where it is located.  
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Potential for the implementation of a wave energy project in Hawaii 
 
What are the utilities’ views on a potential firm wishing to implement a wave energy 
project in Hawaii? During an interview with Curtis Beck, manager at HELCO on Big 
Island, a number of criteria were identified for the utility to consider integrating a 
wave energy project: size, dispatchability, reliability, and price. Firstly, Mr. Beck 
stated that HELCO could accommodate up to 30 MW of wave energy; anything 
bigger would threaten the capacity margin of the utility. HELCO, HECO and MECO 
all maintain a 25 percent margin of generating capacity at peak load, sufficient to be 
able to supply electricity in the event of the failure of the second largest generation 
unit when the largest unit is out for maintenance. Secondly, the utilities do not 
consider wave energy as a firm power resource: wave conditions are identical at all 
points on a given seashore, meaning that all wave energy converters would stop 
producing electricity if the waves stopped. HELCO is interested in renewable energy 
which could supply power on demand at anytime. To be considered as dispatchable, a 
wave energy plant would need to be backed up by another system such as pumped 
storage39, or a diesel plant. HELCO is also concerned about the reliability of wave 
energy systems. The utilities require further proof and demonstration in order to be 
convinced that wave energy converters can resist the tough ocean environment, and 
that the plants are reliable in the long term. Finally, the avoided cost is the price at 
which any independent power producer is paid under the PURPA40, however HELCO 
claims it would be interested in being offered a fixed price contract with a price below 
the avoided cost, and decoupling of the contract price from the oil price.  
 
The potential requirements of the utilities regarding the implementation of a wave 
energy project, as understandable as they may be, are highly demanding: high 
reliability, dispatchability, and a low, fixed price. At this stage, such requirements 
would be difficult to meet, given the novelty of wave energy technologies. In addition, 
there is confusion with regards to the provision of backup for renewables. To our 
                                                 
39 However, storage reservoirs are difficult to maintain due to the geology of the islands, as they consist 
of porous volcanic rock. In addition, there are a number of environmental and permitting issues 
associated with pumped storage in Hawaii, mostly because of the recent failure of a dam in Big Island 
in which people were killed. 
40 The avoided cost changes monthly. In august 2006, Curtis Beck reported that the avoided cost was 
between 15 and 16 cents per kWh in Big Island, and that the lowest avoided cost in the last five years 
was around 8 cents per kWh. 
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knowledge, there is no statement in PURPA or the RPS which clearly assigns 
responsibility for backing up renewable energy: should it be ensured by independent 
producers or the utilities?  
 
Enabling “wheeling” would allow wave energy companies to sell electricity directly 
to businesses or other facilities. Under a wheeling arrangement, electricity would be 
transmitted from a wave power plant to a facility via the utility’s transmission grid. 
The utility would be compensated for its transmission costs, such as operation and 
maintenance of the transmission system. However, wheeling is not currently legal in 
Hawaii, and local utilities are opposed to it, regarding wheeling as a “competition 
issue”. Unless the PUC mandates wheeling, wave energy producers will have to sell 
their power directly to the utilities.  
 
Two major studies have been undertaken on wave energy resource in Hawaii. A 1992 
study concluded that the annual wave energy resource off the northern shores of 
Hawaiian Islands far exceeds the electricity demand in the islands of Kauai, Maui, 
and Hawaii (Hagerman, 1992, p.5-1). In 2004, another report concluded that “the 
available annual wave energy resource off the northern shores of the Hawaii Islands 
far exceeds the electricity demand of each of the islands, with the exception of Oahu 
that has a large population and electricity demand and an available wave resource that 
is approximately equal to the electricity demand” (Previsic et al., 2005b).  
 
There has already been a demonstration project with wave energy in Hawaii. This 
project, initiated by the US Navy, enabled Ocean Power Technologies to deploy its 
PowerBuoy wave generation system at the Marine Corps Base on Oahu in June 2004 
and October 2005. The 20 kW project is still at a demonstration phase, and locals 
have reported that the buoy was redesigned a few times due to technical problems. No 
delivery of power from this unit has yet taken place. Nevertheless, the military base 
location of this project has provided a unique opportunity for a rapid permitting 
process and positive state cooperation.  
 
In 2005, a report was produced for the Electric Power Research Institute, describing 
the results of a system level design, performance and cost study for a feasibility 
demonstration pilot Pelamis wave power plant and a commercial size Pelamis plant 
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installed in Hawaii (Previsic et al., 2005b). The study reported that the Makai 
Research Pier on the eastern coastline of Oahu offers an opportunity for wave power 
due to existing physical infrastructure and scientific resources. It provides a cost 
analysis of installing 180 Pelamis converters of 500 kW each on Oahu, with a total 
rated capacity of 90MW, which would provide 300,000 MWh per year. For this plant, 
Previsic et al estimate a total investment of about US$243 million (in 2004 US$). The 
study provides a cost analysis to determine the levelized cost of electricity for the 
installation and operation of the wave farm under four different scenarios. These 
scenarios and corresponding estimates of the study are displayed in table 4.3 below: 
 
Table 4.3: Cost of Electricity Generated by a Wave Farm41 
 Installation and 
operation by a regulated 
utility 
Installation and 
operation by an 
Independent Power 
Producer (IPP) 
With Federal Production 
Tax Credit 
10.37 cents per kWh Internal rate of return (post 
tax) of 9.6% 
Without Federal 
Production Tax Credit 
11.33 cents per kWh No internal rate of return 
 
The federal production tax credit used in this study equals 18 cents per kWh for the 
first ten years of the operation of the wave farm. Note that all scenarios assume a 
federal investment tax credit of 10 percent for the first year of investments. The 
estimates for the IPP assume an avoided cost of electricity of about 8 cents per kWh. 
However, the avoided cost of electricity rose up to 13 cents per kWh in 2006. This 
suggests that the internal rate of return for such a project may now be positive for 
IPPs even in the absence of the federal production tax credit.  
 
5)  Using Insights from the Case-Study of Hawaii to Develop a Mathematical 
Model for the Integration of Renewables into Pacific Islands Electricity Systems 
 
The case study outlined in the previous section shows that even in the presence 
of regulation to promote renewable energy generation and independent power 
production, there remain issues related to market power in Hawaii. However, 
                                                 
41 Source: Previsic, M. et al. (2005). “System level design, Performance and Costs – Hawaii State 
Offshore Wave Power Plant”. 
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electricity market structures are not the same in all Pacific Islands: as seen in chapter 
2, electricity is supplied by the governments themselves in the majority of Pacific 
Islands.  
 
The underlying aim of developing the model which is presented in chapter 5 is not to 
explain competition issues in Pacific Islands’ electricity markets, nor to recommend 
solutions to such issues. The goal is to develop a model for the integration of 
renewables into electricity systems, using concepts and ideas which are relevant to 
energy policy-making in Pacific Islands. The competition issues and barriers to 
renewable energy development lie outside the structure of the model, yet they are not 
to be overlooked when studying the integration of renewable energy technologies into 
existing electricity systems. Chapter 6 provides further discussion of the obstacles to 
renewable energy development in Pacific Island Countries, as well as policies to 
overcome these barriers.  
 
Compiling data and information from chapter 2 with the more specific case study 
presented in the previous section, has led to the identification of three key issues 
which are of particular significance to electricity supply in Pacific Island Countries, 
and which are central to the model presented in chapter 5: 
 
? Increasing the share of renewable energy: all Pacific Islands are highly 
dependent on imported fossil fuels and have all at least expressed interest in 
augmenting the share of renewable energy for electricity generation. At least 
some of the benefits of renewables are external to current market prices and 
accounted for by means of a shadow price in the model. 
 
? Price of electricity supply: all Pacific Island Countries incur high costs of 
electricity supply. While the costs of importing fossil fuels are high, the great 
majority of electric utilities are using fuel-based technologies, implying that 
the capacity cost of plants is of great importance to suppliers. The model will 
need to account for both types of costs.  
 
? Reliability: Reliability of supply is one of the biggest concerns to electric 
utilities worldwide, particularly in Pacific Islands (as confirmed during 
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interviews at HECO and HELCO in Hawaii). This is because isolation and 
remoteness imply that the countries cannot rely on interconnection with other 
electric grids. In addition, small electric systems have less ability to deal with 
intermittency than large systems do, so that increasing the share of renewable 
electricity generation would require extra backup capacity. The model will 
need to account for reliability, and provide a measure of backup for 
renewables.  
 
The next chapter provides a detailed description of the model for integrating 
renewables into Pacific Islands’ electricity systems, and presents the key results 
obtained from the model.  
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Chapter Five: A Model for the Integration of 
Renewable Energy into an Existing Electricity 
Network 
 
 
 
1) Context and Objective 
 
Electricity supply involves choices about numerous characteristics. These 
characteristics or features may be thought of as entering into a social welfare function. 
In the model presented in this chapter, this social welfare function is represented by a 
“social planner”.  
 
The characteristics of electricity supply may be divided in three broad groups. The 
first set of features relates to the physical characteristics of the product that reaches 
consumers. These physical characteristics include voltage, frequency and the 
compliance of these with quality and frequency standards; and also reliability: what is 
the probability, and frequency of occurrence, of unplanned outages or failures? All 
else equal, the social welfare function is maximised when consumers are supplied 
with a continuous, uninterrupted supply of perfectly-calibrated electricity. In reality, a 
minimum number of system outages and voltage fluctuations are unavoidable. 
However, an important physical feature of electricity supply relates to the extent to 
which supply outages can be planned or foreseen.  
 
The second set of electricity supply features relates to the market characteristics of the 
product reaching consumers, such as the price, the tariff structure (is the tariff fixed or 
variable? What is the range of options available? Is there net-metering to credit 
customer-premises generation? Is there any option and special rate for “green 
electricity”?), and the availability and quality of supporting services (appliances repair, 
faults service, information services). 
 
The third set of features relates to the techniques or set of techniques available and 
chosen to produce and distribute electricity: what are the relative costs of the different 
technologies available? What are the shares of different technologies, and what are 
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the complementarities between these technologies? In particular, what is the share of 
renewable energy technologies compared to non-renewable energy technologies? 
How do variations in input prices affect the share of each technology in electricity 
generation? What are the emission profiles of the different technologies, relative to 
policy objectives regarding pollution and carbon emissions? How much exposure to 
uncertainty and volatility is incurred (with respect to oil price fluctuations, and 
intermittency of renewable energy)? Is there a possibility for interconnection to 
electricity supply networks in other jurisdictions?  
 
Electricity supply is a multi-dimensional problem, involving multiple tradeoffs and 
complementarities. As for most products, there exists a trade-off between the price 
and quality of electricity. The demand for high-quality supply is higher in affluent 
communities with greater dependence on electricity usage and higher expectations of 
quality of life. In poor communities with lower aspirations and less equipment, cost 
considerations may outweigh quality: in poor rural communities, the intermittency of 
wind and solar supply may be more than compensated for by their low operating costs, 
especially if the capital costs are picked up by some outside aid agency (as discussed 
in chapter 2, this has been the case in several outer islands in the Pacific). This 
particular trade-off is illustrated in Figure 5.1, which displays hypothetical 
indifference curves and budget constraints between electricity quality (in terms of 
intermittency) and other goods in New Zealand and rural Papua New Guinea. Figure 
5.2 displays hypothetical willingness-to-pay frontiers relating acceptable price to 
intermittency in New Zealand and rural Papua New Guinea. In this diagram, 100 
percent intermittency means non-supply, and zero intermittency is absolutely 
continuous supply. Each frontier represents the maximum price each market can bear, 
and the corresponding quality of electricity supplied.  
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Figure 5.1: Indifference Curves and Budget Constraints for Electricity Quality 
New Zealand and Rural Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
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Figure 5.2: Trade-off between Price and Intermittency of Electricity  
0
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Another trade-off in electricity supply exists between the cost and price volatility of a 
portfolio of electricity generation. As discussed in chapter 3, a diverse portfolio of 
resources used for electricity generation can make more sense than complete 
specialisation, even if one technology currently dominates the others in terms of cost. 
Portfolio diversification spreads risks, and hedges against future price changes that 
might lead to a re-ranking of the merit order of technologies. This is especially 
important in the electricity industry, where there is substantial investment inertia (it 
takes years to build a generation plant, and once built, a generation plant lasts for 
decades).  
 
In standard simple theory, multiple competing technologies exist separate from each 
other and each has its own supply chain that reaches through to the customer. Thus 
competition is head-to head on final price and quality, and any technology that cannot 
pay its way does not enter the markets. In electricity, however, the prevalence of 
transmission and distribution networks means that the quality and price dimensions of 
the product reaching the final consumer are often dictated by intermediaries, so that 
generators are able to offer a range of quality/price pairs into a common pool, from 
which the standardised final product is withdrawn.  
 
Consider, therefore, the situation for a renewable energy generator which has “high 
quality” in terms of its emission profile (little or no emissions) but low quality in 
terms of reliability or intermittency. For the social planner, this package of low 
reliability/high renewability will be at a point such as A on an indifference curve, with 
a fossil-fuel, high-reliability plant at point B:  
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Figure 5.3: Trade-off between ‘Renewability’ and Reliability of Electricity  
Reliability 
Renewability
A
B
 
 
The tradeoffs depicted in figures 5.2 and 5.3 represent four of the dimensions or 
characteristics of electricity supply that a social planner would consider carefully: the 
overall cost of electricity supply, diversity of the portfolio of electricity generation, 
the share of non-polluting or renewable technologies, and the reliability of supply (in 
terms of continuity and quality).   
 
Now consider the traditional choices made by private operators, with respect to the 
third set of characteristics (the techniques). In the private sector, renewable energy 
technologies are chosen if and only if the prices are advantageous. For example, high 
oil prices and low capital cost of renewable equipment would drive private investment 
towards renewables. Figure 5.4 below represents the classic choice-of-technique setup 
with two technologies: 
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Figure 5.4: Choice of Technique with Two Technologies 
Fuel Cost
Capital Cost
P
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Renewable with fossil fuel backup
Fossil-Fuel
 
 
In the diagram above, the slope of PP’ is the price ratio at which private investors 
would change their choice of technology, other things being equal. The top line 
represents the isoquant for the technologies. Technology-switching occurs as 
technology prices change. Thus, a flattening of the exogenously-set price ratio PP’ 
would induce a complete switch to the fossil fuel technology. However, a steepening 
of the price ratio would only lead to a partial switch towards the renewable 
technology, because of the need to retain backup capacity in order to maintain 
reliability (at the current technology cost, fossil fuel technologies would likely be 
used to backup renewables, which means that some fuel costs are still involved).  
 
The historic lack of private investment in renewables reflects their high capital cost to 
date, combined with the need to have backup capacity in hand. In addition, inertia and 
path dependence have contributed to the lack of private investment in renewable 
technologies. If the capital for both the renewable and fossil fuel technologies was 
already installed, price changes would only affect the decision of which plant to 
operate, and price-responsiveness would be straightforward. If there was no capital 
installed for either technology, then a fully-specialised investment decision would be 
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optimal only in the absence of uncertainty about price trends. With uncertainty, the 
familiar risk-spreading benefits of a diversified portfolio would be relevant. However, 
in reality there is already a somewhat specialised capital stock installed from past 
decisions. While the installed capital is reflective of past history, and technical 
progress is changing the set of options available, the two key issues in investment 
decisions are relative prices, and the utilisation of existing assets (including human 
capital, control technology, management systems, and installed transmission and 
distribution network infrastructure).  
 
Private electric utilities have traditionally based their investment decisions primarily 
on technology capital costs and path dependence, leading to a predominance of fuel-
based technologies for electricity production. However, there is likely to be a 
divergence between these private decisions and the decisions made by a social planner, 
meaning that there might be a social case for more renewables than the market is 
delivering.   
 
The application of mean-variance portfolio analysis to electricity generation provides 
an analytical methodology to highlight areas of possible market failure, as well as the 
direction in which market-led investment is likely to move in the future, to the extent 
that the benefits of portfolio diversification may be captured by private-sector 
operators. Yet, as noted above, planning electricity supply is a process involving 
multiple dimensions, not all of which are captured by portfolio analysis. The cost and 
risk of a portfolio of electricity generation represent only two of these dimensions. 
From a social planner’s perspective, reliability of supply and the share of polluting 
technologies are also important. In addition, even for a social planner, path 
dependence is almost unavoidable and needs to be accounted for—decommissioning 
existing plants is very costly42.  
 
This chapter introduces a model for the integration of renewable energy technologies 
into existing electricity systems of the Pacific Islands, built using concepts from 
portfolio analysis and integrated resource planning. This model includes different 
technologies (renewable and non-renewable), a measure of financial risk for a given 
                                                 
42 Note that path dependence has been accounted for in some portfolio analysis studies (see chapter 3).  
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electricity generating mix, and it provides an optimization process leading to a choice 
of optimal electricity generating mix. Set as an intertemporal optimization problem, 
the model presented in this chapter builds on concepts from integrated resource 
planning by looking at different options to meet future electricity demand. In order to 
be applicable to Pacific Island Countries, the model ought to emphasize the aspect of 
maintaining reliability of electricity supply. Accounting for reliability of supply is 
important in Pacific Island Countries as their isolation prevents any connection to 
continental grids. With no grid backup available, reliability comes at a high price for 
these countries compared to large integrated continental systems or mainland-
connected islands such as Prince Edward Island (Stuart 2006). The potential tradeoff 
between reliability and other characteristics such as lower cost is thus more important 
in Pacific Islands. 
 
Investment planning for electricity generation has been studied for decades, and 
numerous optimization models have been developed for resource and equipment 
planning, fuel planning, demand-side management, fuel, maintenance and production 
scheduling, and dispatching43. Integrated models can also be used to perform and 
analyse a large number of functions together (e.g. demand-side management as well 
as reliability and production costing…), although such models have been criticised for 
simplifying some of the representative functions (c.f. Hobbs, 1995). However, the 
model presented in the following sections has not been built using any of these 
existing models; it has been built using insights and objectives which arose from the 
observation of electric utility issues in Pacific Island Countries. The following 
diagram (Figure 5.5) frames the conceptual issue which we are seeking to capture. 
The smooth upward-sloping curves, which we here call “iso-reliability curves”, each 
represent a trade-off between the share of renewables and the cost of electricity 
supply for a fixed level of reliability. For a given level of reliability, an increase in the 
share of renewables output to total output leads to an increase in the cost of electricity 
supply, both because of the higher cost of renewable energy technologies themselves 
and because of rising costs of securing backup to maintain the target level of 
reliability. For any given technology mix, an increase in the level of reliability 
induces a higher cost of supply. At the current technology costs, achievement of 100  
                                                 
43 See Hobbs (1995) for a detailed review of optimization models for electricity resource planning, and 
Anderson (1972). 
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percent reliability (that is, no power cut or blackout at all during the year) requires 
more generators to be added to the system as backup as the proportion of renewables 
increases, which will be costly. However, up to some point it will be possible to use 
existing fossil-fired capacity for backup purposes – hence the relatively flat left-hand 
end of the iso-reliability curves..  
 
Figure 5.5: Framework for the Integration of Renewables into an Existing 
Electricity System 
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The downward-sloping line on the right-hand corner represents the country’s 
feasibility constraint in terms of availability of resources; points above the feasibility 
constraint (in the shaded area) are unfeasible. In this hypothetical case, for example, 
the country does not have sufficient resources to sustain 100 percent reliability with 
more than 80 percent of renewables. That is, there are not enough resources to allow 
backing up renewables exclusively with other renewables; there needs to be at least 
20 percent of non-renewables in order to maintain full reliability. There are enough 
resources to supply all electricity from renewables, but the lights would be off more 
than 50 percent of the time.  
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Intuitively, if we were to draw the same diagram for a European country and compare 
it to that of a small Pacific Island Country, the iso-reliability curves would be flatter 
and lower for the European country (a lower cost of electricity supply than in the 
Pacific Island Country for any given level of reliability), given the larger size of the 
system (enabling substantial economies of scale) and the ability to connect to a 
continental grid. The price of fuel in Pacific Islands being much higher than in 
European countries, the left-hand end of the iso-reliability curves will be higher for 
the Pacific Island country than for the European country. On the other hand, the 
feasibility constraint for the Pacific Island Country would likely be above for the 
constraint of the European Country. Indeed, the Pacific Island country is likely to 
have plenty of renewable resources available (waves, wind, sun, hydro, bagasse) and 
could easily sustain, say, an 80 percent share of renewables. The large European 
country, however, does not necessarily benefit from enough resources to provide as 
much as 80 percent renewable energy for its 70 million consumers. While non-
renewable technologies can be turned on and off depending on the level of demand, a 
renewable backstop consisting entirely of renewables would require a diverse range of 
resources to maintain reliability, so that if there is no wind at peak demand times 
another resource such as wave or solar power is used to ensure electricity supply. 
Hence there is likely to be a strong relationship between the availability and variety of 
renewable energy resources, the level of electricity consumption, and the potential 
level of integration of renewable energy capacity into the electric system. The 
feasibility constraint is located further left in countries which have few renewable 
energy resources, and a large population size and electricity consumption. At the outer 
extreme, an island with a population size below 200 people may have no constraints 
on the amount of renewable energy which can be installed to provide electricity to the 
whole population, in which case the integration of renewable energy will solely 
depend on the cost and willingness to pay to maintain reliability.  
 
On the other hand, European countries may be able to sustain a large amount of 
renewable energy generation given their access to the relatively cheap and almost 
unlimited backup resources of neighbour countries. Figure 5.6 illustrates the 
hypothetical case of a country which can connect to another country’s grid.  
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Figure 5.6: Integrating Renewables with Unlimited Backup Resources 
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In the diagram above, in this hypothetical case, the country can benefit from a 
connection to the grid of its neighbouring countries because the connection enables 
more and cheaper options for backing up renewable electricity generation. The iso-
reliability curve is drawn so that increasing the share of renewable output leads to a 
higher cost of producing electricity for a given level of reliability. The diagram shows 
that this country has enough renewable resources to generate up to 80 percent of its 
power supply using only renewable resources, at price Pr. However, in this case the 
country can increase the share of renewable output beyond 50 percent without 
incurring increases in the cost of supply by importing cheap backup supply from its 
neighbouring countries, at price Pn. In addition, if the neighbouring countries also 
generate renewable output using different resources, it may be possible to import 
renewable electricity as a backup for the country’s renewable output, meaning that the 
country could use solely (100 percent) renewable energy for its power supply. The 
price associated with generating power using 80 percent to 100 percent of 
neighbouring countries’ resources is higher than Pn, as maintaining 100 percent 
reliability requires extremely abundant and varied renewable resources.  
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In figure 5.5, the iso-reliability curves were given a positive slope to reflect the 
current situation with existing technologies and their costs. However, in the future 
these curves may eventually become downward-sloping as in figure 5.7 below, as the 
price of fuel rises and renewable energy technology costs decrease. If technological 
progress were made on renewable energy storage or other means of backing up 
renewable energy generation, the iso-reliability curves would also become flatter, as 
illustrated in the diagram below (backing up renewables using renewables would 
become cheaper and easier).  
 
Figure 5.7: Possible Future Shape of Iso-Reliability Curves 
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2) The Model  
 
This section presents the intertemporal optimization problem of an energy 
planner in discrete time. The model focuses on selecting an optimal amount of 
investment in renewable (r) and non-renewable ( n ) generating capacity in each 
period over a fixed horizon T, given a specified demand growth rate and a renewable 
portfolio standard. We assume that there are two types of large-scale renewable 
energy technologies, subscripted a  and b .  
 
Social Surplus 
The energy planner seeks to maximize present-valued social surplus J: 
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defined as the sum of three components: 
1) The cost of deviating from projected electricity demand ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
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, captured 
by a penalty weight tπ  for not supplying enough electricity to meet the projected 
quantity demanded tq  in period t. If the quantity of electricity actually supplied 
corresponds to quantity demanded at time t , tt qq =  and no penalty is incurred. This 
ensures that the policymaker has an incentive to minimize deviation from quantity 
demanded by ensuring adequate electricity supply in each period, insofar as it is cost-
effective to do so. The quadratic specification of the deviation from projected 
electricity demand means that the penalty rises exponentially as the deviation 
increases.  
2) The second part of social surplus ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
t
t
t y
cω  places a positive value on 
“consumption” ( tc ), defined as all expenditure on non-electricity goods and services. 
The positive sign implies that the policymaker wants to maximise the amount of 
resources available for purposes other than electricity production, which implies 
minimizing the cost of producing electricity.  
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3) Finally, an environmental cost ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
t
nt
t q
qφ  is associated with non-renewable 
electricity production. This represents the shadow price, or penalty on non-renewables, 
of the energy planner. 
 
The planner faces a macroeconomic budget constraint: 
 
btbatantntutt ipipipupcy ++++=                                                                            (2) 
 
in which expenses for electricity production (fuel tu  and capital investment for 
renewable and non-renewable energy plants ati , bti , and nti ) are treated as diverting 
scarce resources from other uses ( tc ).The variables tu , ati , bti  and nti  represent fuel 
input for the non renewable plants, capacity investment in the two renewable 
technologies “a” and “b”, and non renewable capacity investment, respectively. The 
parameters up , np , ap  and bp  represent the coefficients associated with the cost of 
fuel input for the non renewable plant, the cost of capacity investment for the non-
renewable plant, and the cost of capacity investment for the renewable plants 
respectively. The budget constraint implies that every dollar which is used for 
electricity production or capacity investment is withdrawn from other purposes ( tc ). 
 
The problem can thus be written as: 
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1           (Objective function) 
 
..ts  btbatantntutt ipipipupcy ++++=               (Budget constraint) 
       btatntt qqqq ++=             (Generating portfolio) 
 
Total energy output tq  is the sum of renewable output ( atq  + btq ), and non-renewable 
output ntq . ρ  is the social discount rate.  
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Electricity Production 
The electricity production process is designed as follows: renewable electricity 
generation using renewable energy technology a  depends on the amount of available 
capacity atk  and the factor productivity parameter aA  for the type of renewable 
energy resource used. The capacity factor of a plant z  is defined as the amount of 
electricity produced over a period of time divided by the amount of electricity it could 
have produced if it had run at full capacity over that time period. Assume a Leontief 
process for renewable energy production, with α  being the fixed coefficient on 
labour input l :  
 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧= α
t
ataaat
lkzAq ,.min                                       ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧= α
t
btbbbt
lkzAq ,.min   (4) 
 
Efficiency in production requires 
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t
ata kzl
l
kz αα =⇒=                                     btbt
t
btb kzl
l
kz αα =⇒=   (5) 
 
so that 
 
ataaat kzAq =                                                       btbbbt kzAq =    (6) 
 
 
Non-renewable electricity production depends on fuel input u , in addition to the 
amount of installed capacity available. This available capacity is made up of two 
categories: capacity which is earmarked to back-up renewable generating capacity, 
which is operated only when renewable generators are down; and capacity entirely 
dedicated to stand-alone non-renewable generation, which can be operated without 
restriction at any time. The amount of non renewable capacity set aside as a backup to 
the intermittent, renewable plant is determined by fixed coefficients θa, θb, 
proportional to the amount of capacity installed in each of the renewable technologies. 
The θ parameters are set to maintain a fixed level of reliability of supply for the 
system. As explained in the previous section, the electricity systems of Pacific Island 
Countries are typically very small and have important requirements with regards to 
reliability. On the other hand, maintaining reliability may not be such a significant 
issue for an island in which power is only supplied less than twelve hours a day, such 
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as in Tokelau. The model is flexible in the sense that it allows us to specify the 
amount of backup required for each unit of renewable capacity. As the range of 
renewables used for electricity production increases, the model can easily be modified 
to include an additional parameter to account for renewable backup using other 
renewables (e.g. backing up wind power using wave power or hydro).  
 
The non-renewable capacity which serves as a backup for renewable resources is used 
solely when the renewable plants are not working ( az−1 , bz−1 ); that is, backup 
capacity is turned on whenever there are not enough renewable resources to produce 
renewable electricity. Once again, we assume a Leontief process for non-renewable 
energy production, with β  being the fixed coefficient on fuel input tu . Fuel input is 
used for non-renewable energy production ( ntu ) and also for backing up renewable 
plants using non-renewable capacity ( rtu ).  
 
Non-renewable electricity production is thus specified as follows: 
 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+−+⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−= βθθβθθ
rt
btbbataan
nt
btbatantnnt
ukzkzAukkkAq ,)1()1(,.min         (9) 
βθθθθ
t
btbbataabtbatant
ukzkzkkk =−+−+−− )1()1(             (10) 
 
rtntt uuu +=  
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 [ ]btbbataanbtbatantnnt k)z1(k)z1(A)kkk(Aq θθθθ −+−+−−=  
 
 )kzkzk(A btbbataantn θθ −−=                (11) 
 
 
Capacity Accumulation 
Capacity accumulation for both renewable and non-renewable plants depends on the 
amount of investment in renewable and non renewable capacity, ati , bti  and nti , and 
the rate of capacity depreciation for each type of plant, aδ , bδ  and nδ .  
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                   (12) 
 
                   (13) 
 
                   (14)
         
 
Hence the amount of capacity in period 1+t is equal to the amount of net investment 
in period t  plus the existing capacity in period t . This implies a rather simplistic 
assumption of rapid construction and installation of generation plants by means of 
investment. Realistically, the model should account for investment-installation delays 
according to each type of plant, which currently constitute a significant barrier to 
renewable energy implementation. This would involve imposing an upper bound on 
ati , bti  and nti . (Such a bound was not imposed for this study.) 
 
Insofar as the government is implementing policies to “level the playing field” 
between renewables and non-renewables, part of tc  in the model would be taken up 
by the cost of these policies. 
 
The Optimal Control Problem 
The optimal control problem can be summarised as follows:  
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The initial capacities 0ak , 0bk  and 0nk , are already known and taken as given. The 
terminal conditions, or final state capacities, aTk , bTk  and nTk , must be specified. The 
terminal conditions can easily be computed using the pre-specified electricity demand 
path and target level of output at time T ( Tq ), and the planner’s two choice 
parameters x and v , which determine the share of renewables to total output and the 
share of renewable a  to total renewable output in the terminal state respectively:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     (15) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           (16) 
    
Hence the final state capacities can be specified to match a renewable portfolio 
standard (which corresponds to x  here), which constitutes a requirement to provide a 
certain amount of total generation from renewable energy plants (see chapter 6). The 
model can thus be applied to Hawaii, where a renewable portfolio standard has been 
enacted and requires 20 percent of renewable electricity generation by year 2020 (see 
chapter 5). The renewable portfolio composition parameter v  is typically not 
specified by renewable energy policies, whether they are portfolio standards or feed-
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in tariffs, probably because it is difficult to do so and because future technological 
trends are hard to predict. A simulation can be done (with the initial arbitrary values) 
to determine the optimal v , which can then be re-entered into the model to find 
optimal investment paths.   
 
The set of equations displayed above, notably (15) and (16), constitute a Two-Point 
Boundary Value Problem, which can be solved using two different methods. Since the 
model is deterministic, it can be solved using the method of shooting, by choosing 
initial investment values. The other way to solve it, which is used here, is to use non-
linear programming. This method makes it computationally easier when introducing 
stochastics into the model, such as fuel price variability and variability of renewable 
energy resources.  
  
The goal of the optimizing formulation is to maximize J subject to investment in all 
plants being ≥ 0 in every period, so that final capacity is sufficient to meet electricity 
demand and meets the renewable portfolio standard, and operating non-renewable 
capacity is ≥0 in every period. The first-order conditions and Lagrangian for the 
optimization can be found in appendix C.  
 
The specification of this model closely resembles the Ramsey model of household 
optimization, in which households optimize their period-by period consumption and 
saving behaviour, subject to a budget constraint over some time horizon.  
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3) Results 
 
a) Scenario 1: Base Case Scenario for Oahu, Hawaii 
The base case scenario values for Hawaii are summarised in the following table: 
 
Table 5.1: Base Case Scenario Parameters and Values 
Parameter Description of the Parameter Value 
 
Unit 
General Parameters ρ  Social discount rate 5 % per period 
0π  Initial penalty weight on energy 
tracking 
1.00 
 
 
grπ  Growth rate of the penalty 
weight on energy tracking 
50 
 
% per period 
0φ  Initial environmental penalty on 
non-renewable output 
1.00  
grφ  Growth rate of the 
environmental penalty 
10 
 
% per period 
0ω  Initial priority weight on the 
consumption to GDP ratio 
1.00  
grω  Growth rate of the priority 
weight on consumption to GDP 
ratio 
10 % per period 
0q  Initial production tracking target 10,090,000 MWh 
grq  Growth rate of the production 
tracking target 
1.124 % per period 
0y  Initial macroeconomic 
resources 
32,008,500,000 US$ (2000$) 
gry  Growth rate of macroeconomic 
resources 
2.167523 % per period 
Non-Renewable Parameters 
nA  Coefficient of fabrication 6,858.81 Assumed 
load factor 
79%, times 
the number 
of hours in a 
year 
β  Fuel Leontief coefficient 1.307651066 Barrels of 
fuel/MWh  
aθ  Backup coefficient for 
renewable A (wind) 
100 % 
bθ  Backup coefficient for 
renewable B (wave) 
100 % 
0up  Initial price of fuel 56.61 US$ per 
barrel 
grpu  Growth rate of the price of fuel  1 %  per period 
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0np  Initial price of investment 1,500,000 US$ per MW  
grpn  Growth rate of the price of 
investment 
0.00 % per period 
nδ  Capacity depreciation rate 0.033 % per period 
Parameters for Renewable A (Wind Energy Technology) 
aA  Coefficient of fabrication 8,760.00 Number of 
hours per 
year 
az  Utilization loading factor 35 % 
0ap  Initial price of investment 1,966,559 US$ per MW 
grpa  Growth rate of the price of 
investment 
-0.05 % per period 
aδ  Capacity depreciation rate 0.04 % per period 
Parameters for Renewable B (Wave Energy Technology) 
bA  Coefficient of fabrication 8,760.00 Number of 
hours per 
year 
bz  Utilization loading factor 38 % 
0bp  Initial price of investment 2,465,632 US$/MW 
grpb  Growth rate of the price of 
investment 
-0.1 % per period 
bδ  Capacity depreciation rate 0.05 % per period 
Initial and Terminal Conditions 
0kn  Initial non-renewable capacity 1,471.1 MW 
0ka  Initial capacity of technology A 0.00 MW 
okb  Initial capacity of technology B 0.00 MW 
x  Renewable to total output ratio 
requirement 
20 % in the last 
period 
v  Ratio of renewable A to total 
renewable output 
95 % in the last 
period 
knT  Terminal non-renewable 
capacity 
1759.76 MW 
kaT  Terminal capacity for renewable 
A 
781.91 MW 
kbT  Terminal capacity for renewable 
B 
37.90 MW 
 
The initial electricity production target and its growth rate were taken from an annual 
report of Hawaii Electric Industries, and the Integrated Resource Planning report of 
HECO, the electric utility in Oahu. The Gross State Product (GSP) of the county of 
Honolulu for 2000 is used as a proxy for initial macroeconomic resources. The values 
of the GSP and its growth rate displayed in the table were both found in databooks of 
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the Hawaii Department of Business and Economic Development44. The databooks 
provide estimates of the GDP per year, and the GSP growth rate for every five years 
between 2000 and 2030. These estimates were used to calculate a single growth rate 
for the GSP between 2000 and 2030.  
 
Information on the initial and terminal conditions was found on the HECO website 
and in legislative documents on the Hawaii Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS). For 
simplicity, a few assumptions were made on the existing generating capacity and the 
RPS. Firstly, all non-renewable generating capacity—which includes mostly oil-fired 
plants, but also coal-fired  plants, diesel units and combined cycle gas turbines—was 
brought together in a single group. This implies that all non-renewable generating 
plants have the same costs, coefficients of fabrication, and fuel parameters.  
 
Secondly, we assume that there is no renewable energy capacity installed or used in 
period 0. In addition, the existence and possibility of electricity generation from 
renewable resources other than wind and wave power is ignored. This assumption  
may not be so unrealistic since apart from solar energy, as there is little use of 
renewables on the island of Oahu (other renewable resources such as geothermal, 
hydro and biomass are used in Hawaii on Maui and Big Island but not Oahu). Finally, 
the terminal conditions listed in table 5.1 imply that renewable energy should account 
for 20 percent of Oahu’s electricity generation in period 20. In reality, however, the 
RPS requires 20 percent of renewable electricity generation in the whole state of 
Hawaii: electric utilities may have different shares of renewable electricity generation 
and it is the average across the whole state which matters. Indeed, to date the electric 
utility on Oahu has accommodated much less renewable energy than the utility on Big 
Island. The renewable energy requirements entered into the model can readily be 
adjusted to represent a lower target for Oahu.  
 
The terminal capacity of each type of plant was calculated using the renewable energy 
requirements, x and v , with x set to 20 percent and v  set arbitrarily to 95 percent, 
reflecting the prevailing view that wind is the dominant renewable energy technology. 
The renewable plant backup requirements, growth rate in the price of investment of 
                                                 
44 http://www.hawaii.gov/dbedt/info/economic/databook/db2005/  
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each plant, and growth rate of the price of fuel were all set on an ad hoc basis as 
exogenous parameters which can be changed for various scenarios as required. In 
order to ensure as much reliability as possible, we impose a one-to-one backup 
requirement for renewable energy plants (every MW of wind and wave power is thus 
backed up by a MW of non-renewable capacity). The price of investment in wave 
energy is assumed to decline faster than that of wind energy because the novelty of 
the wave energy technology implies that learning by doing should enable large cost 
reductions. The price of investment in the non-renewable technology is assumed to 
remain constant over time.   
 
The coefficients of fabrication for wind and wave energy were set by multiplying 365 
by 24 in order to find the number of MWh per year produced by each plant operating 
continuously; they were then multiplied by the capacity factors z to determine output 
from each technology. The coefficient of fabrication for non-renewables was derived 
from the electricity production and non-renewable capacity in year 1. The capacity 
depreciation rates and utilisation loading factors of renewables were found in studies 
relating to wind (Dale and Milborrow, 2006) and wave (Previsic et al., 2005b) energy. 
The investment price for non-renewables, wind and wave energy were found in 
Wikipedia, www.offshore.co.uk, and in Previsic et al. (2005b) respectively.  
 
Ad hoc feasibility constraints for the production of renewable energy can also be 
included in the model, although it has not been done in this instance. If the model 
incorporated production functions for all the available types of plants as well as a 
feasibility constraint for each type of renewable energy, the optimal feasible share of 
generation of each type of renewable ( x and v ) could be easily determined. Limited 
time and data resources have precluded such an extension of the model in this study. 
 
The values displayed in table 5.1 are all exogenous. Using these parameter values, the 
model defines the welfare-maximising capacity accumulation process for all types of 
plants over the specified time horizon (20 years in this case), and the resulting 
electricity output. The following figures display the results associated with the 
exogenous values shown in Table 5.1: 
 93
Figure 5.8: Model Output for Scenario 1 
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As seen in the second graph above, the capacity accumulation process follows the 
terminal condition requirements: in year 20, renewable energy output constitutes 20 
percent of total electricity output (as required by x = 0.2); most renewable energy 
output is produced by technology “a”, or wind turbines (as required by v = 0.95), 
hence little investment is made in wave energy.  
 
How does the energy planner choose to meet these requirements? Despite a 
decreasing price of investment for renewable energy, the energy planner in this 
scenario chooses to make the largest investment in renewable energy capacity in the 
first period. Investments in renewable energy, particularly wind energy, are still made 
in subsequent periods (until period 7 for wind energy; and also very small amounts 
until period 7 for wave energy). However, as shown in table 5.8 below, the magnitude 
of these investments is hardly comparable to that of period 1: 
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Table 5.2: Investment in Renewable and Non-Renewable Energy Plants 
(Scenario 1) 
Period Investment in 
renewable A 
(wind energy)  
Investment in 
renewable B 
(wave energy)  
Investment in 
non-
renewables   
0 1207.2 100.4 0.0 
1 121.2 0.00004 0.0 
2 10.6 0.00068 0.0 
3 10.2 0.00062 0.0 
4 33.6 0.00000 23.7 
5 84.8 0.00009 75.1 
6 94.9 0.00000 85.0 
7 57.7 0.000011 56.2 
8 0.0 0.0 96.8 
9 0.0 0.0 96.2 
10 0.0 0.0 89.9 
11 0.0 0.0 85.3 
12 0.0 0.0 82.2 
13 0.0 0.0 80.4 
14 0.0 0.0 80.5 
15 0.0 0.0 82.6 
16 0.0 0.0 85.7 
17 0.0 0.0 83.3 
18 0.0 0.0 75.8 
19 0.0 0.0 88.1 
 
Therefore, the energy planner finds it optimal to invest in wind energy mostly in the 
first period, and subsequently invest just enough to ‘maintain’ capacity so that 20 
percent of output is delivered by wind turbines in the last period. On the other hand, 
there is no investment in non-renewable capacity until period 4, and an increasing 
investment thereafter. As shown in the above figure representing non-renewable 
generating capacity, actual non-renewable output other than backup supply drops to 
zero between periods 2 and 8 (as all non-renewable capacity is used to backup 
renewables), so that all electricity is produced using solely wind turbines and wave 
plants plus non-renewable backup supply. There is relatively little investment in wave 
energy, mainly because although setting v  to 0.95 means that 95 percent of 
renewable electricity generation should come from wind energy in period 20 only, not 
in other periods, the twenty-year period of the simulation is equal to the economic life 
of a wave plant, so that substantial investment in wave plant during the intervening 
period would leave undepreciated wave capacity stranded and idle at the terminal date. 
In addition, building a wave power plant is more costly than building a wind power 
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plant; as shown in table 5.1, which displays the parameter values used in this scenario, 
the initial price of investment for a wave plant is US$ 2,465,632 per MW, compared 
to US$ 1,966,559 per MW for a wind plant.    
 
A major question follows from observing the capacity accumulation process: why 
does the energy planner start by making such large investments in wind energy? The 
following paragraph provides a first intuitive answer; however, this question is 
examined more carefully in section 4.  
 
It is possible to think that the electricity supplier would meet a renewable portfolio 
standard ( x ) by investing and installing renewable capacity later in the planning 
period: intuitively, an increasing price of fuel, a decreasing price of investment for 
renewables, and a increasing environmental penalty on non-renewable output should 
make investments in renewable energy capacity more and more advantageous over 
time. Yet in this scenario the energy planner meets the portfolio requirement by 
investing mostly in the first period, then letting the capacity depreciate down to 20 
percent of total generation in year 20. This suggests that renewables are already 
competitive with fossil fuel technologies, and that x =20% represents a downward 
constraint on the planner’s desired renewable energy investment and development. 
Hence, when the renewable portfolio standard is represented by an absolute number, it 
can constitute a constraint to renewable energy development in either direction, 
upward or downwards.  
 
Another reason for such a large, sudden investment in wind energy may be the 
existence of a growing penalty weight on electricity output tracking. The following 
graph displays the evolution of electricity supply (q) verses the pre-determined 
electricity demand path ( q ): 
 97
Figure 5.9: Desired Vs. Actual Output for Scenario 1 
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In this particular scenario it is optimal for the energy planner/supplier to deviate from 
the pre-determined electricity demand path by not supplying enough electricity, 
except in period1. This deviation can be “corrected” by increasing the penalty weight 
on output tracking (see scenario 4), but it is possible that there will always remain 
some deviation. Note, however, that in this case the deviation from q  decreases with 
time, with the electricity output finally reaching the target value in the last period. 
This is likely due to the positive growth rate on the penalty weight for energy tracking 
( grπ ), so that it becomes less and less optimal to deviate from the output target. 
Hence, the largest deviation is made rather early (when it is still relatively “cheap” to 
deviate from the output target) by supplying all the electricity with an intermittent 
source of energy and living with some under-supply.  
 
In period 1, there is excess supply due to the large increase in wind energy supply and 
available backup capacity, coupled with the inability to decommission the existing 
non-renewable energy capacity. The planner is temporarily letting existing non-
renewable capacity depreciate, with no investment until period 4, as well as turning 
this capacity into backup for renewables. The non-renewable capacity depreciation 
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rate is more than offset initially by the large new wind energy capacity, so that there is 
temporary excess supply; subsequently the pattern is reversed for a number of years.  
 
b) Second Scenario for Oahu: Optimal Value of v  
After modelling the base-case scenario described in the previous section, a simulation 
was made by varying the parameter v  (the ratio of wind output to total renewable 
output) and observing the resulting welfare surplus, in order to find the optimal, 
welfare-maximising value of v . The simulation revealed that the optimal ratio is 
actually close to zero, meaning that given the exogenous specifications employed, our 
energy planner would prefer to generate electricity using the wave energy technology 
rather than wind turbines. This “technology preference” may come from four different 
parameters: utilization loading factor or capacity factor of the plants, initial price of 
investment for each technology, expected growth in the price of investments and for 
capacity depreciation rate45. The initial price of investment and capacity depreciation 
rate associated with the wave energy technology are higher than those associated with 
the wind energy technology. However, the capacity factor of the wave energy 
converter is slightly higher than that of the wind turbine (by 3 percent), and its price is 
arbitrarily set to decrease faster (given the novelty of the wave energy technology, 
there is assumed to be more scope for the price to fall due to effects such as learning 
by doing). This implies that the model favours the renewable energy technology 
which has the highest capacity factor and largest expected decrease in price.    
 
After running the simulations to find the optimal value for v , the model was applied 
to a second scenario, similar to the base case scenario except for the value of v , 
which was set to 0.01. The resulting capacity accumulation and output trajectory are 
displayed in the following figures: 
                                                 
45 The “preference” for wave energy revealed by the simulation was cross-checked by running a 
simulation with the same parameter values for both technologies. The simulation revealed a constant 
welfare for all values of v  (except for 0.01 and 0.02, which were associated with a lower welfare).  
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Figure 5.10: Model Output for Scenario 2 
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Welfare = 10.61 
 
Unsurprisingly, the capacity accumulation and output decomposition figures are quite 
similar to those of the base case scenario (including a large investment in renewables 
in the first period), except that the majority of renewable output comes from wave 
energy, as required by the low value of v . The value of welfare associated with this 
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scenario is larger than in the base case scenario; this confirms that a lower value of v  
is preferred to a higher value. There is also more renewable output being produced 
than in the previous scenario, for two reasons. Firstly, due to the higher capacity 
depreciation associated with the wave energy technology, the energy planner starts by 
installing more capacity in the first period than under the base case scenario in order 
to end up with 20 percent of renewable energy in period 20. Secondly, the capacity 
factor of the wave technology is higher than that of the wind technology, which 
means that every MW of wave capacity installed produces more than a MW of wind 
capacity.  
 
Thus in this case, the energy planner uses mostly wave energy (and very little wind 
energy) and non-renewable capacity as a backup to produce electricity for 8 periods, 
using more non-renewable energy from period 9. All non-renewable capacity serves 
as a backup for renewables from periods 1-9, after which the ratio of backup capacity 
to total non-renewable capacity decreases as the energy planner lets the renewable 
plants capacities depreciate (from periods 9 to 20). A sudden increase in deviation 
from the output target occurs in period 9: as the energy planner lets the wind and 
wave energy plants depreciate, the corresponding backup capacity is also let to 
depreciate. Instead of maintaining the total amount of non-renewable capacity and 
increasing the share of non-renewable electricity production, the energy planner keeps 
using the totality of non-renewable capacity as a backup for renewables, and lets it 
depreciate with the renewable plants. From period 10, however, stand-alone non-
renewable supply reappears and its share of total supply rises thereafter. 
 
c) Third Scenario: A Higher Renewable Portfolio Standard  
This section provides an overview and explanation of the modelling results for the 
case of Oahu with a Renewable Portfolio Standard of 40 percent in year 20 ( 4.0=x ). 
This scenario thus consists of the same parameter values outlined in the previous 
scenario ( 01.0=v ), except for x , which is set at 0.4. The resulting output for this 
scenario is displayed in the following diagrams: 
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Figure 5.11: Model Output for Scenario 3 
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Welfare = 13.49 
 
Once again, our energy planner starts investing in wave energy capacity straight away 
in order to meet the renewable energy requirements in year 20. Renewable energy 
capacity (mostly wave energy) and corresponding non-renewable backup is used to 
produce the totality of electricity output for 15 consecutive periods. Since the 
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portfolio standard is set higher, however, capacity accumulation follows a slightly 
different path. Instead of installing the largest amount of wave energy capacity early 
and letting it depreciate, the energy planner accumulates renewable capacity gradually, 
with a capacity peak in period 17, in order to meet the portfolio standard. Welfare has 
increased as the renewable portfolio standard x has increased to 40 percent.  
 
Non-renewable capacity is entirely used as a backup for renewables, except in periods 
1, 18, 19 and 20 where some stand-alone non-renewable generation occurs. Some 
non-renewable capacity is installed in periods 18 and 19 in order to ensure that the 
output target is met in period 20 as wave energy capacity declines slightly. In period 
20, however, the majority of non-renewable capacity is still used for backing up 
renewables.  
 
d) Fourth Scenario: Behaviour of the Model Output as x increases 
This section provides a brief description of the model output behaviour as x is 
increased gradually by 10 percent from 20 percent to 100 percent. Apart from the 
value of x , all parameter values used for this scenario are the same as in scenario b 
( v =0.01).  
A number of observations can be made on the amount of renewable energy installed 
as x  increases: 
? Whatever the value of x , the largest investment is made in wave energy in the 
initial period, increasing the amount of wave energy capacity from 0 MW in 
period 0 to 1422 MW in period 1 in each case. This is always accompanied by 
a drop in operating non-renewable capacity in period 1, with all non-
renewable capacity used as a backup for renewable energy. In each case, the 
capacity of wave energy decreases to 1375 MW in period 2, then 1330 MW in 
period 3, and 1286 MW in period 4. These figures remain the same regardless 
of the value of x . In each case, wave energy capacity drops again between 
1242 and 1245 MW in period 5. Hence, whatever the value of x , a large 
investment is made in wave energy capacity in period 0, leading to a jump in 
wave energy capacity and production in period 1. Small investments are also 
made between period 1 and 4; nevertheless, the magnitude of these 
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investments is smaller than the capacity depreciation rate, which leads to a 
decrease in capacity from period 2 to 5.  
? From period 5, larger investments are made in wave energy, leading to a 
gradual increase in wave energy capacity.  
? After period 5, the investment and capacity accumulation paths differ from 
case to case, depending on the value of x . When x  is set at 20 percent, wave 
energy capacity starts decreasing again from period 8, in order to meet the 
portfolio standard requirement of 20 percent, which corresponds to 750 MW. 
As x  increases, this decrease in capacity occurs more and more late: for 
example, when x  is set to 30 percent, wave energy capacity starts decreasing 
again from period 14 from 1530 MW down to 1126 MW—the capacity 
required by the 30 percent standard.  This is shown in the figures below, which 
display capacity accumulation for x =0.2, x =0.3 and x =0.4. 
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Figure 5.12: Model Output for Scenario 4—Increasing the Renewable Portfolio 
Standard from 20% to 30% and 40% 
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? When x  is set between 20 and 40 percent, the model seems to be reaching for 
an optimal amount of renewable energy capacity. The similarities observed in 
the investment path and capacity accumulation process when x  is set below 
40 percent imply that all else equal, there is an optimal value of x , which 
defines an optimal amount of capacity for every type of generating technology, 
and which simultaneously determines an optimal capacity accumulation path. 
Hence, all else equal, the model is reaching for the optimal value of x  by 
remaining as close as possible to the corresponding optimal accumulation path.  
? However, once x  is set beyond 40 percent, the model does not solve. In other 
words, there is no solution that satisfies the constraints given the value of 
parameters and requirements. There are 3 constraints applied to this model: the 
first constraint is that investment remains non-negative from period 0 to 19. 
The second constraint is that non-renewable operating capacity remains non-
negative in all periods. This constraint is applied to non-renewable operating 
capacity, which refers to the capacity used for stand-alone non-renewable 
energy production—it does not include the capacity that is used as a backup 
for renewables. The third constraint is placed on final state capacities for all 
three technologies, so that the renewable energy requirements set by x  and v  
are met in the final period. Any combination of  x  and v  implies a very 
specific set of knT, kaT, and kbT values, which further, and endogenously, 
affects the values that the non-renewable operating capacity can take on 
during the last period. For example, setting x  to 100 percent with v  set at 
0.01 would require 100 percent of the capacity in the final period to consist of 
renewable energy capacity, including 99 percent of wave energy capacity and 
1 percent of wind energy. However, this is not compatible with the second 
constraint, which states that non-renewable operating capacity must be non-
negative at all times. Indeed, with 100 percent of renewable energy feeding the 
system, there should be no fossil fuel technology operating, except for backing 
up renewable energy whenever it is necessary. Hence, all else equal, when x  
is set above 40 percent, the second and the third constraints are not compatible 
with each other, and the model cannot solve. When the second constraint is 
not applied, renewable energy capacity accumulation follows the same process 
as when x  is set between 20 percent and 40 percent, except for an additional 
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“jump” in wave energy capacity in the final period in order to meet the 
portfolio standards. This jump is accompanied by a jump in non-renewable 
backup capacity, which is enabled by imposing a negative value on the 
operating non-renewable capacity. Similarly to the 20 percent RPS scenario 
observed above, the last-minute increase in renewable energy capacity implies 
that the energy planner seeks to remain as close as possible to the optimal 
capacity accumulation path, and deviates from this path only in the last period 
in order to meet the requirements. This behaviour implies that all else equal, 
the optimal value of x is lower than 100 percent. When running the model 
without imposing the second constraint, the optimal value of x was found at 
42 percent.  
 
e) Fifth Scenario: Increasing the Penalty on Output Tracking 
In this scenario we aim to increase the output tracking penalty, π , in order to have the 
output stay as close as possible to the target output. The results presented in this 
section are based on the same input values as in scenario b, except for the value of π  
which is arbitrarily set to 30. The resulting model output is displayed in the figure 
below: 
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Figure 5.13: Model Output for Scenario 5 
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Welfare = 10.16 
 
The capacity accumulation and generation paths are very similar to those in scenario 2 
(outlined in section b). In order to meet the output target, however, the energy planner 
accumulates more wave energy capacity during the first periods, and lets it depreciate 
slightly earlier than in scenario 2, leading to a continuous increase in non-renewable 
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generation from period 7. In addition, investments in wind energy are deferred until 
non-renewable generation kicks off.  
 
f) Sixth Scenario: Lower Backup Requirements on Renewables 
This section presents the model output when imposing a fossil fuel backup 
requirement of 50 percent on wave and wind energy capacity ( aθ =0.5, bθ = 0.5). The 
parameter values are all set as in scenario 2, except for aθ  and bθ . The model output 
is displayed below: 
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Figure 5.14: Model Output for Scenario 6 
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The accumulation process observed above is fundamentally different to that observed 
in scenario 2. Here, the energy planner invests largely in wave energy during the first 
two periods (period 0 and 1), and in wind energy capacity in the first period. No other 
investments are made in renewable energy in subsequent periods. Hence, the energy 
planner installs enough renewable capacity within the first periods so as to let it 
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depreciate until the final period while meeting the renewable energy requirements. In 
period 2, the amount of wave energy capacity installed reaches almost 1890MW, 
which is more than 400 MW larger than in scenario 2, and the amount of energy 
produced is significantly higher than the production target. This is because the 
renewable backup requirements are smaller, so there is relatively more of the existing 
non-renewable operating capacity available for use. All renewable energy capacity 
installed is thus backed up by non-renewable capacity, however not all non-renewable 
capacity is used for backing up renewables, and this “remainder” capacity is used in 
all periods, with a load factor of 79 percent. This is likely due to the linear 
specification of backup capacity with respect to renewable energy capacity factors. At 
the same time, all renewable energy and non-renewable backup capacity is also used. 
In period 8 the quantity of energy produced is below the production target, as 
renewable capacity and the corresponding backup capacity are depreciating. The 
energy planner then invests in non-renewable capacity from period 8 until period 19, 
so that the production target is met in the final period.  
The welfare value associated with this scenario is lower than in scenario 2, where the 
renewable backup capacity requirement was higher. Intuitively, lowering the 
renewable backup requirements could lead to lower investments in non-renewable 
capacity, and hence more welfare. The cost of investments in non-renewable capacity 
is indeed lower than in scenario 2. However, these savings are outweighed by two 
types of expenses. Firstly, because the totality of renewable energy investments was 
made within the first two periods, the energy planner did not benefit from the 
decreasing price of renewable energy capacity. Hence, even if the amount of 
renewable energy capacity is the same as in scenario 2, the cost of renewable 
investments made by the planner is higher. Secondly, because a large part of non-
renewable energy capacity was generating energy from periods 1 to 20, the amount of 
non-renewable energy production was higher, which incurred additional spending due 
to the environmental penalty. It is also likely that the large upward deviation from the 
output target may have incurred more costs (due to the penalty on output tracking) 
than in scenario 2.  
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4) Discussion 
 
The results outlined in the previous section reveal some interesting 
characteristics about the behaviour of the model. In each case with a portfolio 
standard of 20 percent, the energy planner satisfies the terminal conditions (renewable 
portfolio standards) by investing in renewable energy surprisingly early. We observe a 
declining path for renewable electricity, rather than a sudden growth in renewable 
electricity in the last periods. What are the explanations for such behaviour?  
 
Firstly, because of the quadratic term associated with output tracking in equation (1), 
the model can be regarded as a quadratic-linear programming framework, with linear 
optimality conditions. Hence in each scenario, the trajectory of choice represents the 
unique solution which satisfies the linear conditions. Secondly, there is an implicit 
assumption of perfect foresight on investment prices and fuel prices, so that the model 
is forward-looking. The model takes these values and the terminal conditions into 
account, and solves the problem backwards for the entire period. In other words, 
given the terminal conditions, the model solves backwards to identify the “ideal” 
initial conditions. We suspect that these ideal initial conditions involve a relatively 
high (and definitely non-zero) share of renewable electricity generation. Because the 
actual initial capacity and generation in renewables are much lower than those 
identified as “ideal”, the model undertakes a large investment in renewables within 
the first periods, in order to jump onto the optimal path as soon as possible and 
subsequently follow this path.  
 
5) Future Research 
 
The model presented in the previous sections still contains a number of flaws that 
could not be solved within the bounds of this Master’s Thesis. The first noticeable 
weakness inherent to this model is the simplistic assumption on the lag between 
capacity investment and plant construction and installation. Although the lag between 
investment and actual plant installation currently constitutes a significant barrier to 
renewable energy development (in particular for new technologies such as wave 
energy, which entail a significant lag), the capacity accumulation process underlying 
this model implies that all types of generation plants are operational one period after 
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investment is made. Setting a longer delay between investment and construction for 
renewable energy technologies would ensure that current, relevant challenges such as 
installing the plants and obtaining permits are accounted for. Ideally, the model 
should be specified so that each technology would have a specific 
investment/installation delay, depending on variables such as the amount of permits 
required and construction experience. Such delays may become smaller over time, as 
the process of obtaining environmental permits becomes easier and industries gain 
from experience and learning-by-doing. The specification of capacity accumulation 
equations for each technology could be done on an ad-hoc basis, and updated with the 
accumulation of data and experience. Unfortunately, there is little experience in wave 
energy to fine-tune our equations. However, it seems unlikely that that correcting for 
this simplistic assumption would change the core of the model output. As previously 
explained, the model sets out an optimal capacity accumulation process, given a 
number of exogenous parameters such as fuel price, investment price, and output 
target. The assumption that installation can occur one period after investment for all 
types of plants has resulted in model outputs involving the installation of a large 
amount of renewable energy capacity in little time (see, for instance, scenario 1, 
where the energy planner installs almost 2000 MW of wind energy capacity in period 
1). If the period between investment and installation for renewables was set to be 
longer, say 5 years, the core of the model output would remain similar: the optimal 
capacity accumulation path would remain the same, the energy planner would simply 
not be able to meet this optimal path as early as period 1, but from period 5. In other 
words, this simplistic assumption only impacts on the speed at which the energy 
planner can “jump” onto the optimal capacity accumulation path.  
 
Another weakness of the model’s capacity accumulation process is the failure to 
account for both lumpiness and economies of scale in investments for electricity 
generating capacity. While installing small amounts of wind energy capacity at a time 
may be feasible, it is not the case for non-renewable plants. Ideally, the capacity 
investment equations should contain a limit which specifies the minimum amount of 
generating capacity to be installed at a time. In addition, an assumption inherent to the 
model specifications is that the price of each plant does not vary with size, meaning 
that there are no economies of scale for investment in generating capacity. While this 
assumption does not change anything with regards to feasibility, economies of scale 
 117
are very important to investment decisions in electricity generation, and the 
subsequent price of electricity.  
 
Finally, a major weakness inherent to the specification of this model is the linearity of 
the renewable electricity production functions, which entails the “domination” of one 
renewable energy technology over the other. This technology domination (or 
preference) became particularly obvious in scenario b, where the optimal value of 
v was found to be zero, leading to a high wave-energy share of renewable generation. 
Looking back at equation 6, both renewable technologies have the same linear 
production function. However, wave energy has a higher capacity factor than wind 
energy, which makes the production of electricity more efficient with wave energy 
than with wind energy. It is suspected that this preference for wave energy is also 
partly due to the faster decrease in the wave energy investment price, given that the 
growth of investment price appears directly in the investment co-state variable. In any 
case, linear production functions of renewable electricity lead to a corner solution: the 
optimal v  is always going to be either zero or one, because the production function of 
one technology will dominate the other.  
 
One way of dealing with this problem would be to set non-linear production functions 
for renewable energy technologies. Non-linearity would entail an interior solution 
with respect to the ideal combination of renewable energy resources, v . Having an 
interior solution would then be useful to find the combination of renewable energy 
resources which maximises reliability, or minimizes the amount of non-renewable 
backup required to maintain reliability. This would enable a proper integration of 
portfolio analysis into the model. While the modelling work above had no mutual 
backup of renewables “a” by renewables “b”, a more sophisticated version would 
definitely need to incorporate this. The following diagram provides an intuitive 
framework for this concept.  
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Figure 5.15: Framework for Reliability with a Portfolio of Renewable Energy 
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The concave functions display the relation between reliability of electricity supply, 
expressed as a percentage, and the ratio of wind energy to wave energy generation, v , 
for a fixed amount of non-renewable back-up capacity. For simplicity and consistency, 
we assume that there are only two large-scale renewable energy technologies 
available: wind and wave energy. As was the case in section 3, when v  equals zero, 
all renewable electricity generation comes from wave energy; when it is equal to one, 
all renewable electricity generation comes from wind energy.  
 
The curves displayed in figure 5.8 are concave; there is diminishing substitutability 
between wind and wave energy in terms of reliability. As explained in chapter 3, the 
more diverse the resources, the higher the reliability of supply: adding some wave 
energy capacity to a system where all renewable energy is generated from wind power 
will increase the reliability of supply. Similarly, adding wind energy to a system 
which consists of solely wave energy for renewable generation will lead to an 
increase in reliability of supply. However, there is a point after which adding wind 
energy will no longer increase reliability (e.g. point A on the lower curve): as v  
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approaches 1, there is less diversity. Hence, when looking at the relationship between 
reliability of renewable energy supply and the combination of renewable resources 
used, it makes more sense to have an interior solution than a corner solution. 
Intuitively, one might expect to find this interior solution close to 5.0=v . In the 
figure, however, the local maximum is drawn to occur below 5.0=v , reflecting the 
likelihood that wave energy is inherently more reliable than wind energy (hence, 
reliability is higher when 0=v than when 1=v ). This assumption reflects the fact 
that wave energy is characterised as more continuous, more predictable, and with a 
higher power density than wind energy (Power Projects Limited, 2005).  
 
The error bars displayed on the lower curve provide a measure of uncertainty with 
respect to the level of reliability for different values of v . The error bars become 
wider as v  increases because wave energy is considered more predictable than wind 
energy.   
 
The diagram displayed in figure 5.8 presents an innovative way of thinking about 
portfolio analysis, which was mentioned in chapter 3: increasing the diversity of 
renewable electricity generating resources leads to an increase in reliability of supply. 
Observing and calibrating the correlation between outputs of different renewable 
energy resources will likely lead to significant improvements in reliability of 
renewable energy supply at any given cost, with better investments in backup capacity. 
For instance, the hypothetical diagram above shows that the level of reliability (50 
percent) achieved by using solely wave energy generation on the higher curve can 
also be achieved with an ideal combination *v  of wind and wave energy (point A on 
the lower curve), which is cheaper as it requires less backup ( nn kk <' ). If a minimum 
of 50 percent reliability was required at all times, one may consider investing in more 
non-renewable backup capacity, shifting the lower curve up so that the lower part of 
the error bar at point A corresponds to 50 percent reliability. This option would 
remain cheaper than using solely one resource for renewable electricity generation.  
 
Rewriting the renewable production functions as non-linear and introducing 
interdependency amongst renewables would thus enable a deeper analysis of 
reliability using renewable energy resources, which is particularly important to Pacific 
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Islands. Future research in this area may also require a redefinition of the concept of 
reliability. In reality, the duration and frequency of power interruptions are important, 
as well as the time at which these interruptions occur. However, rewriting the 
renewable production functions and reliability functions would entail complications 
for the model, which are beyond the scope of this thesis.    
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Chapter Six: Policies and Market Instruments to Promote 
Renewable Energy in Pacific Islands  
 
 
 
1) Barriers to the Development of Renewable Energy in Pacific Islands 
 
The potential for Pacific Island Countries to generate electricity using 
renewable energy is significant, given their endowments in various renewable energy 
sources and the availability of an increasing range of renewable energy technologies. 
Yet these countries are even more heavily reliant on imported fossil fuels for 
electricity supply than the typical country in the world economy. Part of the 
explanation for limited market penetration by renewables is the economic issues 
analysed in Chapter 4.  However, it is also true that renewable energy technologies 
face strong institutional and market barriers – which may be specific to a technology, 
a country or region (Painuly, 2001) – in addition to a variety of market failures. This 
section provides an identification of the structural and institutional barriers to 
renewable energy development, with particular reference to the context of Pacific 
Island Countries.  
 
Pacific Islands are remote, isolated, and fragmented countries. These geographic 
characteristics, coupled with small and dispersed populations, place important 
constraints on the production of electricity. In most islands, there is little opportunity 
to benefit from economies of scale because of the small size of markets, their 
geographical fragmentation, and the inability to connect to a bigger continental grid 
(Mayer, 2000; Stuart, 2006). Due to low absolute demand, Pacific Islands do not have 
bulk electricity markets so that there is little room for competition and consequent 
price reductions (Weisser, 2004). In most islands, electricity supply is in the hands of 
vertically integrated monopolies which have control over all stages of power 
generation, transmission and distribution (see chapter 2). The lack of incentive for 
existing electric utilities to buy or produce renewable energy has been identified as a 
significant market barrier for the development of renewables worldwide (Neuhoff, 
2004), and monopolistic market structures hinder the deployment of renewables 
further. For example, utilities may set burdensome and expensive interconnection 
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requirements for independent power producers. Hence, renewable energy producers 
have no or limited access to electricity grids in Pacific Islands. In addition, if access to 
the grid is granted, the intermittency of renewable energy can become an issue 
because utilities often pay independent producers solely for the energy value of their 
production, not the capacity value of the generation.   
 
There is typically little opportunity for profit in small, remote islands, even though 
renewable energy projects may be less expensive than non-renewable energy in such 
areas (Weisser, 2004). As explained in chapter 2, due to the small size of the markets 
electricity demand is lumpy and can vary sharply with the construction of a new 
business or resort, which can make predictions of demand growth difficult (especially 
since large new enterprises can choose to self-supply in preference to relying on local 
grid supply). This may have limited the ability of electricity suppliers and potential 
investors to plan capacity expansion on an integrated basis, resulting in little 
commitment to renewable energy.   
 
With little or no competition for electricity production, there is little opportunity to 
create markets for green electricity; but such market structures could ease the 
implementation and monitoring of policies aimed at increasing the share of 
renewables in a generating mix. Clear legal and regulatory frameworks for 
independent producers, especially with respect to power purchase agreements with the 
utilities, would also encourage and support the deployment of renewables. More 
independence for regulatory bodies could potentially ensure better frameworks to 
reduce the influence of incumbent suppliers, and enhance new private sector 
participation in the industry.   
 
The presence of direct and indirect subsidies for fuel-based generating technologies 
clearly distorts incentives for electric utilities to invest in renewables. This is 
especially the case since the cost structure of renewable energy technologies is 
different to that of conventional technologies. Renewable energy technologies involve 
high initial capital costs, and little input costs thereafter. While some utilities benefit 
from import tax exemptions for fuel inputs, the high investment costs of renewable 
energy technologies are often exacerbated by high taxes and import duties (Wade, H. 
et al., 2005, Volume 1 p.84). Electricity generating technologies typically last for 
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decades, which makes it difficult to radically change the electricity generating mix 
once an investment decision has been made. Partly for this reason, Neuhoff (2004) 
argues that the energy industry is characterised by a strong technology lock-out which 
impedes renewable energy development. 
 
Another market distortion which affects the competitiveness of renewables related to 
fossil fuel technologies is the absence of recognition of the costs related to fossil fuel 
price volatility. Price volatility is believed to have significant, negative impacts on 
macroeconomic activity as measured by GDP growth, employment and inflation 
(Awerbuch, 2004b, p.8). Increasing the amount of renewable energy leads to a more 
diversified electricity generating mix and reduces the costs related to fuel price 
volatility (see the section on portfolio theory in chapter 3). Nevertheless, such costs 
are typically not accounted for in utilities’ pricing or investment decisions46. This is 
especially the case for Pacific Islands: in some countries, such as Guam and Hawaii, 
the distortion is exacerbated by the fact that fuel costs are passed on to consumers. 
Similarly, in Palau, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, electricity tariffs contain a fuel 
price adjustment component (Wade et al., 2005, Vol. 9, p.13, Vol. 16 p.14, Vol. 12 
p.18). In Kiribati, Tokelau and the Marshall Islands, all fuels used by the electric 
utilities (PUB, Taupulegas and MEC respectively) are exempt from taxes and import 
duties (Wade et al., 2005). Other market distortions in Pacific Islands include 
government subsidies for conventional electricity supply and fossil fuels and pricing 
electricity below its average cost of production (Wade et al., 2005, Vol.1 p.29), which 
undermine the economic viability of renewable energy technologies. Furthermore, it 
is particularly difficult to evaluate the amount and impact of these subsidies as they 
are rarely transparent, and information on electricity and energy costs is difficult to 
obtain (Wade et al., 2005).  
 
In addition to existing distortions in electricity markets themselves, a number of 
characteristics inherent to the financial, institutional and regulatory environments 
hinder renewable energy development in Pacific Islands. Perhaps the most noticeable 
institutional obstacle to the development of renewables in most Pacific Islands is the 
                                                 
46  On the other hand, the high capital cost and uncertainty associated with renewable energy 
technologies (such as survivability, potential licensing and construction delays) constitute risks which 
are of primary concern to (reluctant) investors. 
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lack of clear, recent national energy policies (see chapter 2). Most governments of the 
Pacific Islands have at least expressed the desire to enhance the implementation of 
renewables (Domah, 2002; World Bank, 1992; Wade et al., 2005). Some island 
countries have recently developed national energy policies, and others are currently 
reviewing their policies with regards to renewable energy (e.g. New Caledonia). 
However, in a majority of islands, energy policies, if available, do not prioritize 
renewable energy, and lack specific objectives and implementation procedures for 
renewable energy development (Weisser, 2004, Wade et al., 2005).  
 
Another issue which impedes renewable energy development, and helps to explain the 
lack of accurate energy planning, is the lack of financial and human resources for 
energy departments in Pacific Islands. This is reflected in table 6.1 below (from Wade 
et al., 2005), which displays information on the size of Pacific Islands’ energy offices 
and their authority. Yu and Taplin (1997) note that “experience in the region suggests 
that promoting the capabilities of energy institutions related to planning, 
implementation, management and technical training will be an important approach for 
developing renewable energy” (Yu and Taplin, 1997, p.116). Such capabilities depend 
directly on the availability of qualified personnel. The lack of energy policymakers, 
energy economists, technicians and managers in Pacific Islands has hampered energy 
planning for decades (Yu and Taplin, 1997). Furthermore, inadequate funding 
allocated to energy offices makes the monitoring, following up and rehabilitation of 
renewable energy projects difficult (Wade et al., 2005, Volume 1, p.84).   
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Table 6.1: Overview of PIC National Energy Office Staffing and Authority 
(2004)47 
 
 
Finally, limited access to credit and financial resources in Pacific Islands impedes the 
large upfront capital investments required for deploying renewable energy 
technologies. Aside from aid from international donor organisations, there are few 
financing mechanisms for renewable energy in the Pacific Islands. Renewable plants 
involve particular costs and benefits, which should be accounted for by financing 
authorities. For example, the implementation of renewable energy technologies 
involves high upfront capital costs compared to traditional electricity generating 
technologies. Providing low-interest loans for renewable energy investments would 
therefore encourage investments at the local level.  
                                                 
47 Source: Wade et al. (2005) Vol. 1, p.16 
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In addition to the regional characteristics and market barriers which hinder the 
deployment of renewable energy technologies in Pacific Islands, there exist five types 
of market failures which are fundamental: unpriced costs and benefits due to the 
existence of environmental and knowledge externalities, high transaction costs, 
adoption externalities, and the absence of thick markets.  
Environmental Externalities 
The challenge to developing renewable energy technology markets and increasing 
their contribution to electricity generating mixes first relates to their competition 
against conventional, fossil fuel technologies which have been long established in a 
world where energy supply is considered critical to a country’s economic 
development 48. Conventional technologies benefit from a first-mover advantage in 
the sense that electricity supply decisions and tariff structures have been shaped by 
the long predominance of fossil fuel generation in electricity markets (Neuhoff, 
2004). The production costs of conventional technologies have been significantly 
reduced with long experience, mass production, and large government subsidies.  
While renewable energy technologies still have much to gain from learning by doing 
(by “improving efficiency, reducing their costs and develop mature, self-sustaining 
industries to manufacture, install and maintain those systems” – Sawin, 2004) they are 
forced to compete with these established traditional technologies on the basis of price. 
Neuhoff (Neuhoff, 2004, p.6) refers to an “uneven playing-field” between traditional 
and emerging renewable technologies. A major reason for this is that traditional 
energy pricing does not reflect accurately the social and economic risks of different 
energy options, starting with the failure to internalise the costs of environmental 
externalities in electricity production and consumption. The implementation of an 
environmental tax for the production of non-renewable electricity, for example, would 
give electric utilities an incentive to use renewables (Menanteau et al., 2003). Without 
such taxes, the environmental benefits of renewable energy technologies as opposed 
to conventional technologies are not accounted for in investment decision-making, 
while the costs of intermittency are explicitly considered, leading to under-investment 
                                                 
48  For instance, Newbery (2005) states the importance of energy to a country’s macroeconomic 
development.  
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in renewables relative to the social optimum. This effect is exacerbated by a lack of 
information on emissions from the utilities in Pacific Islands.  
The absence of a market or cost for environmental externalities from electricity 
production in Pacific Islands creates an incentive problem, in which electric utilities 
do not bear the consequences of their investment decisions, meaning that they have no 
incentive to invest in “clean” generating capacity such as renewable energy 
technologies. Yet, implementing an optimal environmental tax is practically difficult, 
and may not be sufficient to support renewables until their costs are driven down by 
the learning process (Menanteau et al., 2003)49.  
Knowledge Externalities 
Jaffe et al. (2005, p.166) argue that market failures associated with pollution 
externalities interact with market failures associated with knowledge externalities. 
Contrary to the pollution externality, innovation and knowledge are in essence 
positive externalities, yet the failure to account for this externality also leads to a 
suboptimal level of investment. Because knowledge is a non-rival and more or less 
non-excludable good, it retains the characteristics of a public good, with which the 
problem of free riding is traditionally associated. As explained by Jaffe, “innovative 
firms cannot keep other firms from also benefiting from their new knowledge and 
therefore cannot capture for themselves all the benefits to the innovation”(Jaffe, 
2000), leading to a reduced incentive to invest in technology development. Hence, 
while the failure to internalise the costs of environmental externalities leads to little 
incentive to buy and use renewables, the failure to internalise the costs of knowledge 
externalities creates little incentive to innovate and develop renewables on the supply 
side. The uptake of renewables is thus hindered by market failures which create a 
double-sided incentive problem: failures to account for environmental and knowledge 
externalities.  
                                                 
49 Most renewable energy technologies are relatively new technologies, so that their costs are likely to 
be driven down with the accumulation of production and experience (learning by doing, economies of 
scale, reduction of input prices…). 
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High transaction costs  
Renewable energy projects typically involve a smaller installed capacity than 
traditional energy projects; however, implementing a renewable energy project may 
require additional costs related to resource assessments, utility connection and 
transmission, construction permits, and environmental impact assessments. For 
instance, in most Pacific Islands there is a significant lack of accurate data with 
respect to the availability of renewable energy resources, which can create uncertainty 
and increase the costs to renewable energy projects, as the cost of resource assessment 
would need to be borne by project developers 50 . In addition, renewable energy 
projects involve high information costs, due to the novelty of the technologies and 
because there is little information on the technologies available. Having little or no 
experience with renewables, local project developers need to allocate extra resources 
to acquire information on the quality and cost of each technology, to compare this 
information, and to determine which technology is the most appropriate for the 
Pacific Islands environment. While information costs are likely to decrease with 
experience, the perceived rate of risk of investing in an unfamiliar technology can 
initially be extremely high, affecting both investment and the ability to borrow from 
financial institutions, so that government intervention is required in order to foster 
experience, information and expectations.  
 
These additional information and implementation costs make transaction costs higher 
for renewable energy projects than for conventional energy projects. High transaction 
costs can substantially deter market formation even when the exchange of a good is 
beneficial and desirable; the exchange is unlikely to occur if it is prohibitively 
expensive to set up (Jaffe et al., 2005).  
Adoption Externalities 
High transaction costs induce little effort in implementing renewable energy 
technologies in markets such as Pacific Islands. This problem is exacerbated because 
of “adoption externalities”, which Jaffe et al. characterise as “dynamic increasing 
                                                 
50 Nevertheless, this seems to have improved in the last few years, thanks to regional institutions such 
as SOPAC (which has released specific assessment reports on wind, solar, geothermal resources in 
different islands) and SPREP, as well as local corporations such as SRP, which has been studying the 
potential for wave energy in some Pacific Islands since early 2006.   
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returns due to learning-by-using” (Jaffe et al., 2005, p.167): even if environmental 
externalities were accounted for, investors and electric utilities would rather wait for 
others to invest and install renewable capacity, as transaction costs are likely to 
decrease once a number of renewable energy projects have been implemented. 
Moreover, once a project developer has installed a new technology successfully, other 
firms become more confident about the technology and benefit from additional 
information on its characteristics. In addition to learning-by-using effects, adoption 
externalities include learning-by-doing, an effect associated with the learning curve. A 
learning curve shows the empirical relationship between costs and accumulated 
production or capacity (Ibenholt, 2002, p.1181). This relationship is typically negative, 
revealing a cost reduction for a technology over time due to learning by doing and 
production experience (e.g. finding the minimum efficient scale, finding cheaper 
inputs and assembling the technologies in different countries). Hence, given that most 
renewable energy technologies are still at a relatively early development stage or 
production process, investors have an incentive to defer investments in renewables 
until the production costs have decreased further. 
Thin Markets 
While this may be considered a result of inherent, geographical characteristics rather 
than a market failure, the size and nature of electricity markets in Pacific Islands 
constitute constraints on the amount of renewable energy which can be handled by 
these systems while maintaining reliability of supply. The ability to deal with 
intermittency in electricity supply involves constraints on both quantity and diversity 
of supply. Thick markets, which involve large volume of supply and activity, imply a 
greater ability to maintain a reliable supply of electricity, even when dealing with 
large amounts of intermittency. To illustrate this point, imagine a large country with a 
large and competitive market for electricity, a wide range of energy resources, and a 
renewable portfolio standard under which renewable energy is required to supply 20  
percent of total annual electricity supply.  Supposing that wind energy constitutes the 
most exploited renewable energy resource; under such market conditions (with a large 
number of different types of electricity producers), in the absence of wind the system 
operator would be able to contract a different type of supplier (selling hydroelectricity, 
or power from an oil or diesel plant) immediately in order to ensure that electricity 
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supply matches electricity consumption. That is, intermittency is less of a problem in 
thick markets. Although Pacific Island Countries benefit from a diverse range of 
renewable energy resources (hence the possibility to ensure diversity of electricity 
supply and to use a renewable resource to back up another one), the size of these 
countries does not necessarily allow for a large number of electricity producers, given 
that producers have little opportunity to reap economies of scale. In other words, 
competition for electricity supply is constrained by the size of the markets, hence the 
presence of thin markets; which results, ceteris paribus, in a smaller ability to deal 
with intermittency.  
 
Environmental and knowledge externalities, high transaction costs, adoption 
externalities, and thin markets constitute market failures which impede renewable 
energy development. Market failures mean that the existing markets fail to achieve 
the efficient allocation that perfectly competitive markets would foster (Newbery, 
1989). Under such circumstances, renewable energy projects in Pacific Islands will 
probably remain funded by aid and donor agencies for a long time. In order to foster a 
commercial, competitive deployment of renewables, there are a variety of policies 
which could be implemented to address the market failures. In particular, policies may 
target high transaction costs, which constitute one of the most substantial market 
failures for renewable energy in Pacific Islands. The traditional technology choice for 
electricity supply is unlikely to change if it remains expensive to implement a new 
technology— even if the capital cost of the renewable technology is the same as that 
of the traditional technology. On the other hand, some of the market failures listed 
above may not necessarily need to be addressed. For example, knowledge 
externalities are not particularly relevant to Pacific Islands: it can be assumed that 
most Pacific Island Countries would have insufficient resources to develop and export 
a technology of their own. In addition, the market failure caused by adoption 
externalities may be addressed by decreasing the transaction costs to renewable 
energy projects. The following section provides a description of the different policy 
instruments available, as well as an evaluation of these policies for addressing the 
market failures in the Pacific Islands context.  
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2)  Policies and Instruments to Facilitate Renewable Energy Development 
 
Since the late 90s a range of policies aimed at accelerating the development of 
renewables have been introduced worldwide, notably in Europe and the United States. 
These policies were motivated by a number of factors and could almost be qualified 
as multipurpose policies, aiming not only at reducing carbon emissions to meet Kyoto 
Protocol targets, but also at developing the renewable energy industry with the 
prospects of subsequently exporting high quality renewable energy technologies to the 
world by being first-movers in the production of such technologies. This increasing 
support also comes from an acknowledgement both of the benefits brought by the use 
of renewables, and of the existence of market failures which impede renewable 
energy development. Pacific Islands Countries could potentially benefit greatly from 
an increased use of renewables, enabling them to pursue sustainable socio-economic 
development and to reduce reliance on expensive fossil fuel imports. Furthermore, 
while the prospects for Pacific Island Countries to develop a technology of their own 
are still low, Pacific Island Countries could benefit economically by developing local 
industries around the installation and servicing of renewables (including assembling 
and maintaining imported technologies).  
 
The variety of instruments which provide incentives for the development of 
renewable energy technologies have been evaluated in numerous studies (Sawin, 2004; 
Butler and Neuhoff, 2004…). Beck and Martinot (2004) classify such policies into 
four main categories: mandated market policies (price-setting and quantity-forcing 
policies), cost reduction policies (or financial incentives), public investment and 
market facilitation activities, and power grid access policies.  
 
a). Mandated market policies: a renewed debate on prices vs. quantities 
 
Price and quantity instruments have long been the subject of debates on 
environmental policy. While Coase (1960, p.44) argued that “the right to do 
something which has a harmful effect is also a factor of production” and that taxing 
pollution leads to inefficiency when polluting agents can bargain with “harmed” 
agents, the issue of global warming has become significant enough to lead to the 
general consent that pollution ought to be dealt with by penalizing polluting agents (in 
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line with the OECD’s adoption of the polluter-pays principle in 1972). The debate on 
prices and quantities was traditionally focused on how to regulate environmental 
externalities such as pollution (using either a pollution quota or a pollution tax). While 
such instruments are still in use (carbon tax and carbon credits), the discussion seems 
to have recently drifted to a new set of instruments which aim at promoting renewable 
energy technologies.  
 
i) Price-setting policies: feed-in laws  
 
Price-setting policies establish stable, favourable pricing regimes for renewables 
(Beck and Martinot, 2004) and are often coupled with regulations which ease the 
connection of independent producers to electricity grids (Wiser et al., 2002). Under a 
price setting policy, electric utilities are obliged to purchase electricity produced from 
renewable energy resources at a guaranteed, predetermined price for a specific 
amount of time (typically between 15 and 20 years). The price is typically set higher 
than the market price, acting as a subsidy towards renewable energy producers, and is 
adjusted regularly in order to account for changes in the technologies costs and 
efficiency. It has been noted that the countries which have experienced the greatest 
deployment of renewables and created the strongest domestic industries are those 
which have enacted feed-in laws (International Conference for Renewable Energy, 
2004, p.14; World Bank Renewable Energy Toolkit, 2006). 
 
A number of pricing policies used to offer a price expressed as a fixed percentage of 
the retail electric price  (e.g. 85  percent of the retail rate in Denmark, 90  percent in 
Germany51), but these policies were revised in the late 1990s and today most pricing 
laws provide a fixed payment for renewable electricity (Sawin, 2004; World Bank 
Renewable Energy Toolkit, 2006). The feed-in tariff may vary according to the 
technology used and/or location of the plant. Differentiating prices according to each 
type of technology allows for the deployment of different technologies which are at a 
different development stages (e.g. wind, solar, wave, tidal).  Offering higher payments 
for projects located on sites which comprise lower renewable resources constitutes a 
way of dealing with competition for project sites. By providing a compensation for 
                                                 
51 Wiser et al. (2002). p.3.  
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lower production, the German feed-in tariff has led to a more “uniform” development 
of wind projects with respect to location. In addition, this type of scheme prevents the 
creation of scarcity rents by land owners or project developers associated with high 
wind sites (Butler and Neuhoff, 2004).   
 
As argued by Menanteau et al. (2003), the feed-in tariff system works similarly to a 
pollution tax for polluting firms. In the case of a feed-in tariff, the price for renewable 
energy is fixed and the quantity of renewable energy produced depends on the 
marginal cost curve of the producers, which is typically unknown. The total amount 
of subsidy (if any) given to renewable energy producers is thus initially unknown. Just 
as the main criticism of a pollution tax relates to an uncertain amount of pollution 
reduction, feed-in tariffs are often criticised for creating large and uncertain 
government expenditures52. In addition, because the quantity of renewable electricity 
supplied is initially unknown, a feed-in tariff policy which induces more renewable 
energy supply than expected can result in “excess” intermittency. Unpredicted excess 
intermittency could lead to a decrease in reliability of electricity supply, depending on 
the type of renewables used and the size of the system and existing “firm” supply—
given the size of electric systems and the importance of reliability in most Pacific 
Islands, this could become a significant issue in these countries. While striving to 
increase the amount of renewables, such countries may not be able or willing to 
accommodate a large amount of renewables at first. Hence, if implemented in Pacific 
Islands, pricing policies should include requirements with respect to renewable energy 
backup and intermittency. Alternatively, a pricing policy may be combined with a 
Renewable Portfolio Standard or a maximum target share of renewable energy in 
electricity supply.    
 
A feed-in tariff is generally funded either by levying an additional charge per kWh on 
all electricity customers (such as in Spain, Italy, and the USA), or by a combination of 
additional charges for all customers and reimbursement of a carbon tax - such as in 
Denmark (World Bank Renewable Energy Toolkit, 2006). Until 2000, the German 
feed-in law required the customers of only some utilities to purchase green electricity, 
                                                 
52 Butler and Neuhoff (2004), p.9; Wohlgemuth and Madlener (2000) p.2 (“potentially exponential 
public expenditure”); Menanteau et al. (2003) p.804.  
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however this mechanism was modified as it was considered inequitable, ‘placing a 
disproportionate burden on utility customers in regions where wind power 
development was heaviest’(Beck and Martinot, 2004, p.8).  
 
The first feed-in tariff measure, the Public Utilities Regulatory Act (PURPA), was 
enacted in the United States in 1978. PURPA requires utilities to purchase electricity 
from qualifying facilities, including renewable energy plants, at avoided costs of 
production (see the Hawaii case study in chapter 4). Since then, feed-in laws have 
been implemented in a large number of European countries as well as South Korea, 
Israel, Brazil, and China53. Pricing policies may also be implemented with mandated 
targets for renewable energy (as in China, Brazil and the United States), which creates 
more certainty with regards to the quantity of renewable energy produced.  
 
By providing guaranteed, profitable prices and long-term grid access to renewable 
energy producers, feed-in laws can lead to a significant reduction in uncertainty and 
risk and thus create a stable environment for investment in renewables (Goldstein et al 
1999). Nevertheless, it is important to remember that such policies have not always 
been successful. The success of a pricing policy depends on a number of critical 
factors, such as the level of the feed-in tariff, its duration, charges for access to the 
electric grid, and permitting process. Goldstein et al. (1999) consider that feed-in laws 
have been less effective in countries which chose lower tariffs (e.g. $US 0.032/kWh 
in Sweden, compared to $US 0.07/kWh in Portugal). Prices must be sufficiently high 
to stimulate the development of renewables, and they should be guaranteed for long 
enough to provide investors with an acceptable return on investment (Goldstein et al., 
1999, p.7). Ideally, a pricing policy should have a simple design that allows for low 
administrative costs, and be flexible in order to adjust for the evolvement of cost 
efficiency. Enacting other policies such as financial incentive policies, as well as 
standardizing interconnection requirements, would also improve the effectiveness of a 
pricing policy.  
 
Criticisms of feed-in tariffs mostly relate to excess profits and cost reduction. It has 
been argued that such policies do not encourage renewable energy cost reduction 
                                                 
53 IEA Global Renewable Energy Policies and Measures Database, 
www.iea.org/textbase/pmsdb/grresult.aspx?mode=gr  
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(Sawin, 2004, p.12). While feed-in tariffs do not directly create price competition 
among renewable energy project developers, firms still have an incentive to lower 
their costs in order to benefit more from the subsidy. Another argument against feed-
in tariffs is that “setting the price too high may result in excess profits to renewable 
energy producers at the expense of electricity consumers” (Van der Linden, 2005). 
This possibility arises from the lack of information on the costs of production of the 
technologies, which also leads to uncertainty with respect to the amount of 
renewables which will be deployed. It may be possible to restrain excessive profits by 
implementing a feed-in tariff which decreases over time according to technological 
advances or market changes.  
 
ii) Quantity-based policies 
 
Tendering Policies 
Under a tendering policy, the government schedules several competitive bidding 
rounds to achieve a renewable energy generation or capacity target. The government 
may also specify a maximum price per kWh for the bids. The bidding process 
typically involves price-based competition among renewable energy project 
developers over long-term contracts in the form of power purchase agreements with 
electric utilities and/or access to government financial support (Van der Linden, 2005). 
Successful bidders may be guaranteed their bid price for the period of the contract. 
Tendering policies are sometimes argued to be more compatible with open electricity 
markets (World Bank Renewable Energy Toolkit, 2006). In some countries, 
competitive bidding has also been used to implement concession programs (China, 
Norway). Note that there may be different tenders for different technologies, so that 
companies within a given technology band compete with each other.  
 
While feed-in laws involve setting a price for renewables, tendering policies involve 
the specification of a desired quantity of renewables. Unlike a feed-in tariff, not all 
renewable energy companies can benefit from a tendering policy. Only those who 
submit proposals at the lowest price are selected for a guaranteed purchase. This 
process thus aims at fostering competition by giving incentives for renewable project 
developers to reduce their price. Unfortunately, such policies have not always worked 
as expected.  
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Tendering policies have been used in the UK, Ireland (AER program), France (EOLE 
program), China, Norway and the United States. The most cited example is that of the 
UK’s Non-Fossil-Fuel Obligation (NFFO) policy, which was implemented from 1990 
to 1997. The NFFO involved four bidding rounds, with an overall capacity target of 
1500 MW for renewables. It required lower prices at each round. The government 
placed a national levy on fossil fuels to pay for any difference between the market 
price and the successful bid, on the assumption that bids reflected incremental cost. 
Although the NFFO led to a rapid decrease in prices of renewable electricity, notably 
for onshore wind energy, this program has been criticized for encouraging renewable 
project developers to bid below cost in order to capture contracts (World Bank 
Renewable Energy Toolkit, 2006). This distorted incentive resulted in a number of 
projects which were never carried out due to the inability of successful bidders to 
meet the terms of their contract. The World Bank reports that only 25 percent of the 
capacity of awarded contracts has been installed. The NFFO scheme was finally 
replaced by a Renewables Obligation system. The three rounds of bidding for the 
Chinese Wind Concession program have had similar results: although eight 
developers have been selected since 2002, no project has been developed yet (World 
Bank Renewable Energy Toolkit, 2006). Similar policies in Ireland and California, 
however, were more successful and resulted in significant price decreases as stringent 
criteria for pre-qualifying bidders was applied, setting competition between bidders of 
similar quality levels (World Bank Renewable Energy Toolkit, 2006).  
 
While quantity-setting policies have not always led to satisfying results after awarding 
contracts, these policies could be complemented by additional mechanisms or 
incentives in order to ensure credible enforcement and performance post-tender. For 
example, the California Renewable Energy Incentive Program successfully set 
incentives for early project implementation and penalties for project delays (projects 
that come on line before their target date are eligible for up to a ten percent bonus on 
top of original incentive bid, and project delays can result in a ten percent reduction in 
the bidder’s incentive payment, or a fifty percent reduction if the project is delayed by 
a year after the target date, and no payment beyond a year)54.  
                                                 
54 World Bank Renewable Energy Toolkit, 2006.  
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Renewable Portfolio Standards and Tradable Certificates  
A renewable portfolio standard establishes a target quantity of renewable energy to be 
integrated into the energy mix by a specific date (Wiser et al, 2002). The target 
quantity, typically increasing over time, may be expressed in terms of output (as a 
minimum percentage of the total generation, or a fixed MWh requirement) or installed 
capacity (fixed MW requirement). It has been argued that energy-based requirements 
are preferable to capacity-based requirements as the latter entail a number of 
challenges with regards to performance incentives, allocation and calculating the 
value of renewable energy (Centre for Resource Solutions, 2001; Wiser et al., 2002). 
For example, under a capacity-based requirement, utilities may install renewable 
capacity, but they have less incentive to use this capacity or maintain it properly  than 
would be the case under an energy-based requirement. To avoid this problem, 
capacity-based renewable portfolio standards can be complemented by a set of 
established technical performance standards. Alternatively, the capacity goal may be 
translated into an energy-based requirement, as in Texas (Center for Resource 
Solutions, 2001, p.3-4).  
 
Market share mandates typically do not provide any specification with regards to the 
price of renewables introduced; however there must be penalties for utilities which do 
not comply with the standards. The additional costs of payments to renewable energy 
producers are generally covered by charging higher rates to all consumers as with 
feed-in laws (World Bank Renewable Energy Toolkit, 2006). 
 
Renewable energy obligations can easily be implemented along with other policies 
such as tendering policies (as in the UK with the NFFO) and feed-in tariffs (as in 
Hawaii with PURPA). A number of countries have also used obligation systems in 
combination with Tradable Renewable Energy Certificates, or Green Certificates (the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, United Kingdom, and Australia). This sort of 
scheme involves the creation of a “paper” market for renewables that is independent 
of electricity sales (Beck and Martinot, 2004), where renewable energy producers 
obtain green certificates or renewable energy credits (RECs) for the electricity they 
generate. Renewable energy producers can thus sell these certificates on the green 
certificates market, in addition to selling their electricity to utilities at the market price 
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(Menanteau et al., 2003). Tradable certificates serve both as a subsidy for renewable 
electricity producers and a means for checking whether the targets have been met by 
each participant. The certificates can be bought by utilities which are unable to meet 
their renewable energy obligations. Given that operators have different costs and 
opportunities for developing renewable energy, a tradable certificate scheme 
constitutes a flexible instrument for allocating renewable quotas efficiently and/or 
implementing quantitative aggregate emission limits (Menanteau et al, 2003; Bertram 
and Pauls, 2000; Van der Linden et al., 2005). Tradeable certificates represent an 
efficient way of creating a market for pollution and at the same time for renewable 
energy, by internalising the pollution externality which constitutes a market failure 
impeding the development of renewables. Importantly, this type of scheme also 
creates competition among renewable energy generators and project developers, 
providing incentives for cost reduction and increased efficiency of renewable energy 
technologies. In addition, by operating ex post and not ex ante, such schemes do not 
lead to the creation of perverse incentives such as understating costs and slow project 
completion, which have been major issues with tendering policies (Bertram and Pauls, 
2000).  
 
iii) Discussion 
 
It has been widely recognised that policy instruments for renewable energy should 
above all create long-term, stable and consistent market environments in order to 
increase certainty for investors and project developers. Overall, there seems to be 
general consensus in the existing literature that feed-in systems are more effective 
than quantity-based instruments at promoting renewable energy by creating 
predictable and consistent markets (Sawin, 2004; German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, 2004; World Bank Renewable Energy 
Toolkit, 2006). Feed-in laws have generally been very successful in terms of 
renewable energy deployment, while a number of tendering policies have failed to 
meet their target renewable capacity. Tendering policies are known to be less 
expensive than price-setting policies, leading to a rapid decrease in price. However, 
Butler and Neuhoff (2004) compared the German feed-in tariff and UK’s NFFO and 
ROC programs for onshore wind energy projects and found that when the difference 
in wind resource between the two countries is accounted for, the difference in price 
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for wind energy projects in the two countries is much smaller than generally 
suggested (Butler and Neuhoff, 2004, p. 31). In addition, although tendering policies 
are meant to stimulate strong competition, Butler and Neuhoff found that the German 
feed-in tariff resulted in stronger competition among wind turbine producers and 
constructors, leading to significant developments in the industry. They also note that it 
is easier to differentiate prices according to the resources under a feed-in tariff, which 
prevents owner of projects in high wind sites from capturing large scarcity rents. 
Feed-in tariffs allow for more flexibility to account for different sites and resources, 
and for different development stages of renewable energy technologies, assuring more 
diversity.  
 
By promoting least-cost projects, tendering policies may not provide sufficient 
investment to take new, more expensive technologies down the learning curve. 
Indeed, new renewable energy technologies will require a minimum of support before 
attaining a minimum cost of production: due to learning-by-doing and learning-by 
using effects, the costs of renewable electricity supply will considerably decrease as 
the industry grows (through adoption externalities, improved efficiency, finding the 
minimum efficient scale of the technologies). Additionally, given the use of 
competitive bidding, tendering policies base technology choice solely on a price 
criterion, which may not be appropriate in all cases. Some technologies may be 
designed more appropriately for certain environments, or for a certain amount of 
electricity demand. For example, for a solar photovoltaic system to function properly, 
the overall capability of the system should match the electrical needs of the users, as 
installing undersized panels can create problems (World Bank, 1992). Installing 
undersized panels has been recognised as one of the factors for unsuccessful solar 
energy programs in the Pacific Islands in the past (World Bank, 1994, Liebenthal et 
al., 1994). When installing a solar panel in a remote place such as an outer island in 
the Pacific where there is a low population density and low skill levels, it is important 
to choose high quality, low-maintenance systems in order to have the systems 
working for as long as possible, and to reduce the costs related to repair and 
maintenance. Selection of least-cost technology without allowance for quality 
differences may not lead to the most appropriate choices; the environmental, 
economical, and social characteristics of the countries should be accounted for, as 
well as the context in which the technologies are implemented.  
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Tradable certificates have been criticised for the limited support they provide to less 
mature renewable energy technologies (Espey, 2001; Carbon Trust, 2006). For 
example, the United Kingdom’s Renewables Obligation has lead to little development 
in offshore wind energy (Carbon Trust, 2006). It has also been argued that both types 
of quantity-based policies create instability and involve high administrative costs. 
With tendering policies, bidding rounds create a “stop and go” situation, altering 
periods of activity with periods of inactivity, which leads to instability (Butler and 
Neuhoff, 2004). Price volatility of tradable certificates can lead to significant 
uncertainty and have negative impacts on the behaviour of investors (Carbon Trust; 
Menanteau et al., 2003; Van der Linden, 2005). Quantity-based policies have been 
found to generate more risky, less rewarding environments for renewable energy 
developers (Espey, 2001; Sawin, 2004).                         
 
On the basis of the above arguments, a price-setting policy is likely to be more 
appropriate for the development of renewable energy technologies in Pacific Islands. 
Pricing laws tend to favour smaller companies (Sawin, 2004 p.4), whereas small 
developers have more difficulty financing their projects under tradable certificate 
systems and tendering policies (Sawin, 2004; Van der Linden, 2005). Wiser et al 
(2002) argue that tendering policies are unlikely to result in price decreases if 
implemented in a country which has not developed its own independent power 
producer industry. The success of tendering policies is likely to depend on the size of 
the market—enforcing a tendering policy in small Pacific Islands could result in a 
handful of companies developing the projects, leading to strong market power and 
little diversity. In order to ensure more competition in small markets, it might be 
sensible to enforce tenders in which all renewable energy technologies compete with 
each other. However, if this type of tender were implemented and involved a small 
quantity of supply, it would be likely to rule out large-scale technologies such as wave 
farms. For example, a Pelamis wave farm may not be modular enough to participate 
in a tender for 400 kW. Even if each Pelamis device was rated at 400 kW, this 
technology may still be ruled out because the installation of one single device would 
entail high costs compared to the installation of a farm of 10 Pelamis devices (the 
installation of such technology involves significant economies of scale).  
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Implementation of a tradable certificates system in a country where there is a high 
degree of market concentration can result in the formation of cartels and abuse of 
market power. At the other end of the spectrum, a large number of small market 
participants can result in large administration and transaction costs (Espey, 2001, 
p.561). A tradable certificates scheme constitutes a very suitable approach for large 
countries which intend to fulfil multiple goals (reduction of carbon emissions, 
development of a domestic renewable energy industry) such as Australia and 
European countries. However, implementing a tradable certificates market in a 
country which operates only one utility would be effectively the same as 
implementing a feed-in tariff, but with higher administration costs, higher uncertainty, 
and less flexibility. Feed-in tariffs involve lower administration and transaction costs 
than tendering policies and tradable certificates, which are important characteristics in 
countries such as Pacific Islands, where policy and administration resources can be 
scarce, and where transaction costs are already a major barrier to renewable energy 
development.  
 
Furthermore, feed-in tariffs provide enough flexibility to encourage the development 
of a range of different technologies which may be at different development stages, 
which would be useful as Pacific Island Countries benefit from a variety of renewable 
energy resources. In addition, the ability to differentiate prices according to the site or 
resource availability would make the implementation of renewable energy projects 
easier in such countries, particularly in places where native people own the land and 
may refuse the development of such projects. 
 
Hence, a feed-in tariff is likely to be the most suitable policy for Pacific Islands. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that whatever instrument is chosen, it should 
be complemented with other policies or incentives, such as financial incentives and 
public investment, in order to target market failures such as knowledge externalities 
and asymmetric information. The following sections provide a description of financial 
incentives and public investment possibilities. 
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b). Cost-reduction policies: financial incentives 
 
Financial incentives help to reduce the initial capital costs of renewable technologies, 
and to address the issues related to high perceived risks of investing in renewables. 
Furthermore, providing incentives for increasing investment in renewable energy 
technologies is likely to help overcome issues such as adoption externalities and 
asymmetric information. There exist various types of financial incentives for 
accelerating renewable energy development. Although such incentives cannot be 
considered as substitutes for mandated market policies, they constitute flexible 
complements to these policies and can easily be targeted to specific technologies and 
groups of investors (Clement et al., 2005), and increase predictability and stability for 
investors and financing institutions. Financial incentives can apply to both investors 
and customers and may also be used to promote local manufacturing of renewable 
energy technologies (Clement et al., 2005; Wiser and Lewis, 2005). Similarly to 
mandated market policies, financial incentives may be gradually phased out as the 
renewable energy industry matures.  
 
Tax incentives offer a reduction in the amount of taxes owed by a renewable energy 
company, investor, or consumer (Clement et al., 2005). An advantage of such 
incentives is that an institution administering taxes already exists in every country, 
making the organisation and administration of a tax incentive program relatively 
simple (Gutermuth, 1998, Gouchoe et al., 2002). There are various types of tax 
incentives: investment tax incentives (for investment in renewable energy projects), 
production tax incentives (for renewable energy production), property tax reduction to 
the owner of the land where renewable energy projects are installed, reduced income 
tax, reduction in value-added tax, and excise tax reductions (for the purchase of 
renewable energy equipment). Production tax incentives are generally preferred to 
investment tax incentives as they encourage performance, efficient use and good 
maintenance of renewable energy technologies rather than large amounts of 
investment in these technologies (Sawin, 2004). Other tax incentives include tax 
holidays, accelerated depreciation, and tax credits on research and development, 
demonstration or manufacturing (Clement et al., 2005). On the other hand, a 
government may also decide to implement taxes on conventional fuels, or carbon 
taxes. The most important is to create a stable market for renewable energy investors 
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and to target aspects or needs which are not covered by mainstream renewable energy 
policies such as renewable portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs. Tax incentives, 
however, can only be useful if investors or customers owe sufficient tax to the 
government. Consequently, they cannot provide benefits to some organizations such 
as government agencies and schools (Gutermuth, 1998; Gouchoe et al., 2002).  
 
Other financial incentives include long-term and low-interest loans, import duty 
reduction and favourable custom duties for renewable energy technologies. As noted 
by Lewis and Wiser (2005), import duty reductions and favourable custom duties may 
be applied to components of the technologies, in order to create favourable conditions 
for domestic manufacturing and assembling of renewable energy technologies.  
 
c). Public investment and market facilitation activities  
 
Market facilitation activities include support to market institutions and participants, 
and rules to encourage renewable energy technology deployment (Beck and Martinot, 
2004. p.13). Similarly to financial incentives, these types of policies are unlikely to be 
sufficient to foster large-scale renewable energy development on their own; however 
their implementation are likely to be crucial for the success of any market-based 
policy in Pacific Islands. There exist various policies that help overcome market 
failures and barriers such as high transaction costs and high perceived risk, including 
design standards, accelerated siting and permiting, education and information.  
 
Firstly, governments can encourage the use of renewable energy by purchasing and 
using renewables in public places and buildings. Public investment in renewables 
would both increase public awareness and reduce uncertainty with regards to the 
technologies (Sawin, 2004; Beck and Martinot, 2004). Direct participation in 
renewable energy projects may also help government officials to identify some 
market distortion or barriers and accordingly encourage the development relevant 
market facilitation policies.  
 
Industry standards, such as equipment certification and design standards, as well as 
contractor certifications, ensure a uniform quality of equipment and installations 
(Beck and Martinot, 2004), hence providing information on the quality of 
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technologies for potential customers and buyers. Ideally, such standards may be 
adjusted to the geographical and environmental conditions of a given country. On the 
other hand, providing resource assessments, siting requirements and restrictions, and 
permitting standards can significantly lower transaction costs for renewable energy 
suppliers.  
 
Additionally, the implementation of market-based policies in Pacific Islands would 
require setting consistent grid-connection and transmission standards, in order to 
facilitate the connection of independent power producers to the electric grids which 
are typically owned by a single electric utility. The goal is to create a stable and 
transparent framework for independent power producers, which is critical to 
renewable energy development in the context of market-based policies. 
 
Another important type of public investment involves providing information to the 
general public on the benefits and characteristics of renewable energy technologies, 
resource availability, and the programs and policies implemented to support 
renewable energy (Sawin, 2004). Providing consumer education would enable 
consumers and investors to make informed decisions, while ensuring that all agents 
are aware of the incentives in place.  
 
d). Power grid access policies  
 
Power grid access policies, such as interconnection requirements, standard Power 
Purchase Agreements, Wheeling, and Net Metering, provide a framework for 
renewable energy independent producers to access power grids and transmission 
systems. The choice of power grid access policy may depend on the structure of the 
existing electricity market and, if implemented, the type of renewable energy 
mandated market policies in place. Power grid access policies are likely to be 
particularly important in countries where electricity is generated, transmitted and 
distributed by a single, vertically-integrated utility, as vertically-integrated monopoly 
utilities may be able to deter competition by restricting transmission access to 
independent renewable energy producers, or by charging high prices for transmission 
access.  
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Standard Power Purchase Agreements are contracts which define the legal terms and 
conditions for the sale of power, the roles and responsibilities of the parties to the 
Power Purchase Agreement, interconnection and transmission provisions, tariff and 
price adjustments, operating requirements and restrictions, and dispute resolution 
mechanisms (World Bank Renewable Energy Toolkit, 2006). Such agreements 
typically accompany mandated market policies such as feed-in tariffs.  
 
Interconnection requirements allow independent renewable energy producers to 
connect to power grids, and specify the conditions with which interconnection can 
occur (e.g. determine access charges and technical requirements). Interconnection 
regulation may be determined on its own, or as part of a Standard Power Purchase 
Agreement. Regardless of the policies implemented for renewable energy 
development, interconnection regulation is particularly important for renewable 
energy producers, since some renewable energy resources may be located far from the 
population centres (Beck and Martinot, 2004).  
 
Alternatively, access to the transmission system may be opened by allowing power 
wheeling. Wheeling can be defined as the transmission of electricity by an entity that 
does not own or use the power it is transmitting (www.srpnet.com/competition/terms). 
Power wheeling would thus enable renewable energy producers to sell electricity 
directly to customers, without necessarily signing an agreement with the electric 
utilities. As noted by Schweppe, “wheeling is a mongrel concept resulting from 
mating two inherently different economic concepts: an ideal world of regulated 
utilities, and an ideal deregulated competitive market place. Wheeling would not exist 
at either extreme.” (Schweppe, 1988).  
 
Finally, net-metering policies allow electric utility customers to offset their purchase 
of electricity from the utility with excess electricity produced by their renewable 
system at a specified rate (see chapter four). Net-metering constitutes a type of feed-in 
tariff or power purchase agreement for small-scale renewable energy (often small 
wind turbines or solar panels). When a customer provides excess power with his own 
small-scale plant, this power is fed back into the grid, and the customer gets credit on 
his electricity bill. Essentially, excess power is thus “stored” on the grid until needed 
(Martinot et al., 2005).  
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3) Discussion 
 
Renewable energy technologies are facing significant market barriers and 
failures in Pacific Island Countries: insufficient information, unpriced environmental 
and adoption externalities creating incentive problems, high transaction costs, 
subsidies for fuel-based technologies, and thin electricity markets which are typically 
served by vertically integrated monopolies. The existence of such market failures 
provides an explanation to the lack of commercial, grid-connected production of 
renewable energy in Pacific Islands: there are incomplete or missing markets for 
renewable energy in Pacific Islands. Despite large endowments in renewable 
resources, a particularly high cost of running conventional plants, and little possibility 
to use nuclear energy, most renewable energy projects in the Pacific Islands consist of 
rural, small-scale projects which have been undertaken by governments, donors, 
international and regional organisations (apart from hydroelectricity plants). The 
existing market failures can be addressed by various government interventions in 
order to create favourable market conditions for the development of commercial 
renewable energy projects.  
 
A large number of countries have already enacted policies to correct for existing 
market failures and accelerate renewable energy development. Although most of these 
policies have only been implemented in the last decade, there is already much to learn 
from the diversity of available instruments, whether they are market-based policies, 
financial incentives, or public investments. According to the majority of the literature 
on renewable energy policies, the creation of consistent, stable and reliable market 
conditions is crucial to renewable energy development and cost reduction (Sawin, 
2004; World Bank Renewable Energy Toolkit, 2006, Martinot et al., 2005). Such 
market conditions can be created by enacting long-term, credible, consistent and 
transparent policies, in order to increase certainty, particularly for investors (Sawin, 
2004). Furthermore, such policies should be flexible enough to account for market 
changes such as cost reductions in the technologies.  
 
The characteristics of Pacific Island Countries (small scale, dispersed, thin markets) 
require policies which create conditions that enable a variety of small and medium-
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scaled renewable energy independent producers to connect to the electrical grids. As 
discussed previously, feed-in tariffs seem to be more suited to such characteristics 
than tendering policies and renewable trading certificates. To date, most feed-in tariff 
policies have shown to be effective at developing renewable energy markets for 
different types of technologies and allowing the entry of small and medium scale 
independent power producers. Nevertheless, given the monopolistic nature of Pacific 
Islands’ electricity markets, the implementation of feed-in tariffs would require 
extensive work and consideration for the creation of a stable and transparent 
framework for independent power producers (including the removal of subsidies for 
electricity generating petroleum products, standards and power purchasing 
agreements, and possibly open access to transmission systems, or wheeling). 
Furthermore, any attempt to accelerate renewable energy development would require 
the implementation of activities that address the high transaction costs of renewable 
energy projects, which constitute a major market failure in Pacific Islands. 
Additionally, there remains an unconditional need for education and public 
information on renewable energy in the Pacific Islands, particularly in outer islands 
and rural areas, which has already been undertaken by regional institutions such as the 
Pacific Islands Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC) and the Pacific Regional 
Environment Programme (SPREP). On a different note, Sawin (2004) has highlighted 
the importance of stakeholder involvement and public participation in the decision-
making process for project development and viability, particularly in developing 
countries. This is likely to be the case for projects in outer islands and rural areas, 
where a number of solar electrification projects have failed due to little information 
and education, and consequent poor maintenance.  
 
Eventually, the implementation of such programs and policies may lead to 
competitive markets for renewable energy production: in addition to learning by 
doing effects, transaction costs will be driven down as the number of renewable 
energy independent power producers increases and as the domestic industries become 
experienced (“there is a national learning curve for each individual country as the 
domestic industry matures, eventually manufacturing, installing and maintaining 
renewable energy systems using local equipment and labour” Sawin, 2004). In other 
words, once market failures and externalities have been corrected for, and once the 
appropriate market conditions have been reconstituted, the renewable energy industry 
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is likely to grow, and the costs are likely to decrease significantly, so that the policies 
and incentives implemented can gradually be phased out, and eventually be removed.  
 
Aside from green certificates and the removal of subsidies for fuel-based technologies, 
in the previous sections there has been no mention of any policy which purposely 
target the market failure related to environmental externality. Feed-in tariffs provide 
subsidies to renewable energy technologies in order to address the “learning by 
doing” externalities. Renewable Portfolio Standards may be considered as a means of 
reducing emissions from electricity generation, yet these policies do not provide direct 
subsidies or targets for a reduction in the level of emissions. The relevance of policies 
targeting pollution and environmental externalities to Pacific Island Countries is 
questionable: Pacific Islands are small countries which emit small levels of pollution. 
In addition, while some Pacific Island Countries have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, 
they do not have any obligation to reduce their emission levels. Nevertheless, 
environmental externalities are becoming more and more important at the global level. 
The establishment of cap-and-trade systems, such as the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme, has shown that countries which have obligations of emission 
reductions are willing to pay to ‘trade’ carbon emissions. This type of trading scheme 
could provide a potentially significant source of subsidies to Pacific Islands, given 
their large endowments in renewable energy resources. This can be demonstrated 
using a quick “back of the envelope” calculation with the installation of a wave 
energy device in a country trading CO2. The installation of a 750kW Pelamis, which 
has a capacity factor of 35 percent, would provide 2,299,500 kWh of “carbon-free” 
electricity per year. Assuming a price of $US13 per ton of CO2 and assuming that a 
fossil fuel technology produces 625 tons of CO2 per year, the installation of a Pelamis 
would save 1,437 tons of CO2 and provide a total subsidy of $US18,683 per year. 
Hence, it is possible that participating in carbon trading schemes can address 
environmental externalities and encourage both local and foreign investment in 
commercial renewable energy projects in Pacific Island Countries.  
 149
Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
 
There is a large potential for electricity production using a variety of renewable 
energy sources in Pacific Islands. However, renewable resources remain largely 
untapped in these countries. Policies aimed at increasing the share of renewable 
energy will need to be tailored to account for the characteristics of these countries and 
their electricity markets. In particular, electricity production in Pacific Island is often 
ensured by a small number of companies which have significant market power. In 
some countries, such as New Caledonia, these electricity companies have historically 
dominated not only electricity markets, but also most decisions with regards to energy 
policy, until recently. This implies that institutional and political changes may need to 
be implemented in order to open Pacific Islands’ electricity markets to independent 
power producers.  
 
The technical feasibility for increasing the share of renewables is a particularly 
important matter in Pacific Islands. Pacific Islands are isolated countries and cannot 
be interconnected to larger, continental electric systems, which means that reliability 
of supply can be critical, particularly in the main islands with industrial or commercial 
activities. The mathematical model developed in Chapter 4 accounts for this 
significant aspect by including a measure for backing up renewable energy production 
using non-renewable capacity. One of the main conclusions of this analysis, however, 
is that the amount of backup capacity for renewable energy could be optimally 
minimized by diversifying the mix of renewable energy resources in each island. This 
would require studying the complementarities and loading curves of the various 
renewable resources available, and comparing their total potential production, and the 
variability of this production, to electricity demand. Looking at the seasonability, 
variability and complementarities of available renewable resources would allow 
planners to model the inclusion of a maximum amount of renewable energy using a 
minimum of backup capacity to maintain system reliability. This would enable a more 
efficient implementation and formulation of policies aimed at developing renewable 
energy generation.    
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Appendix A: Electricity Generation in Pacific Island 
Countries 
 
 
Table A1: Sources of electricity generation in Pacific Island Countries 
 
Country Main sources of electricity generation 
 
American 
Samoa 
Diesel generators.  
 
Source: Pacific Power Association (2006) United States of America Insular Areas Energy 
Assessment Report 
Cook 
Islands 
Mostly diesel generators. Solar photovoltaic, solar water heating and wind 
energy are also used. A wind generator was installed in Mangaia in 2003 and 
consists of two 20 kW turbines. In early 2004, 10.9% of homes were using 
biomass for cooking. 
 
Source: Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Program (2003). Pacific Regional Energy 
Assessment Vol. 2.  
Federated 
States of 
Micronesia 
Diesel generators are used by the state utilities. There is one run-of-river 
hydroelectric plant in Pohnpei; however, it was not operating in early 2004 
due to penstock problems which were costly to repair (it is unknown whether 
the plant has been repaired). In Kosrae, the construction of a 35 kW micro-
hydro plant was started and abandoned in the late 1980s (PREA). Solar water 
heating and solar photovoltaics are also used. According to the 2000 census, 
51.4% of households were using biomass for cooking in 2000. 
 
Source: Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Program (2003). Pacific Regional Energy 
Assessment Vol. 3. 
Fiji Hydroelectricity and thermal electricity are the main sources. The 
contribution of hydroelectricity to the total production of electricity has 
declined from 92% in 1995 to 55% in 2003, but several mini and micro 
hydropower projects were under consideration in 2004. In 2003, Fiji 
Electricity Authority was operating a 83.2 MW hydropower plant in Viti 
Levu, and a 0.8 MW hydropower plant in Vanua Levu. Solar photovoltaic 
and solar water heating are also used. 
In 1997, PV and wind energy were integrated with an existing diesel 
generator at Nabouwalu government station in Vanua Levu. There are eight 
6.7 kW wind turbines, 37.4 kW of PV and 200 kVA of diesel. Initially, wind 
and solar did contribute over 60% but this fell steadily to less than 15%. 
Because fees only cover 30% of operating costs, the operator has no incentive 
to maintain the wind and solar components as diesel operation is easier and 
better understood than the wind and solar components. 
 
Source: Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Program (2003). Pacific Regional Energy 
Assessment Vol. 4. 
French 
Polynesia 
Electricité De Tahiti, the main electricity provider in French Polynesia, 
reports that 2/3 of its production comes from thermal power plants with diesel 
motors, and 1/3 comes from hydropower. Another small hydropower plant is 
operated by CHPP, a private company (production of about 1 GWh per year). 
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In addition, there are 2 wind turbines of 50 kW in Rurutu, and also a hybrid 
power plant combining solar and diesel generation in Makatea, with 300 solar 
panels of 45 kWc and a production of about 50 000 kWh/year. 
Programme PHOTOM (solar photovoltaic electrification of remote  
Areas): has led to about 1200 installations and a production of about 
1GWh/year. There is also a photovoltaic installation at the University of 
Tahiti, which produces about 80000 kWh/year.  
 
Source: http://www.edt.pf/edt/web/webedt.nsf/pages/rp_tech_prot_index.html; interview at 
EDT 
Guam Thermal power plants. Some solar panels and solar thermal units, and a few 
wind generators. 
 
Source: www.guampowerauthority.com; Lienbenthal et al. (1994). Solar Energy: Lessons 
from the Pacific Island Experience; Pacific Power Association (2006) United States of 
America Insular Areas Energy Assessment Report 
Hawaii The electricity utilities of Oahu, Maui, and Big Island use oil power plants, 
there are also some combustion cycle gas turbines. On Big Island, HELCO 
(the utility) owns two small hydro plants (total of 3.35 MW) and a wind farm 
of 2.3 MW. Independent power producers run biomass, geothermal, coal 
plants, waste-to-energy systems, as well as a wind farm, and small 
hydropower plants.   
 
Source: http://www.heco.com/images/pdf/PowerFacts.pdf 
Kiribati Thermal electricity is mostly used; solar pumping and solar photovoltaic are 
also used and provide most of the electricity in outer islands. Note that 
biomass is the primary fuel for cooking on all islands except Tarawa and 
Kiritimati. Wind power has been used for water pumping but those systems 
were no longer used in 2004. 
 
Source: Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Program (2003). Pacific Regional Energy 
Assessment Vol. 5. 
Marshall 
Islands 
Diesel generators are used for the main grid power. Solar PV is also used, 
particularly in outer islands. There are biomass resources and the use of 
biomass remains important for cooking and copra drying.  
 
Source: Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Program (2003). Pacific Regional Energy 
Assessment Vol. 6.; Pacific Power Association (2006) United States of America Insular 
Areas Energy Assessment Report 
Nauru All electricity generation is by diesel. 
 
Source: Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Program (2003). Pacific Regional Energy 
Assessment Vol. 7. 
New 
Caledonia 
Electricity is produced from thermal plants, hydropower, wind energy, and 
solar photovoltaic.  
In 1997, about 76% of the total electricity production was generated from 
thermal plants, 23.5% was hydroelectric, and about 3% came from wind 
turbines. In 2004, 80% of the electricity came from thermal plants, 19% was 
hydroelectricity, and the share of total production from wind turbines 
increased to 0.7% (10 new wind turbines were installed in 2003, and 21 other 
new turbines were installed in 2004). Thermal electricity generation may 
have increased further with the construction of two new plants to satisfy the 
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needs of the growing nickel industry (Source: Bilan Energie 2003 and 2004). 
 
Source: Institut de la Statistique des Etudes Economiques de Nouvelle-Calédonie (2004) 
Bilan Energie 2004  
Niue Diesel engines generate most of the electricity; there are some solar water 
heaters and solar PV installations. 
 
Source: Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Program (2003). Pacific Regional Energy 
Assessment Vol. 8. 
Northern 
Mariana 
Islands 
There are five diesel engine electric power plants on Saipan, Tinian and Rota, 
and some small installations on some of the outer islands. 
 
Source: Pacific Power Association (2006) United States of America Insular Areas Energy 
Assessment Report 
Palau All power generation is with diesel engines. Solar water heating and solar 
photovoltaic are used in some islands. 
 
Source: Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Program (2003). Pacific Regional Energy 
Assessment Vol. 9. 
Papua 
New 
Guinea 
Hydroelectricity provides 32% of electricity generated; geothermal provides 
1% and thermal (gas and fuel oil) 67%. (Source: APEC Energy Overview 
2005). A few wind turbines were installed in farms in the Morobe Province 
after independence but it is not known whether any are still functioning. 
Commercial companies market and sell small wind generators. 
 
Source: Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Program (2003). Pacific Regional Energy 
Assessment Vol. 10. 
Samoa About half of Upolu’s electricity generation is from hydropower; the rest is 
diesel generation. The percentage provided by hydro varies depending on 
rainfall but there has been a downward trend as demand for power has 
increased whereas hydro capacity has not. 
 
Source: Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Program (2003). Pacific Regional Energy 
Assessment Vol. 11. 
Solomon 
Islands 
Mostly diesel generators; some hydro and solar energy is also used, although 
hydroelectricity only accounted for about 1% of generation in 2003. 
In 2004, Solomon Islands Electricity Authority was operating two 
government-funded small hydroelectric plants on Malaita and Santa Isabel 
islands, with a capacity of about 30kW and 150kW respectively. Three other 
hydroelectricity projects were also under consideration by the government in 
2004. Seven other small and micro hydroelectric systems have been 
developed by APACE, an Australian organization, and other systems have 
been operated by religious missions. 
 
Source: Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Program (2003). Pacific Regional Energy 
Assessment Vol. 12. 
Tokelau  Diesel generators and solar photovoltaic. Biomass is used for some cooking. 
 
Source: Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Program (2003). Pacific Regional Energy 
Assessment Vol. 13. 
Tonga Diesel generators, there are also some solar photovoltaic and solar water 
heaters installations, especially in outer islands. 
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Source: Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Program (2003). Pacific Regional Energy 
Assessment Vol. 14. 
Tuvalu Diesel generators. Except for cooking with fuel wood, very small scale 
coconut oil production (at a small Vaitupu oil expeller facility intended for 
soap production, not for energy) and attempts to provide outer island 
households with high efficiency wood stoves for cooking with biomass, solar 
photovoltaic and solar water heaters are the only renewable technologies used 
in Tuvalu. 
 
Source: Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Program (2003). Pacific Regional Energy 
Assessment Vol. 15. 
Vanuatu Diesel generators (provide more than 90% of generation), small 
hydroelectricity systems and solar installations.  
The government-owned Sarakata hydroelectric system is located at Santo. 
This two turbine 600 kW system was built by JICA and is operated by 
UNELCO, the main electricity provider. An expansion of the plant to 1200 
kW was reportedly planned but it is unknown whether it has been carried out. 
One private company in Port Vila imports Vietnamese-made pico-hydro 
systems which cater for individual households or small communities. 
 
Source: Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Program (2003). Pacific Regional Energy 
Assessment Vol. 16. 
Wallis and 
Futuna 
Little information was found on electricity generation. It is likely to come 
mostly from diesel generators, but there may be other sources of electricity 
such as solar photovoltaic. 
Source: PIREP Reports, www.heco.com.  
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Table A2: Main electricity utilities in the Pacific Islands  
 
Group of Islands 
 
Main electricity utilities 
responsible for electricity supply 
Status of the main electricity 
utility 
American 
Samoa American Samoa Power Authority Government-owned 
Cook Islands 
Te Aponga Uira O Tumu te 
Varovaro (TAU) Government-owned 
Federated States 
of Micronesia 
Chuuk Public Utilities Corporation, 
Kosrae Utility Authority,  
Pohnpei Utilities Corporation,  
Yap State Public Service 
Corporation 
State-owned 
Fiji Fiji Electricity Authority Government-owned 
French 
Polynesia Electricité de Tahiti Public service concession 
Guam Guam Power Authority 
Government-owned  
(public corporation) 
Hawaii 
Hawaiian Electric Company 
(HECO), Hawaii Electric Light 
Company (HECLO), Maui Electric 
Company (MECO), Kaua’I Island 
Utility Cooperative (KUC) 
HECO, HELCO and MECO: 
regulated monopoly.  
KUC: corporation 
Kiribati  Public Utilities Board Statutory authority 
Marshall Islands 
Majuro Electric Company,  
Kwajalein Atoll Joint Utility 
Resources Government-owned 
Nauru Nauru Phosphate Corporation Government-owned 
New Caledonia 
Electricité et Eau de Calédonie,  
Enercal Public Service Concession 
Niue Niue Power Corporation  Government-owned 
Northern 
Mariana Islands 
Commonwealth Utilities 
Corporation Government-owned 
Palau Palau Public Utilities Commission Government-owned 
Papua New 
Guinea PNGPower Government-owned 
Samoa Electric Power Corporation 
Government-owned (operates 
commercially) 
Solomon Islands 
Solomon Islands Electricity 
Authority 
Government-owned statutory 
body (operates commercially) 
Tokelau Individual Taupulegas 
Owned by island Taupulegas 
(Council of Elders) 
Tonga Shoreline Regulated monopoly 
Tuvalu Tuvalu Electric Corporation Government-owned 
Vanuatu  UNELCO Public service concession 
Wallis and 
Futuna 
Electricité et Eau de Wallis et 
Futuna Public Service Concession 
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Appendix B: Hawaii Case-Study 
 
Table B1: List of Interviews in Hawaii (August 2006) 
 
Date  Name Position Company / Institution Island 
Tuesday 1 August 
2006 
Neal 
Shinayaka  Manager 
Maui Electric Company 
(MECO) Maui 
Wednesday 2 August 
2006 Lee Jakeway  
Director of 
Energy 
Development 
and Planning  
Hawaiian Commercial and 
Sugar Company (HC&S), 
Independent Power Producer Maui 
Thursday 3 August 
2006 Andrea Gill 
Program 
Manager for 
Wave Power 
for the State 
Energy Office 
Department of Business and  
Economic Development 
(DBEDT) 
Big 
Island 
Friday 4 August 2006 Curtis Beck 
Manager at 
the Customer 
Services 
Department  
Hawaii Electric Light 
Company (HELCO) 
Big 
Island 
Friday 4 August 2006 John Leite 
Representative 
of the Public 
Utilities 
Commission 
on Big Island 
Public Utilities Commission 
(PUC) 
Big 
Island 
Friday 4 August 2006 
Victor 
Trevino 
Chief 
Operations 
Officer  Big Island Toyota 
Big 
Island 
Monday 7 August 
2006 Arthur Seki 
Director of 
Technology 
Hawaiian Electric Company 
(HECO) Oahu 
Monday 7 August 
2006 Maria Tome 
Alternate 
Energy 
Engineer 
Department of Business and  
Economic Development 
(DBEDT) Oahu 
Monday 7 August 
2006 Steve Alber 
Energy 
Analyst 
Department of Business and  
Economic Development 
(DBEDT) Oahu 
Tuesday 8 August 
2006 
Cynthia 
Thielen Representative   Oahu 
Tuesday 8 August 
2006 Henry Curtis 
Executive 
Director Life of the Land Oahu 
Tuesday 8 August 
2006 
Catherine 
Awakuni 
Legal Councel 
(now 
executive 
director of the 
Department of 
Commerce 
and Consumer 
Affairs) 
Public Utilities Commission 
(PUC) Oahu 
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Appendix C: Model for the Integration of Renewables 
into Pacific Islands’Electricity Systems – First Order 
Conditions 
 
 
Substituting the renewable and non-renewable production functions (6) and (11) into 
the generating portfolio (3): 
 
btbbataabtbbataantnt kzAkzAkzkzkAq ++−−= )( θθ  
 
Similarly, substituting fuel use from non-renewable electricity production and backup 
(10) into the budget constraint (2): 
 
btbatantntutt ipipipupyc −−−−=  
 
btbatantnbtbbataabtbatantutt ipipipkzkzkkkpyc −−−−+−+−−−= )))1()1((( θθθθβ
 
 
Let ntΛ , atΛ  and btΛ be the multipliers associated with capacity accumulation for 
renewable and non-renewable plants (12), (13) and (14), the Lagrangian for this 
problem is: 
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We impose non-negativity constraints on capital investment for electricity generating 
plants, and on the capacity of the plants. The first-order conditions are: 
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